1. © 2002, Karey Perkins Ethical Theories  Act-Based Ethics:  Consequentialist Egoism Hedonism Utilitarianism (Act and Rule)  Deontologicalist Kantianism Relativism Intuitionism Theologism  Character-based/ Self-Realization Ethics Virtue Ethics Developmental  Care Ethics  Meta-Ethics Ethical Nihilism Ethical Skepticism Emotivism/Positivism

2. Three major kinds of moral theories  Consequentialism: Outcomes Helping others brings the best results …promotes the best consequences  Deontologicalism: Duties and Rules Helping others is a duty …accords with the correct moral principle  Virtue Ethics: Virtues or Character Helping others is the virtue of charity or beneficence …what a virtuous agent would do © 2002, Karey Perkins

3. Traditional moral theories  Tell us what to DO instead of BE  Consider what we ought to do and be separately rather than together  Do not give proper respect to the value we place on friendship and relationships  Separate beliefs from desires (intellectual desires)  Elevate the “right action criterion” © 2002, Karey Perkins

4. Virtue Ethics  Second half of 20 th century  Eudaimonia (Aristotle) Happiness, flourishing, well-being TRUE or REAL happiness, the sort of happiness worth having  Virtue: A character trait © 2002, Karey Perkins

5. A virtue is…  A character trait; people with the character trait of [any virtue, such as honesty] tend to: ACT in a certain way [be honest] KNOW what they are doing For certain REASONS (They don’t want to be dishonest; inarticulacy; because it was needed; other-oriented) With a certain ATTITUDE [disapprove of, deplore dishonesty; approve, like, praise, defend honesty] With certain EMOTIONS [distress at dishonesty] With RELIABILITY, trait strongly entrenched, all the way down (with maturity, reason; not whim, passion or desire like children) Have PRACTICAL WISDOM GET THINGS RIGHT (not too honest, not too generous…) Function as a GUIDE; shame us for our lack of virtues © 2002, Karey Perkins

6. Nothing is right or wrong, but we should act virtuously. (Aristotle) VIRTUE ETHICS Virtue is a “mean” (middle) between two extremes (“vices”)

7. STRONG CODIFIABILITY THESIS  An acceptable moral theory will provide universal principles that do two things: Amount to a decision procedure for determining right action Be such that any non-virtuous person could understand and apply them  Hursthouse rejects this for all moral theories Naïve Practical wisdom needed (not codifiable, something experiential and lived) Virtue Ethics can be a guide, but not a codifiable rule © 2002, Karey Perkins

8. Objection One  Can Virtue Ethics be a guide? HH says yes:  1) Ask what virtuous agent would do But would you know a virtuous agent if you were non-virtuous? HH says yes: imperfectly known.  2) Each virtue/vice generates a moral rule Not just evaluative, but the way we teach children – “mother’s knees rules” Sufficient for moral education and moral guidance V-rules like deontology with different foundations Deontology: not lying is rule, prohibited; virtue ethics: dishonesty is a vice, honesty a virtue © 2002, Karey Perkins

9. Objection Two  The Conflict Problem Should doctor’s lie or tell the truth about a patient’s condition? (Kindness vs. honesty) Should professors lie or tell the truth about a student’s capabilities for grad school? Should you let a friend down or help a friend in need?  HH: no real conflict, only an apparent one  Irresolvable and Tragic Moral Dilemmas © 2002, Karey Perkins

10. How do you get virtues  Cultivate it  A continuum; moral motivation a matter of degree from: Perfectly virtuous Exceptionally virtuous Thoroughly Virtuous Fairly Virtuous Basically Virtuous but for X The Viscious © 2002, Karey Perkins

11. Cases  The Nazi; the Mafioso  Those living in times/societies where a group is oppressed  Blind Spots © 2002, Karey Perkins

12. Ethics is determined not by the act, but by human character development. The will of the fully mature (ethical) human becomes increasingly less self centered and more aligned with and motivated by larger concerns. (Based on a variety of psychological development theories.) DEVELOPMENTAL ETHICS See http://www.kareyperkins.com/classes/445/445stageschart.htmlhttp://www.kareyperkins.com/classes/445/445stageschart.html STAGE ONE: The Liar, influenced and motivated by power and force, lives for self at the expense of others. STAGE TWO: The Conformist, loyal to one’s social group, obedient to authority, supports values and traditions of own community. STAGE THREE: The Thinker/Scientist, uses reason and self-discovered principles to make ethical decisions, independent and thinking. STAGE FOUR: The Mystic, operates out of compassion and caring for others, willing to sacrifice self for others, even those quite different from self.

13. Domain of Concern © 2002, Karey Perkins Self, Desires Family, Community The World, Others not like me Principles Rules Love The Entire Universe, seen and unseen Authority

14. Ethics of Care  Caring for the needs of others is central  Notion of the individual as relational and interdependent  Previous concept of person was public sphere person: independent, autonomous, rational, self-sufficient, self interested  We are born dependent on others, will at times be so, and will end our life so: young, old, ill constitute our identity  We only think we are independent due to a network of social relations that allow us to think so. © 2002, Karey Perkins

15. What is Care?  ACTIVITY: taking care of someone  ATTITUDE: close attention to needs, feelings, situation from other’s point of view  VIRTUE [Michael Slote; Held disagrees as care is “other” oriented, not self oriented]  PRACTICE AND VALUE: Responding to [any] needs; valuing a person and continuing relations Not “benevolence” b/c caring is other oriented, a social relation, not a dispositional trait © 2002, Karey Perkins

16. Partiality vs. impartiality  Emotions and partiality are more important than rationality, and not to be rejected  Certain kinds of emotions: sympathy, empathy, sensitivity, responsiveness  Rejects abstract impartial reasoning  Values the private sphere – extends that attitude to the public  Interdependence vs. independence © 2002, Karey Perkins

17. Care vs. Justice  JUSTICE: fairness, equality, individual rights, ABSTRACT principles, public sphere (politics, law, society)  CARE: attentiveness, trust, responsiveness to need, cultivating caring relationships, nuance, interests of the cared for and one caring wrapped together, private sphere (family and friends)  Combined? Merged? Work together?  Held: Care is most fundamental value, both are good: “There has historically been little justice in the family, and care and life have gone on without it. There can be no justice without care however for without care, no child would survive and there would be no persons to respect” (549). © 2002, Karey Perkins

18. Objections  Distinct or a kind of virtue ethics?  Limited in scope or whole world applicability: Bioethics, law, political society, war, international relations?  Feminist objection: Women have been subjugated and held back due to caring roles  Can care ethics be action guiding? Case One: Lifeboat Case Two: Robin Hood Case Three: Two conflicting promises © 2002, Karey Perkins

19. “Meta-Ethics” or “No” Ethics  Ethical Nihilism: There are no right or wrong acts, only perhaps prudent and imprudent acts. (Nietzsche)  Ethical Skepticism: There may be right or wrong acts, but there is no way to know which are which. (Pyrrho)  Emotivism/Logical Positivism: The question is meaningless; it merely expresses one's emotions, or disapproval or approval, but has not substance in reality. (A. J. Ayer)

20. © 2002, Karey Perkins Bibliography Almeder, Robert. Human Happiness and Morality: A Brief Introduction to Ethics. New York: Prometheus, 2000. Held, Virginia. “The Ethics of Care,” pp. 537-566. In the The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, Ed. David Copp. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006. Hursthouse, Rosalind. On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999. Thiroux, Jacques P. Ethics: Theory and Practice. 7 th Ed. New York: Prentice-Hall, 2001.