1. To Share & To Absorb The Lessons Vessel Collision Incident Vessel Collision Incident Lecturer – Capt Cao jihui Aoxing Ship Management (Shanghai) Ltd

2. Incident Date :31st Mar.2010 Incident Date :31st Mar.2010 Time: 0540LT / During Chief Officer ’ s Watch Time: 0540LT / During Chief Officer ’ s Watch Vessel A -- Chemical Tanker, Full loaded with 3000mt Chemical Cargo Vessel A -- Chemical Tanker, Full loaded with 3000mt Chemical Cargo Vessel B – Domestic Bulk Carrier in ballast condition, with DWT about 1000mt Vessel B – Domestic Bulk Carrier in ballast condition, with DWT about 1000mt Category of incident: Vessel Collision btw “ A ” & “ B ” Category of incident: Vessel Collision btw “ A ” & “ B ” Location: China Costal Waters Location: China Costal Waters Visibility was 0.1 miles, wind SE/4 Visibility was 0.1 miles, wind SE/4

3. Description of the Incident Vessel A, sailed along the fairway with course 110deg and speed 13.2Kts, visibility was 0.1 miles, wind SE/4; Vessel A, sailed along the fairway with course 110deg and speed 13.2Kts, visibility was 0.1 miles, wind SE/4; 0505Lt, Chief Officer found vessel B through Radar on her port side 30deg/5miles without AIS, vessel B sailed southly and vessel C followed vessel B with distance 3 miles When the distance between this two ships was about 2 miles, Chief Officer ordered to alter course to port heading to vessel B, he planned to pass from the space between vessel B & C

4. Description of the Incident When distance was less than 1 mile, Chief Officer observed vessel B altered course to starboard, Vessel B did not respond to his sound signal & VHF calling. he judged it ’ s dangerous to turn to starboard, then ordered hard port, Vessel A turned around to come back to the original course, Vessel B turned course to port at that time, Chief Officer ordered hard starboard, but it ’ s too late, Vessel A starboard bow collided with starboard side of Vessel B at 0540Lt, with speed 5 kts. All ships were safe to float, Vessel A anchored immediately and Vessel B made fast to Vessel A

5. Sketch for Ship movement : VSL A VSL B VSL C

6. Damage to Vessel A: Starboard Anchor lost; Damage to Vessel B: Starboard shell plate was dented and become tore, starboard hatch coming disconnected from the ship ’ s construction. 4m long gunwale was collapsed. No Personnel injured; No environmental pollution Damage to Vessel A

7. Vessel B

8. CAUSES ANALYSIS for Vessel A 1. Immediate Cause Chief Officer took wrong collision prevention actions. Chief Officer took wrong collision prevention actions. ----- Chief Officer altered course to port for a vessel detected forward of the beam in restricted visibility ----- Chief Officer altered course to port for a vessel detected forward of the beam in restricted visibility ----- and did not lower down the ship ’ s speed or stop the ship to use safe speed. ----- and did not lower down the ship ’ s speed or stop the ship to use safe speed. ----- Even the ship made a turn around, Chief Officer did not check the effectiveness of his action, the collision was not avoided. ----- Even the ship made a turn around, Chief Officer did not check the effectiveness of his action, the collision was not avoided. Root Cause: Chief Officer was in breach of rule 8 “ action to avoid collision ” and rule 19 “ conduct of vessels in restricted visibility ” of the COLREG Root Cause: Chief Officer was in breach of rule 8 “ action to avoid collision ” and rule 19 “ conduct of vessels in restricted visibility ” of the COLREG

9. CAUSES ANALYSIS for vessel A 2. Immediate Cause Master was not on the bridge at that time. Master was not on the bridge at that time. ---- The visibility sometimes was good and sometime was poor. Master get down the bridge for a short rest when the visibility was good ---- The visibility sometimes was good and sometime was poor. Master get down the bridge for a short rest when the visibility was good ---- The visibility was getting poor, Chief Officer did not call Master on bridge to because of improper thought, he did thought he ’ s an senior Officer and he can safely navigate without Master ’ s supervision and he was afraid to affect Master ’ s rest. ---- The visibility was getting poor, Chief Officer did not call Master on bridge to because of improper thought, he did thought he ’ s an senior Officer and he can safely navigate without Master ’ s supervision and he was afraid to affect Master ’ s rest. Root Cause: Master & Chief Officer was lack of necessary safety awareness and did not follow the Company ’ s policy: “ SQI-133 Root Cause: Master & Chief Officer was lack of necessary safety awareness and did not follow the Company ’ s policy: “ SQI-133 Instructions for Safe Navigation in Restricted Visibility ”

10. Other Observations for vessel B: - Vessel B was detained by MSA, and just released from the MSA - Minimum Safe Manning Certificate required 5 persons on board, but only 4 crew on board at time of collision. No Master on board. - Radar was used at range 1 mile only. - Officer on watch did not keep proper watch on VHF. - Officer on watch was lack of knowledge who alter course frequently.

11. -----Marine Superintendent boarded this vessel and held a safety meeting on board, discussed this incident together with Master & Officers -----The technical operator has promulgated Safety Circular and Lesson Learnt with regard to the collision accident fleet wide, which emphasized to follow COLREGs & the Company ’ s policy strictly and clearly required: -----The technical operator has promulgated Safety Circular and Lesson Learnt with regard to the collision accident fleet wide, which emphasized to follow COLREGs & the Company ’ s policy for Safe Navigation in Restricted Visibility strictly and clearly required: 1. Officer on watch must call Master on bridge in restricted visibility. 2. To lower ship ’ s speed or stop the ship as the 1st step for collision prevention in limited area and not to alter course to port for the vessel detected forward of the beam 3. Master and Officers need to check the effectiveness of their actions for collision prevention until other vessel is finally past and clear. 4. Master must call all deck officers to hold safety meeting to study the COLREG and improve safety awareness. Preventive Actions:

12. Response to the Incident Master Reported this incident to the Company immediately and then reported to MSA nearby, MSA investigator & Marine Superintendent came on board and investigation was carried out. Under the intermediation of the MSA, two ships settled down this incident at friendly method, Vessel A paid 35,000RMB to Vessel B. All liability for both vessels are clear to each other. Vessel A: to install her anchor at next port Vessel B: to go to shipyard for repairs directly. Off-hire of Vessel A: Total 9 hours from 0540 to 1440 on Mar.31,2010,

13. - END OF REPORT- - END OF REPORT- Appreciated your participation for sharing the information. Appreciated your participation for sharing the information.