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1 Grand Challenges in Authorization Systems Prof. Ravi Sandhu Executive Director and Endowed Chair November 14, 2011 ravi.sandhu@utsa.edu www.profsandhu.com www.ics.utsa.edu © Ravi Sandhu World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Institute for Cyber Security
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Mutually Supportive Technologies © Ravi Sandhu 2 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! AUTHENTICATION INTRUSION DETECTION CRYPTOGRAPHY ACCESS CONTROL ASSURANCE RISK ANALYSIS SECURITY ENGINEERING & MANAGEMENT
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Cyber Security Objectives © Ravi Sandhu 3 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! INTEGRITY modification AVAILABILITY access CONFIDENTIALITY disclosure
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Cyber Security Objectives © Ravi Sandhu 4 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! INTEGRITY modification AVAILABILITY access CONFIDENTIALITY disclosure USAGE purpose
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Cyber Security Objectives © Ravi Sandhu 5 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! INTEGRITY modification AVAILABILITY access CONFIDENTIALITY disclosure USAGE purpose USAGE
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6 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Authorization Systems © Ravi Sandhu Policy Specification Dynamics Agility Enforcement Grand Challenge arena
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Discretionary Access Control (DAC) Owner controls access But only to the original, not to copies Mandatory Access Control (MAC) Same as Lattice-Based Access Control (LBAC) Access based on security labels Labels propagate to copies Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) Access based on roles Can be configured to do DAC or MAC Generalizes to Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) © Ravi Sandhu 7 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Access Control Models Numerous other models but only 3 successes: SO FAR
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Discretionary Access Control © Ravi Sandhu 8 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! File F A:r A:w File G B:r A:w B cannot read file F A trusted not to copy F to G B cannot read file F A trusted not to copy F to G ACL
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Discretionary Access Control © Ravi Sandhu 9 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! File F A:r A:w File G B:r A:w But trusting A does not stop Trojan Horses ACL A Program Goodies Trojan Horse executes read write
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Mandatory Access Control © Ravi Sandhu 10 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Unclassified Confidential Secret Top Secret can-flow dominance
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Mandatory Access Control © Ravi Sandhu 11 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Low User High Trojan Horse Infected Subject High User Low Trojan Horse Infected Subject COVERT CHANNEL Information is leaked unknown to the high user
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Role-Based Access Control © Ravi Sandhu 12 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Access is determined by roles A user’s roles are assigned by security administrators A role’s permissions are assigned by security administrators Is RBAC MAC or DAC or neither? RBAC can be configured to do MAC RBAC can be configured to do DAC RBAC is policy neutral RBAC is neither MAC nor DAC!
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Role-Based Access Control © Ravi Sandhu 13 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! ROLES USER-ROLE ASSIGNMENT PERMISSIONS-ROLE ASSIGNMENT USERS PERMISSIONS... SESSIONS ROLE HIERARCHIES CONSTRAINTS
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Server Pull Enforcement Model © Ravi Sandhu 14 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! ClientServer User-role Authorization Server
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Client Pull Enforcement Model © Ravi Sandhu 15 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! ClientServer User-role Authorization Server
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Trojan Horse Covert Channels Inference Analog Hole Assured Enforcement Privelege Escalation Policy Comprehension and Analysis © Ravi Sandhu 16 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Tough Challenges Tough Challenges NOT EQUAL TO Grand Challenges
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How can we be “secure” while being “insecure”? What is the value of access control when we know that ultimately it can be bypassed? © Ravi Sandhu 17 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Grandest Challenge
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18 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Authorization Systems © Ravi Sandhu Policy Specification Dynamics Agility Enforcement Grand Challenge arena
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How do we determine the balance between too much and too little? How do we enforce policies across multiple layers of the software stack? How do we build dynamics into policy specifications and enforcement mechanisms? How do we understand and control what we have done? © Ravi Sandhu 19 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Grand Challenges
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Computer scientists could never have designed the web because they would have tried to make it work. But the Web does “work.” What does it mean for the Web to “work”? © Ravi Sandhu 20 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Butler Lampson Paraphrased
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