1. Mohammad Waseem

2.  The 1935 India Act (federation-in- making)  The 1940 Lahore Resolution: maximum provincial autonomy (a con-federal formula?)  The 1947 Independence of India Act (Section 92-A): Centre's powers of dismissing provincial governments  A quasi-federal state?

3.  Two wings of the state: State elite (West Pakistan)/ demographic preponderance (East Pakistan)  One-province-dominates-all  Military-bureaucratic formula for the 1956 and 1962 Constitutions: --One Unit (merger of provinces and states/ end of federalism in West Pakistan) b) Inter-wing parity

4.  Punjab: One-province-dominates-all  Solution: Two houses of parliament  Senate: Territorial chamber with equal representation for all provinces  A majority-constraining formula  Asymmetrical policy scope of the two houses (Senate: no control over money bills vs Brazil and US with more powers for the upper house)

5.  Symmetrical federalism -a mechanical approach? (non-sensitive to size, demography and resource base of federating units); the US model  Asymmetrical federalism: India --avoiding the anomaly of small states overriding the large states --Upper chamber sensitive to population --Space for new provinces

6.  Historical, ethnic and linguistic sources of identity of federating units (vs territorial/ administrative sources: US, Canada, Germany)  Ethnic hierarchy: challenge for federalism  Overlapping ethnic and provincial boundaries  Federalization of Pakistan: The 1973 Constitution (de jure recognition of ethnic provinces)

7.  1935/ 1956: Federal, Concurrent and Provincial lists  1962: Federal list (vs. residuary subjects with provinces)  1973: Federal and Concurrent lists (no provincial list-only residuary powers)  2010 18 th Amendment: Federal list (Concurrent list abolished: 40 out of 47 subjects transferred to residuary list)

8. India  Language in, religion out (as legitimate source of identity)  Re-organization of provinces on a linguistic basis Pakistan  Religion in, language out  No provincial re-organization  Occasional nod to administrative provinces  Legal constraints in the way of new provinces

9. Parliamentary sovereignty: Article 58(2)(B) Abolishing the Concurrent List Representation for minorities in the Senate Lifting the ban on a third term for PM Appointing judges by Judicial Commission Integration of FATA with KP/no Accountability of ISI, MI, other security agencies/no Establishment of a Federal Constitutional Court/no

10.  The 2009 NFC Award: revised share of the divisible pool of tax receipts: --between the Centre and provinces (56% 2010-11 to 57.5% for subsequent years --among provinces: reducing the share of Punjab to 51.74%/, doubling the share of Balochistan to 9.09%  Revising the criteria beyond population --now including poverty, revenue generation and inverse population density

11.  Prior consultation with provinces (hydro-electricity)  Provincial share not less than previous NFC Award  Biannual of implementation of NFC Award  Periodic presentation of the report to parliament  Expansion of membership  Mandatory quarterly meetings  Provinces raising loans at home and abroad  Provinces issuing guarantees/ consolidated fund  Joint/ equal ownership of mineral wealth by the Centre and provinces

12.  A coup against the Centre?  Political institutions: --Two steps forward to shared sovereignty: (ethnic parties; minority provinces)  State institutions: --One step back (army and bureaucracy; fear of the loss of power, disintegration of the country)

13. CivilianMilitary  ParticipationStability  ConsensusUnity  Co-ordination Command  Horizontal viewVertical view  DemocracySecurity  Devolution as Devolution as strength weakness

14. Bottlenecks:  Weak federal government (vis-à-vis army and judiciary)  Limited infrastructural capacity of provinces  Securitization of the national vision (army)  Administrative centralization (bureaucracy)  Financial centralization (bureaucracy)

15.  Alienation of ‘secondary’ communities via provincial identity (1973) and provincial autonomy (2010)  Demand for new linguistic provinces (for speakers of Urdu (Sindh), Pushto (Balochistan), Hindko (KP) and Seraiki (Punjab)  Unlikely protagonists: PML-N (Karachi), MQM (Hazara, Siraikistan), PML-Q (Hazara), PPP (Saraikistan)  Language creeping in as a factor?

16.  Province, not district, as the pivot of ethnic federalism  Ethnicity in, locality out  Local bodies: Military government’s instrument for undercutting political parties  Local bodies: Flip side of the demand for a new province (Mohajirs in Sindh)

17.  Centralist establishment (army and bureaucracy): no space for devolution  Constitution, no bulwark against Bonapartism  Revenue-raising authority mainly with the Centre (90%): (source of military funding)  Political initiative in the hands of army (foreign policy, operation against terrorists)