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On Constructing Parallel Pseudorandom Generators from One-Way Functions Emanuele Viola Harvard University June 2005.

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Presentation on theme: "On Constructing Parallel Pseudorandom Generators from One-Way Functions Emanuele Viola Harvard University June 2005."— Presentation transcript:

1 On Constructing Parallel Pseudorandom Generators from One-Way Functions Emanuele Viola Harvard University June 2005

2 Poly(n)-time Computable Stretch s(n) ¸ 1 (e.g., s(n) = 1, s(n) = n) Fools efficient adversaries: 8 PPT A Pr X, |X| = n+s(n) [A(X) = 1] ¼ Pr , |  | = n [A(PRG(  )) = 1] Pseudorandom Generator (PRG) [BM,Y] PRG

3 PRG, One-Way Functions (OWF) [BM,Y,GL,…,HILL] (f OWF if easy to compute but hard to invert, i.e. 8 PPT M, almost never M(f(X)) 2 f(X) -1 ) Applications of PRG: cryptography, derandomization need stretch s(n) = poly(n) Stretch s(n) only makes sense relative to n –E.g. G : {0,1} n ! {0,1} n+s(n) ) G : {0,1} n 2 ! {0,1} n 2 + n ¢ s(n) –Two main cases s(n) = 1, or s(n) = n Background on PRG

4 PRG Constructions We study complexity of constructing PRG with big stretch from OWF f Def.: black-box PRG constructions G f : for every (comput.-unbounded) function f, adversary A A breaks G f ) 9 PPT M : M f,A inverts f Most constructions are black-box [BM,Y,…,HILL] Many negat. results for black-box model [IR,…,GT,RTV] –Cannot make sense of negat. result in non-black-box model

5 STEP 1: OWF f ) G f : {0,1} n ! {0,1} n+1 –Think e.g. f : {0,1} n  ! {0,1} n  STEP 2: G f ) PRG with stretch s(n) = poly(n) [GM] Stretch s ) s adaptive queries to f ) circuit depth ¸ s Question [this work]: stretch s vs. adaptivity & depth? E.g., can have s = n, circuit depth O(log n)? Standard Constructions w/ big stretch GfGf Input  GfGf GfGf GfGf GfGf GfGf........ Output......... …

6 Previous Results [AIK] Log-depth OWF/PRG ) O(1)-depth PRG (!!!) However, any stretch ) stretch s = 1 [GT] s vs. number q of queries to OWF (Thm: q ¸ s) [This work] s vs. adaptivity & circuit depth [ …,IN,NR] O(1)-depth PRG from specific assumptions [This work] general assumptions Context: [V] studies complexity of NW-type PRG

7 Outline Our model Our results Proof sketch of main negative result Other: new negative result on worst-case vs. average-case connections in NP, PH

8 Parallel PRG G f : {0,1} n ! {0,1} n+s(n) from OWF f Our Model of PRG construction Input , |  | = n f ÆÆÆÆÆÆÆÆ Ç ÇÇÇÇÇ ÆÆÆÆÆÆÆÆ ff Constant Depth Circuit (AC 0 ) Output, n+s(n) bits f q 1 q 2 q 3 q 4 Nonadaptive Queries to f

9 Our Results on PRG Constructions Parallel construction G f : {0,1} n ! {0,1} n+s(n) From one-way function f ( e.g. f : {0,1} n  ! {0,1} n   f arbitraryf one-to-onef permutation Neg.s(n) · o(n) ? Pos.?s(n) ¸ 1

10 Thm[this work]: Parallel black-box PRG constructions G f : {0,1} n ! {0,1} n+s(n) satisfy s(n) · o(n) Proof: Exhibit comput.-unbounded f, A such that: (1) A breaks G f when s(n) =  (n) (2) f one-way, i.e. hard to invert. We show distribution on f s. t. (1) & (2) hold w.h.p. Proof Sketch of Negative Result

11 Def. of f and (1) break G f Restriction [FSS,H,…]  maps bits to {0,1,*} Def. distribution on f apply  to truth-table of f –  known to adversary A replace * with random bits (1) A breaks G f : 8 , G f (  ) is  AC  function of truth-table of f )  makes G f (  ) biased ) A breaks G f (  ). –If s(n) =  (n) can union bound over all . 01** 1*0*  1**0 f(0) f(1)  f(111) 0101 1100  1110

