1. The World Stands By, Again
Darfur
Yundi Liu and Becky Lang
The World Stands By, Again

2. Historical Background
Largest African Country
Darfur an Independent Muslim Sultanate until 1916
40 years under British Colonial Rule
Grouped with two other territories to form Sudan when British withdrew in 1956

3. Diverse Sudan North: Ethnicity Arab, Religion Muslim
South: Ethnicity African, Religion Christian
Darfur: Ethnicity African, Religion Muslim
Main three tribes:
Fur (Darfur = Land of the Fur)
Zhaghawa
Masalit
Nomadic Arabs (Sudan and Chad)

4. Lasting Conflict 1980s Oil and ethnic tension further complicate 1990s
Civil war in Chad spills over into Darfur
Beginning of a 20 year civil war between Sudan’s Muslim North (central govt in Khartoum) and Christian South (SPLA)
Oil and ethnic tension further complicate
1990s
Terrorist Connections and Osama bin Laden (1991)
Unilateral U.S. Sanctions

5. A Precedent for Darfur

6. Darfur: Conflict waiting to Erupt
Darfur’s tribal-administration conflict resolution mechanisms weakened in favor of ineffectual state institutions
“breakdown of local governance”
No trusted system of conflict resolution
Desertification increases economic competition
Tribes gather arms to protect economic intersts
Ethnic tension

7. Peace Talks as a Catalyst for Conflict
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Naivasha Agreement)
Signed 2005
Negotiated by the USA, UK and Norway
Increased USA involvement
Similarly disenfranchised Darfur demands political reform and economic assistance
Appeal to government to have their concerns addresed in the peace process
When this approach fails, feel only option left is a rebellioin that could get similar international treatment as the south

8. Darfurian Rebels Lack united political front
Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/SLA)
Abdel Wahid al Nur (Fur)
Minni Minawi (Zaghawa)
Formed February 2003
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
Lack united political front

9. Who are the Janjaweed?
Translates as “evil horseman” or “devil on horseback”
Not a self-identifying term
Government funded (proxies)
Nomads who came from Chad and West Africa 1970s, 1980s
Local, Arab camel-herders
Free to pursue own agenda in return for suppressing the rebellion

10. Civilians Targeted Bombing by Sudanese government
Attack by Sudanese armed forces
Followed by Janjaweed raids
Driven from destroyed village
Corpses in wells ensure inability to return
Approximately 200,000 dead, 2 million displaced
Still no security in camps
Vulnerable to attack and rape
Deaths from malnutrition and preventable disease

11. BCC Report

12. Khartoum’s Motivation Unclear
“Arabize” Sudan
Could not afford to placate another rebel group VS
Or some combination of the two

13. International response
For much of 2003, the international response to the Darfur crisis was limited to the delivery of humanitarian aid.
By the spring of 2004, mass atrocities and crimes against humanity were widely known to be occurring in Darfur.
The actions of the government of Sudan resembled a text book illustration of a government unwilling to live up to its responsibility to protect its citizen.

14. Response from the “Western Powers”
The UK, the USA, Canada and the EU were vocal advocates of the R2P principle.
However, this did not mean that these same countries were prepared to agree on a comprehensive strategy along the lines of the R2P framework in relation to Darfur.

15. Response from the UN
In April 2004, the UN Human Rights Commission Dispatched a fact-finding team to Darfur.
“ a disturbing pattern of disregard for basic principles of human rights and humanitarian law, which is taking place in Darfur for which the armed forces of the Sudan and the Jan-jaweed are responsible.”
Condemned by Pakistan and Sudan governments.
The draft was watered down.
The redrafted resolution neither condemned Sudan nor mentioned its crimes.

16. June 11, 2004, Resolution 1547 3 different positions
required ceasefire and peace agreement
passed unanimously
3 different positions
Pakistan, China, Russia
USA, UK, France
Philippines
Pakistan, China, Russia
USA,UK, France
Philippines

17. July 30, 2004, Resolution 1556
This resolution gave the government of Sudan 30 days to disarm the Janjaweed and punish human rights abusers, threatening economic sanctions if it failed to do so.

