1. McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2008 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. CHAPTER 11 SOCIAL SECURITY

2. 11-2 Sources: Expenditure data from Social Security Trustees [2006]. CPI data from Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics. GDP data from Department of Commerce's Bureau of Economic Analysis.

3. 11-3 Why Have Social Security?  Consumption Smoothing and the Annuity Market How Social Security works Annuity Consumption smoothing  Adverse Selection and the Annuity Market Asymmetric information Adverse selection

4. 11-4 Other Justifications  Lack of foresight and paternalism  Moral hazard  Economize on decision-making and administrative costs  Income Redistribution  Improve the Economic Status of the Aged

5. 11-5 Fully Funded Plan Period 1Period 2Period 3Period 4 contribute benefits contribute benefits contribute benefits The Greatest Generation The Baby Boom Generation Generation X WorkRetireDead Unborn Work Retire Still Dead DeadChildhood Retire Each generation’s benefits based on deposits it made during working life plus accumulated interest

6. 11-6 Period 1Period 2Period 3Period 4 The Greatest Generation The Baby Boom Generation Generation X WorkRetireDead Unborn Work Retire Still Dead Dead Childhood Retire contribute benefits contribute benefits contribute benefits Pay As You Go (or Unfunded) System Each generation’s benefits come from tax payments made by current workers

7. 11-7 Period 1Period 2Period 3Period 4 The Greatest Generation The Baby Boom Generation Generation X WorkRetireDead Unborn Work Retire Still Dead Dead Childhood Retire contribute benefits contribute benefits contribute benefits Today’s Partially Funded System Baby Boomers and Gen X are also contributing to their own retirement

8. 11-8 Explicit Transfers  Benefits for dependents and survivors (1939)  Supplemental Security Income

9. 11-9 Benefits  How to calculate benefits AIME (Average Indexed Monthly Earnings) – average monthly earnings in 35 highest paid years  Wages indexed for inflation  Ceiling on AIME – up to tax ceiling

10. 11-10 Benefit Structure If AIME < $656  PIA =.90*AIME If $656< AIME <$3955  PIA =.90*$656 +.32*(AIME - $656) If AIME > $3955  PIA =.90*$656 +.32*($3955-$656) +.15*(AIME - $3955) First Bend Point Second Bend Point

11. 11-11 Adjustments  Annual inflation adjustment  Age at which benefit is drawn Normal retirement age Early retirement – benefit reduced 5/9 th of one percent a month for first 36 months preceding normal retirement age Late retirement – benefit increased 15/24 th of one percent a month

12. 11-12 Adjustments  Family Status +50% for spouse or dependent child If covered worker dies spouse receives 100% of worker’s benefit or spouse’s benefit Divorced spouse married at least 10 years gets spouse benefit if not remarried while covered worker alive  Earnings test and taxing benefits Benefits reduced $1 for every $2 earned above $12,480 Individuals losing benefits may have later benefits increased Up to 85% of benefits taxed for recipients with income above a base amount ($25,000 for single and $32,000 for married taxpayers.)

13. 11-13 Financing  FICA (Federal Insurance Contribution Act)  2006 Social Security Tax rates Employee 6.2% (OASI - 5.6%, DI -.6%) of first $94,200 of earnings on both employee and employer Self-employed  12.4%  2006 Medicare Tax rates 1.45% on both employer and employee with no earnings ceiling  Why not fund Social Security through general tax revenues?

14. 11-14 Distributional Issues  Actuarially fair return  Intergenerational redistribution Total benefits = N b * B Total taxes = t * N w * w If total benefits = total taxes: N b * B = t * N w * w or B = t * (N w /N b ) * w  Ida Mae Fuller Ida Mae Fuller

15. 11-15 Social Security Wealth for Representative Individuals Source: Updated tables, furnished by C. Eugene Steuerle and Adam Carasso, 2006. See C. Eugene Stueuerle and Jon M. Bakija [1994] for original tables and methodology. All values expressed in 2006 dollars.

16. 11-16 Other Distributional Issues  Redistribution within a generation Differences by earnings Differences by lifespan Differences by living arrangements Differences by number of earners in the family  Normative evaluation

17. 11-17 The Social Security Trust Fund  Social Security and National Saving  Budget Treatment of Social Security Off budget Unified budget Worker Retiree Trust Fund

18. 11-18 Social Security and Savings Behavior  Life-cycle theory of savings  Wealth Substitution Effect  Retirement Effect  Bequest Effect

19. 11-19 Empirical Evidence  Martin Feldstein’s work CONS = f(DI, W, SSW, X) MPC ssw =.028 60% reduction in personal saving  Others  Rosen: Social security has had a negative effect on saving, but magnitude of effect is unclear

20. 11-20 Effects on Retirement and Labor Supply  1930 LFPR 65+ was 54%  2001 LFPR 65+ was 18%  Effect of Social Security Income Effect – SS raises retirement income Substitution Effect – SS reduces the cost of retiring Earnings test  Impact on Younger Workers?

21. 11-21 Distribution of Wealth  Bequeathable v Annuitized Wealth  Effect of Social Security on Bequeathable Wealth  Effect on Wealth Mobility

22. 11-22 Budget Constraint for Present and Future Consumption Present consumption (c 0 ) Future consumption (c 1 ) N M I0I0 I1I1 D I 0 - S I 1 + (1+r) S S (1+r)S I 1 - (1+r) B F B (1+r)B At endowment point consumer neither saves nor borrows

23. 11-23 Utility-maximizing Choice of Present and Future Consumption Present consumption (c 0 ) Future consumption (c 1 ) N M I0I0 I1I1 E1E1 c1*c1* A c0*c0* Saving

24. 11-24 Crowding out of private saving due to Social Security Present consumption (c 0 ) Future consumption (c 1 ) N M I0I0 I1I1 E1E1 c1*c1* A c0*c0* R T I0TI0T (1+r)T Saving before Social Security Saving after Social Security

25. 11-25 Other ways Social Security Affects Saving  Retirement effect  Bequest effect  Empirical evidence Empirical evidence

26. 11-26 Retirement Decisions  Social security wealth and the retirement decision  Empirical evidence Diamond and Gruber [199] Gruber and Wise [2004]

27. 11-27 Long-Term Stresses on Social Security Projected revenues and projected costs of Social Security as share of Gross Domestic Product Source: Social Security Trustees [2006 ]

28. 11-28 Long-Term Stresses on Social Security Since: B = t * (Nw/Nb) * w Rearrange: t = (Nw/Nb) * (B/w) Dependency RatioReplacement Ratio

29. 11-29 Social Security Reform  Time horizon for solvency Sustainable solvency

30. 11-30 Maintain the Current System  Raise the payroll tax  Raise the Maximum Taxable Earnings Level  Raise the Retirement Age  Reducing the Cost-of-Living Adjustment  Change the Benefit Formula  Comparing the Options

31. 11-31 Privatize the System  Personal Accounts  Pros and cons of personal accounts Effect on Solvency Effect on Saving  Carve-out accounts  Add-on accounts Risk Administration Distribution

32. 11-32 Policy Perspective: President Bush’s Social Security Reform Proposal  Voluntary personal accounts  Carve-outs  Government management  Portfolio limitations  Benefit offsets  Inheritability  Achieving sustainable solvency Progressive indexing

33. 11-33 Empirical Evidence: Does Social Security Reduce Saving?  Time-series evidence Martin Feldstein (1974, 1996) v Leimer and Lesnoy (1982)  Cross-section evidence  Evidence from other countries Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) and Italy

34. 11-34 Ida Mae Fuller