12 (2) f one-way Problem: f not one-way :  leaks info about x E.g. First bit f(x) = 0 ) x Solution: Force many x’s to share same restriction Compose f with hash function Many preimages ) f one-way Low collision prob. ) A still breaks G f Q.E.D. f(0) f(1) f(10)  f(111) 01** 1*0* 1***  1**0 hash 01** 1*0* 1***  1**0 f =

13 Question: given f 2 NP worst-case hard (f 2 P/poly), can build f 0 2 NP average-case hard? I.e. 8 small circuit A : Pr x [A(x)  f 0 (x)] ¸ 1/3 Thm[V]: no black-box construction of f 0 using both function f and adversary A as black-box Thm[BT]: no construction using A as black-box –Also uses A ``non-adaptively’’ Thm[this work]: no construction using f as black-box –Proof uses pseudorandom restrictions Our Result on Average Case Complexity

14 Conclusion Thm[this work]: Parallel black-box construction G f : {0,1} n ! {0,1} n+s(n) satisfy Average-case complexity Thm[this work]: given f 2 NP worst-case hard no construction of average-case hard f 0 2 NP using f as black-box f arbitraryf one-to-onef permutation Neg.s(n) · o(n) ? Pos.?s(n) ¸ 1

15

16 Pseudorandom Bits for Constant-Depth Circuits with Few Arbitrary Symmetric Gates Emanuele Viola Harvard University April 2005

17 Efficiently Computable Big Stretch s(n) À n ( e.g. s(n) = n  (1) ) Fools small circuits: 8 small C Pr X, |X| = s(n) [ C(X) = 1 ] ¼ Pr , |  | = n [ C(PRG(  )) = 1 ] Pseudorandom Generator (PRG) [BM,Y,NW] PRG

18 PRG ) derandomization: BP ¢ P ( EXP [Y,NW,…] PRG, circuit lower bounds: EXP  P/poly [NW,BFNW,STV,SU,…] Open Problem: PRG exist? This Work: study restricted PRG Only fool constant-depth circuits We know lower bounds for constant-depth circuits Do PRG Exist?

19 Constant-depth circuit = PRG that fools constant-depth circuit As before, but only fools small constant-depth circuit C Pr X, |X| = s(n) [ C(X) = 1 ] ¼ Pr , |  | = n [ C(PRG(  )) = 1 ] PRG that fools constant-depth circuits x 1 : x 1 x 2.... : x s Depth PRG

20 Previous Results [N’91] PRG : {0,1} n ! {0,1} s(n) s(n) = 2 n , fools AC 0 = Applications: BP ¢ AC  ( EXP, more in [NW,HVV,V] [LVW’93] PRG : {0,1} n ! {0,1} s(n) s(n) = n  log n, fools SYM ○ AND = SYM = arbitrary symmetric gate E.g., SYM = PARITY, MAJORITY x 1 : x 1 x 2..... : x s ÆÆÆÆÆÆÆÆ Ç ÇÇÇÇÇ Æ SYM ÆÆÆÆÆÆ x 1 : x 1 x 2.... : x s

21 Theorem[This Work]: PRG : {0,1} n ! {0,1} s(n) with s(n) = n  log n fools AC 0 with  log 2 n SYM = Improves on [LVW93] Fools richer class than [N91] but worse stretch BP ¢ (AC 0 with few SYM) ( EXP Currently richest BP ¢ class one can derandomize Our Results ÆÆÆÆÆÆ ÇÇÇÇ SYM x 1 : x 1 x 2.... : x s

22 [NW] style Input = 1101010101110110101110 Output = 101010 …........1 ……….....1010100 f = © = PARITY [RW] The Pseudorandom Generator f x 1............. x n Æ © Æ  ©©  ©© 

23 Outline Why previous results/techniques do not suffice For PRG need new average-case lower bound for AC 0 with few SYM Proof sketch of average-case lower bound

24 Known Lower Bounds Recall AC 0 with  log 2 n SYM = [H,BNS,HG,RW,HM,CH]: f 2 P that requires AC 0 circuits with  log 2 n SYM of size n  log n Often, lower bound ) PRG. But NOT this time! ÆÆÆÆÆÆ ÇÇÇÇ SYM x 1 : x 1 x 2.... : x s

25 Standard Approach [BFNW,STV,SU,…] [NW] Def. f : {0,1} n ! {0,1} average-case hard for C if 8 small C 2 C Pr x [C(x)  f(x)] ¸ ½ - n -  (1) To construct PRG that fools C (e.g. AC 0 with few SYM) h hard for C f hard on average for C PRG that fools C

