1. Capital Flows, Crises, and Growth Joseph Stiglitz, Senior Vice President and Chief Economist The World Bank December, 1998

2. Outline of the Talk Africa and the International Financial Crisis Learning from East Asia Preventing Crises: The Right and Wrong Lessons from East Asia Responding to Crises: A Systemic Approach

3. Global Growth of Capital Flows

4. Capital Flows to Sub-Saharan Africa

5. Capital Flows to Africa in the Wake of the Crisis

6. Effects of the Crisis on Africa (1) Falling commodity prices (2) Slowing foreign direct investment (due to falling commodity prices and the easing of substantial FDI from East Asia into Sub-Saharan Africa)

7. Summary: Why These Issues Matter For Africa Africa needs to adjust to declining aid flows and get more of the benefits of private capital flows But it needs to avoid the costs and crises associated with these flows Africa is affected by international economic conditions and is a participant in shaping the international economic system

8. Learning from the East Asian Miracle Dramatic economic growth and poverty reduction: –Per capita income growth of 5 percent and higher –Stable growth with few if any downturns –Indonesian poverty fell from 64 percent in 1975 to 11 percent in 1995. Many of the old lessons are unchanged: –Importance of education and technology –Benefits of foreign direct investment –Benefits of an export orientation

9. Overview: Causes of the Crisis - - Right and Wrong Lessons Coping with surges of capital flows The issue of short-term debt Did crony capitalism cause the crisis?

10. Capital Flows and Social Welfare Key mistake: governments (and international institutions) trusted the market’s decisions: Social risk  private risk –Individual borrowers impose credit risk on economy –Short-term debt may increase probability of a crisis –Private debt increases the probability of a bailout

11. Limitations of Macroeconomic Policy in Coping with Inflows It was unknown if inflows were temporary or permanent Quandaries of exchange rate management given the constraints of fixed exchange rates, open capital markets, and financial liberalization. –Not obvious how a different exchange rate could have helped –Tight monetary policy helped encourage short-term inflows –Fiscal policy was already very tight and even tighter fiscal policy conflicted with other objectives

12. Financial Restraint and Robust Economies The key problem was the externalities in the capital inflows and financial decisions. This could not be solved by macroeconomic policy alone. The solution lies not just in better Basle-style financial regulation, but more financial restraint (e.g. restrictions on lending to real estate)

13. Average Growth in Selected Countries, 1976-1993 Average Growth Initial Conditions Stock Market Liquidity Financial Depth Calculations by Ross Levine, World Bank

14. The Role of Short-term Debt 11.6

15. Why the Relationship Between Short-term Debt and Crises? Sign of bad policies? Vulnerability to a self-fulfilling collapse of confidence? Coordination mechanism for international investors?

16. 5 Economic Growth, Investment, and Capital Account Liberalization SOURCE: Dani Rodrik (1998). These are the residual growth and investment/GDP that are not explained by per-capita income, secondary education, quality of government institutions, and regional dummies for East Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, and Sub-Saharan Africa.

17. Implications of Short-term Debt It raises questions about complete capital account liberalization Policy responses: (1) Better information (2) Better financial regulation (3) Direct restraints

18. Transparency and Economic Crises: Empirical Evidence (1) There is no econometric evidence that lack of transparency increases the probability of a crisis (2) The East Asian countries (except Indonesia) were not more corrupt or less transparent than other middle-income countries (3) International transparency ratings were improving for all of the countries, including Indonesia

19. Transparency and Crises: Theoretical Perspectives When lack of transparency is common knowledge it should not affect expectations on average Theoretical models show that the relationship between transparency and credit rationing, credit collapses, and volatility are ambiguous Can write down models where lack of transparency worsens a crisis once it begins

20. GDP Growth Before and After Crises, 1975-1994 Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, May 1998

21. Responding to Crises

22. Constraints on Macroeconomic Policy Irreversibilities (it is easier to produce macroeconomic contraction than expansion) Nonlinearities (small shocks may self correct; large shocks may not) Persistence of macroeconomic shocks Asymmetric social consequences

23. Defending Exchange Rates with Temporarily High Interest Rates Higher interest rates increase the promised rate of return. They also increase the probability of bankruptcy. Therefore the effect on the expected rate of return (and thus the exchange rate) is ambiguous. Key issue is why a temporary increase in interest rates would cause a permanent change in the exchange rate. –Change in beliefs (+) –Persistent change in economic health (-)

24. Balancing the Goals of Structural Policy Ex ante incentives Ex post incentives Distributional equity and fairness Macroeconomic consequences

25. The Role of Social Policy Fairness: minimize the suffering of the innocent Economic: social safety nets can have high fiscal multipliers Political economy: build consensus for other structural reforms and maintain socio-political stability and thus confidence

26. A Systematic Approach to Crisis Response Many types of policies (macroeconomic, structural, social) are necessary The focus should be on mitigating the downturn, not necessarily on steps to reduce distortions slowing long-run growth

27. The International Dimension of Crisis Response The international community needs to be involved because of the capital flows and other international issues. One way to be involved is to coordinate standstills and international debt workouts. Another way is to coordinate countries away from beggar-thy-neighbor policies. This recognizes the positive externalities from economic health.

28. For economic research We need to think seriously about microeconomic underpinnings of macroeconomic policies. We need to think through the consequences of market failures, especially in the financial sector, for the behavior of the economy in both crisis and non-crisis situations We need more research on crisis response Conclusions

29. For policy We need robust policies, including some restrictions on short-term capital flows, while encouraging long-term flows and FDI. We need to think systematically about crisis response and focus on maintaining economic strength. We need to protect the victims of crises, not blame them. Conclusions