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ISO/DIS 16159 SPACE SYSTEMS — LAUNCH PAD AND INTEGRATION SITE — FACILITY, SYSTEM AND EQUIPMENT FAILURE ANALYSIS Project Leader: Tsukanov, Eugeny ISO TC20/SC14.

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Presentation on theme: "ISO/DIS 16159 SPACE SYSTEMS — LAUNCH PAD AND INTEGRATION SITE — FACILITY, SYSTEM AND EQUIPMENT FAILURE ANALYSIS Project Leader: Tsukanov, Eugeny ISO TC20/SC14."— Presentation transcript:

1 ISO/DIS 16159 SPACE SYSTEMS — LAUNCH PAD AND INTEGRATION SITE — FACILITY, SYSTEM AND EQUIPMENT FAILURE ANALYSIS Project Leader: Tsukanov, Eugeny ISO TC20/SC14 WG3 meeting October 2011

2 Process of development of the Standard WG3/ODCWG Action: “Adjudicate the difference through Mr. Schultz. meetingWG recommendation is to move this work item to the next 2011 Mai 23-26 stage with the section in question with clarification to follow during the next version and vote” 2011 August 17 Result of CD voting BrazilYes ChinaYes with comments FranceNo GermanyYes IndiaWe abstain IsraelWe abstain JapanNo KazakhstanYes Russia Yes UkraineYes United KingdomYes USAYes

3 Answers to Q.1: "Do you agree to the circulation of the draft as a DIS?" 7 x Yes Brazil, Germany, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, USA 1 x Yes with comments China 2 x No France, Japan 2 x We abstain India, Israel 2011 August 17The message of Mr. Tongson: “I am pleased to announce that ISO/CDV 16159 has passed. Please forward to me a copy of the resolution of comments and the DIS text by 31 October 2011”. August 30 Resolutions to comments from China, Japan and France and the updated draft of DIS are sent to Mr. Tongson and Dr.Finkleman. September 19Editorial comments from ISO Central Secretariat are received from Mr.Tongson Septemder 30Resolutions to editorial comments and the updated draft are distributed

4 CN geEach primary subclause should preferably be given a title. For example, in 6.1,the title”The content of a final report” should be added. To add the titles of all primary subclause. It is declined. The document in common and it’s clauses aren’t big. The majority of subclauses consist of one or two short sentences and there is no need to name each sublause. JP ge It seems better to be discussed in the project of "ISO23461 Program management - Nonconformance control system". This is better to be proposed to WG5 "management". And we think that the analysis method can be left to relevant organization, not be defined by international standard. This project has been approved by WG3 ISO TC20/SC14 in May, 2008.

5 FR1 ge Each failure does not have the same level of criticality for every mission. This standard shall be tailored depending on the kind of failure and its level of criticality for the mission and/or the safety. The standard establishes procedures for all kinds of malfunctions and all levels of criticality. If level of criticality and the reason are obvious, the engineer- controller can not to apply this procedure or apply its part. I understand that the main part of malfunctions can be eliminated quickly without the analysis. But the reason of the malfunction is eliminated not always. And this is the main thing! Action: The requirement about independence of experts is excluded (4.2, 4.5a). The paragraph is included to Scope: «Depending on level of criticality of failures the procedures established by the Standard can be reduced» FR1 & 4.2 to 4.7 ge Experience shows that a ground failure usually leads to a launch delay null or limited to one day when the failure analysis is conducted by operational experts (launcher operator, ground support staff). Gathering a failure analysis team for each kind of failures would create unnecessary costs and delays. Team of independent expert is needed only if the failure is a failure that may result in loss of mission or a security breach. An increased safety measure would be legitimate for manned space flight. 1 / Modify the scope or limit the scope of this standard to major failures. 2 / Define independency criteria 3 / Operational quality team shall be considered as independent FR3.4 ge CD 16159 defines a failure as “any event or condition that impairs the functionality of a component”. The number of failures during a launch campaign can be estimated to a value between 200 and 300. This standard requires nominating a failure analysis team for each one of them. This is not operational, especially as more than 90% of these failures are resolved rapidly without necessity of any major analysis. Limit the kind of failures defined in the standard to those major incidents that would have led to mission failure or major delay. In that perspective, it is proposed : -to define what is a “major failure” -to limit this standard to these “major failures”

6 **Scope EdIn accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2, 6.2.1, the scope shall be worded as a series of statements of fact and shall define without ambiguity the subject of the document and the apsects covered, thereby indicating the limits of applicability of the document. The sentence "Depending on level of criticality of failures the procedures established by the Standard can be reduced." is essentially a permission (to omit or modify certain requirements) and as such does not belong in the scope. In addition, it introduces some ambiguity, as it does not define either the level(s) of criticality of failure at which the document applies in full or what constitutes "reduced" application of the requirements. Ideally, the scope should simply state the level(s) of criticality of failure at which this document applies. If it is necessary to include in the document permission to apply a "reduced" procedure at certain levels of criticality of failure, the permission should be given in the body of the document (rather than in the scope), preferably specifying which requirements can be omitted and under which conditions. Documents of this type also frequently include a requirement in the test report clause (or equivalent) to state any deviations from the specified method. This could be inserted in subclause 6.1 (report of the analysis). I exclude from scope «Depending on level of criticality of failures the procedures established by the Standard can be reduced» and I add to subclause 4.2: «Also depending on level of character of failures the procedures established by the Standard can be reduced» **Normativ e reference s EdIn accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2, 6.2.2, the Normative references clause shall list only those documents that are cited in the document in such a way as to make them indispensable for the application of the document. Documents referenced for informative purposes belong in the bibliography. ISO/TR 17400:2003 and ISO 26870:2009 are only cited as informative references in the terms and definitions clause. These documents should therefore be moved to a bibliography at the end of the document. The normative references clause should be deleted if there are no normative references. It is accepted. Numbering of the subsequent clauses and subclauses is changed. The section "Bibliography" is added **Terms and definition s 3.4EdThere is a reference to IEC 60050:1992, but the part number (it is a multipart series) and the term number are not specified. In addition, this document should be listed in the bibliography. Please specify the part number and relevant term number in the reference to IEC 60050:1992. Add this document to the bibliography. I have applied the equivalent term having the correct reference. «termination of the ability of an item to perform the function for which it was designed» [ISO 14620-2, definition 3.5]

7 **Terms and definition s 3.5edDefinitions shall consist of a single phrase that can be used to replace the term in a sentence. Definitions shall not contain requirements (use of shall), nor begin with an article. Reword definition 3.5 such that it consists of a single phrase and does not contain requirements (these should be stated elsewhere in the document if necessary). Suggested rewording of definition 3.5: systematic approach to determine, as a minimum, the mode and mechanism of failure via investigative techniques, to identify and assess potential root causes and ultimately arrive at the most probable, and to identify and assess potential corrective actions and ultimately recommend/implement the most suitable NOTEInvestigative techniques can range from examination in the field to evaluation in the laboratory. It is accepted. I thank. **Terms and definition s 3.11edOnly terms that are used in the document should be defined in the terms and definitions clause. Term 3.11 (main system) is not currently used in this document. If term 3.11 is not used in the document, it should be deleted from the terms and definitions clause. It is accepted

8 DIS voting was initiated by Secretariat, due date is 26 February 2012. By mistake, not the last DIS version was distributed by Central Secretariat (the distributed version doesn’t include editorial comments which had been sent by Cen.Sec.). We suppose it’s not critical, is it? Thanks for your attention!


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