26 Standard Approach Fails h hard for C f hard on average for C PRG that fools C Proving correctness 9 C 2 C C = h 9 C 2 C comp. f on average 9 C 2 C breaks PRG Problem: requires C ¶ TC 0. Is TC 0 ¶ NEXP? [RR] Conjecture [V]: Black-box construction ) C ¶ TC 0 To construct PRG that fools C (e.g. AC 0 with few SYM)

27 C = AC 0 with few SYM Our vs. Previous Lower Bounds [H,BNS,HG,RW,HM,CH] not average-case hard Theorem[This Work]: There is f 2 P s.t. 8 AC 0 circuit C of size n  log n with  log 2 n SYM Pr x [C(x)  f(x)] ¸ ½ - n  log n h hard for C f hard on average for C PRG that fools C

28 Random restrictions  [FSS,H,…]  : {x 1, x 2,…, x s } ! {0,1,*} C|  subcircuit on *’s Multiparty communication complexity [CFL] Thm[BNS]: Gen. Inner Product (GIP) = has high communication complexity Tools Æ © Æ  x 1....... x n

29 Thm[This Work]: f = GIP ○ PARITY = is average-case hard for small AC 0 circuits with few SYM Proof sketch: C small AC 0 circuit with few SYM. W.h.p. over random restriction  E 1 : GIP ○ PARITY|  ¼ GIP ) high comm. complexity E 1 ( each bottom PARITY has * E 2 : C|  computable with low comm. complexity E 1 and E 2 ) C|  (x)  GIP(x) Q.E.D. Proof Sketch x 1................ x n Æ © Æ  ©©  ©© 

30 Theorem[This Work]: PRG : {0,1} n ! {0,1} s(n) with s(n) = n  log n fools AC 0 with  log 2 n SYM Improves [LVW93], fools richer class than [N91] Currently richest BP ¢ class one can derandomize Obtained from average-case hardness result Conj.: PRG from worst-case hardness ) C ¶ TC 0 Open problems:  (log 2 n) SYM? EXP average-case hard for GF(2) poly of deg. log n ? Conclusion

31 C|  low communication complexity Lemma[this work]: C small AC 0 circuit w/  log 2 n SYM W.h.p. over  2 R p, C|  low comm. complexity Lemma[HG+HM]: Above holds for 1 SYM

32 More SYM gates Lemma: C small AC 0 circuit with  log 2 n SYM W.h.p. over  2 R p, C|  low comm. complexity Proof: Consider following protocol ÆÆÆÆÆÆ ÇÇÇÇ SYM 3 SYM 2 SYM 1 x 1 : x 1 x 2...... : x s

33 Lemma: C small AC 0 circuit with  log 2 n SYM W.h.p. over  2 R p, C|  low comm. complexity Proof: Previous lemma ) low communication complexity More SYM gates ÆÆÆÆÆÆ ÇÇÇÇ SYM 2 SYM 1 SYM 3  x 1 : x 1 x 2...... : x s

34 Lemma: C small AC 0 circuit with  log 2 n SYM W.h.p. over  2 R p, C|  low comm. complexity Proof: Parties compute value of SYM gate More SYM gates ÆÆÆÆÆÆ ÇÇÇÇ SYM 2 1 SYM 3  x 1 : x 1 x 2...... : x s

35 More SYM gates Lemma: C small AC 0 circuit with  log 2 n SYM W.h.p. over  2 R p, C|  low comm. complexity Proof: Previous lemma ) low communication complexity ÆÆÆÆÆÆ SYM 2 1 ÇÇÇÇ SYM 3  x 1 : x 1 x 2...... : x s

36 Lemma: C small AC 0 circuit with  log 2 n SYM W.h.p. over  2 R p, C|  low comm. complexity Proof: Parties compute value of SYM gate More SYM gates ÆÆÆÆÆÆ 0 1 ÇÇÇÇ SYM 3  x 1 : x 1 x 2...... : x s

37 More SYM gates Lemma: C small AC 0 circuit with  log 2 n SYM W.h.p. over  2 R p, C|  low comm. complexity Proof: Previous lemma ) low communication complexity ÆÆÆÆÆÆ ÇÇÇÇ SYM 3 0 1  x 1 : x 1 x 2...... : x s

38 More SYM gates Lemma: C small AC 0 circuit with  log 2 n SYM W.h.p. over  2 R p, C|  low comm. complexity Proof: Parties compute value of SYM gate ÆÆÆÆÆÆ ÇÇÇÇ 1 0 1 Æ  x 1 : x 1 x 2...... : x s

39 More SYM gates Lemma: C small AC 0 circuit with  log 2 n SYM W.h.p. over  2 R p, C|  low comm. complexity Proof: Total communication = communication for 1 SYM X number of SYM Q.E.D. Union bound over 2 #SYM circuitslimits # SYM. Open Problem: Better analysis?