18. September 8,2004, Resolution 1564
US continued to push for stronger measures
the finding of genocide
the finding of Sudanese government’s breach of Resolution 1556
Resolution 1564 contained many of these measures but in a much-dinted form  the resolution failed to claim the breach of resolution 1556, impose measures on it, or even criticize the government

19. Action taken by the international community
AMIS( African Union Mission in Sudan)
UNMIS(United Nations Mission in Sudan)
UNAMID(Hybrid UN-AU Mission in Sudan)

20. AMIS Peacekeeping force operating primarily in the region of Darfur
Foundation: the Ndjamena agreement +
UNSC resolution 1564
“protection of the monitors”
Initially, an AU force of approximately 3,000 troops

21. UNMIS AMIS too weak to protect civilians (“not working”)
In the early 2005, US government
AMIS should be handed over to a UN peacekeeping force
Both the AU and UN were reluctant, Sudanese government was opposed.
 Resolution 1590, 1591, and 1593
Established by the UNSC under Resolution 1590 (as a response to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement)

22. UNMIS
to support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army on 9 January 2005
and to perform certain functions relating to humanitarian assistance, and protection and promotion of human rights.

23. UNAMID
Resolution 1706, ‘invited ‘ Sudan’s consent to a UN force rejected by president Omar al Bashir
A compromise proposal for a ‘hybrid’ AU-UN force was adopted at a high-level meeting chaired by the UN Secretary General on 16 November
8 months of wrangling, the SC finally obtained Sudan’s consent to the hybrid AU-UN force
UNAMID was duly mandated in Resolution 1769 of 31 July, 2007

24. Failures of the international community
AMIS
It was generally thought that the AMIS force was too small and poorly equipped.
the mandate of ceasefire monitoring arising from the Ndjamena agreement was insufficient
the AU had no mechanism for obtaining sufficient contributions from its member states to support AMIS

25. Failures of the international community
UNMIS & UMAMID
they demoralized the AMIS troops stationed in Darfur
any possibly of long-term planning in AMIS evaporated and morale began to decline

26. Failures of the international community
AMIS, UNMIS and UNAMID
Lack of strategic and logical operations
Until now, neither AMIS, UNMIS nor UNAMID have fulfilled their mission  neither disarmament nor the protection of civilians

27. Failures of the international community
Failed to have more robust measures on the Sudanese government
Western powers
The use of R2P framework was deadlocked
The ICC and NGOs failed to get access to Darfur promptly
The procrastination of effective sanctions
Increases Sudanese government’s confidence it can act with impunity and diminishes the international community’s leverage

28. R2P Critera Just Cause O Right Authority O/ Right Intention
Last Resort X/
Proportional Means X
Reasonable Prospects X/

29. Wheeler’s Criteria Two not included in R2P: Selectivity X
Positive Humanitarian Outcome X/

30. Current situation in Darfur
Despite the presence of the United Nations/African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur (UNAMID), civilians remain vulnerable to attacks and human rights violations.
Information about security in Darfur and the impact of violence on civilians is largely unavailable despite the large presence of UN peacekeepers and civilian staff in Darfur.

31. Current situation in Darfur
There are clear signs that the situation in Darfur is getting worse.
But the international community is failing to monitor and respond properly to what is happening in Darfur.

32. Current Situation in Darfur
With South Sudan gaining independence last year and no consensus on how to share oil profits with the north, oil production is at a standstill crippling the Northern Sudanese economy
Before this point some Darfurians were able to return to their homes
But this has caused another surge in violence in Darfur

33. Sources
Khartoum, Sudan., Jeffrey Gettleman; Isma'il Kushkush Contributed Reporting From. "Mixed Signals in Darfur as Attacks Shadow Progress." The New York Times. The New York Times, 19 Aug Web. 01 Dec