40 Theorem[This Work]: PRG : {0,1} n ! {0,1} s(n) with s(n) = n  log n fools AC 0 with  log 2 n SYM Improves [LVW93], fools richer class than [N91] Currently richest BP ¢ class one can derandomize Obtained from average-case hardness result Conj.: PRG from worst-case hardness ) C ¶ TC 0 Open problems:  (log 2 n) SYM? EXP average-case hard for GF(2) poly of deg. log n ? Conclusion

41 ``Number on the forehead’’ model [CFL] –k-parties want to compute f(x) –x partitioned in k blocks ! –i-th party knows all x but x i –Communication = broadcast Generalized Inner Product. GIP(x) = Lemma[BNS]: Low communication complexity protocol P ) Pr x [P(x)  GIP(x)] ¸ ½ - n  log n –Discrepancy, [CT,R] Multiparty Communication Complexity Æ © n k x 1.......... x nk Æ k x 1 x 2  x k

42 C|  low communication complexity Restriction [FSS,…]  map variables to {0,1,*} –R p = uniform distribution, Pr[  (x i ) = *] = p –C|  subcircuit. New input bits = * Lemma: C small AC 0 circuit with  log 2 n SYM W.h.p. over  2 R p, C|  low comm. complexity First prove 1 SYM, then  log 2 n SYM

43 1 SYM gate Lemma: C small AC 0 circuit with 1 SYM W.h.p. over  2 R p, C|  low comm. complexity Proof: [H] [HG] SYM ○ AND k-1 low comm. complexity – 8 AND 9 party that can compute it (fan-in < k = # blocks) –Parties broadcast # AND = 1 –Communication = k ¢ log(size of circuit) Q.E.D. ÆÆÆÆÆÆÆÆ Ç ÇÇÇÇ SYM  = ÆÆÆÆÆÆ k-1 Ç x 1 x 2  x k

44 Lemma[BNS]: Low communication complexity protocol P ) Pr x [P(x)  GIP(x)] ¸ ½ - n  log n Lemma: C small AC 0 circuit with  log 2 n SYM W.h.p. over  2 R p, C|  low comm. complexity Want Theorem: There is f 2 P s.t. 8 AC 0 circuit C of size n  log n with  log 2 n SYM gates Pr x [C(x)  f(x)] ¸ ½ - n  log n Summary of Lemmas

45 Proof: f = GIP ○ PARITY = C small AC 0 circuit with  log 2 n SYM Random Input x = random  + random y for the * E 1 : f |  ¼ GIP ) high comm. complexity –E 1 ( each bottom PARITY has * E 2 : C|  low comm. complexity Pr x [C(x)  f  (x)] ¸ Pr , y [ C|  (y)  f|  (y) | E 1, E 2 ] Pr [ E 1, E 2 ] = Pr y [ P(y)  GIP(y) ] ( 1 - n  log n ) ¸ ( ½ - n  log n ) Q.E.D. x 1................ x n Æ © Æ  ©©  ©© 

46 Theorem[This Work]: PRG : {0,1} n ! {0,1} s(n) with s(n) = n  log n fools AC 0 with  log 2 n SYM Improves [LVW93], fools richer class than [N91] Currently richest BP ¢ class one can derandomize Obtained from average-case hard function Conj.: PRG from worst-case hardness ) EXP  TC 0 Open problems:  (log 2 n) SYM? EXP average-case hard for GF(2) poly of deg. log n ? Conclusion

47 Tools: Random restrictions  [FSS,H,…] –  : {x 1, x 2,…, x s } ! {0,1,*}, C|  subcircuit on *’s Communication complexity bound for GIP [BNS] Theorem[This Work]: GIP ○ PARITY is average-case hard for small AC 0 circuits with few SYM Proof sketch: C small AC 0 circuit with few SYM. W.h.p. over random restriction  E 1 : GIP ○ PARITY|  ¼ GIP ) high comm. complexity E 2 : C|  computable with low comm. complexity E 1 and E 2 ) C|  (x)  GIP(x) Q.E.D. Proof Sketch


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