1. Democratic Transition and Consolidation
Kathryn Stoner
July 26, 2013

2. Where am I going? Transition vs. consolidation Transition to what?
Some theories of transition.
Why the Soviet/Russian case?
What are the general lessons we can draw from this case?
Huntington: Non dem regimes more likely to be replaced by other non-dems than by dem ones. So why success and why failure?
-democratic transition involves end of authoritarian regime, installation of a democratic regime and consolidation of the democratic regime. Causes of change not the same as consolidation. 3 STEPS

3. Democratic Triggers? Death of a Long Serving Leader Defeat in War
Decolonization/Collapse of Empire
External Occupation
Economic Growth
Economic Crisis

4. Do Democratic Transitions Have Preconditions?
1. Wealth and democracy: “Modernization theory.” (Lipset)
* Positive relationship between wealth and democracy: Why?
Actors = society
* Literacy
* Urbanization
* Demands of Greater Number of Owners
-creates mobilization of socially excluded and demands for change.
IN THIS THEORY, CHANGE COMES “FROM BELOW,” THAT IS, FROM THE PEOPLE ON THE STREET. .

5. Modernization Theory:
-Dominant theory of democratic transition from about 1960’s onward.
-Emphasis on Economic Change leading to Social Change
Policy prescriptions:
- develop economies,
- open trade,
-educate population
All of this will create a constituency for representative government; people will demand it!

6. Holes in Modernization Theory
How wealthy does a country have to be before it tips to democracy?
There are some poor countries that have transited to democracy and maintained the system (eg. India)
There are some relatively rich countries that have maintained dictatorships or monarchies (UAE, Saudi Arabia).
Still… the correlation remains, but direction of causality is not crystal clear

7. Elite Pacting: The“3rd Wave” Paradigm
Waves concept (Huntington);
* First wave in Europe (industrialization)
* Second wave LA/Africa (de-colonization; post WWII effect)
* Third wave – , with what Huntington calls a second phase beginning in 1991 onward (L.America, Southern Europe; elite led)
2. Third Wave paradigm vs. modernization theory:
Transition is not about society and changing socio-economic structure as much as it is about ELITES

8. The “Third Wave” Paradigm (Rustow, O’Donnell & Schmitter, Przeworski, Karl)
Actors = Elites
Splits in Ancien Regime --Softliners versus Hardliners
Moderates versus Radicals (in society)
Key Ingredient for Successful Transition = Pacts
“Limit agenda of policy choice”
Share proportionally in the distribution of benefits
Restrict the participation of outsiders in decision-making.
* Equal Balance of Power between incumbents and challengers
* Process Is Cooperative, Non-Zero Sum
* Strategic Interaction Creates Democracy (“democracy without democrats”)

9. Manezh Square, Moscow March 10, 1991

10. 3. The “Fourth Wave” Paradigm (Bunce, Fish, McFaul,)
Actors = Elites AND Masses
Pacts Not a Key Ingredient for Success
Agenda of policy choice was not limited
Distribution of benefits NOT shared proportionally
Participation of outsiders in decision-making not limited to elites
Mobilization not a threat to democratization
Equal BOP not a Necessary Condition for Success
Process Is Non-Cooperative, Often Zero Sum
You Get Democracy only with (Powerful) “Democrats”

11. 4. Transitions from outside?
Can democratic transition be imposed from outside? (Iraq? Afghanistan? Germany? Japan?)
What can/do external actors do to encourage transition?
Media
Civil society
Demonstration effect
Contagion encouragement
Election monitoring training
What works???

12. Democratic Transitions vs. Democratic Consolidation
The causes of democratic transition are not necessarily
the same factors as the causes of democratic consolidation

13. Factors Facilitating Democratic Stability (Consolidation)
Levels of Wealth
Income Equality
Form of transition: from below and non-violent; Pacted Transitions Non-Violent Transitions; What to do with old elites? “torturer problem” and “praetorian problem
Institutional Choices: Parliamentary Democracy (procedural legitimacy)
Ethnic Homogeneity (but not a specific “culture”)
Diffusion: Democratic Neighborhoods
Performance (political and economic)
Time (Huntington): Two turnover test?

14. Income and Consolidation
“…there is no doubt that democracies are more likely to be found in the more highly developed countries. Yet the reason is not that democracies are more likely to emerge when countries develop under authoritarianism, but that, however they do emerge, they are more likely to survive in countries that are already developed.” (Przeworski, et al, 2000, p. 106)

15. New Democracies and Economic Performance
Life expectancy of democracy with decline in incomes: 19 years
Life expectancy of democracy with rise in incomes: 64 years

16. Why Is Wealth Good for Democracy?
Do democracies govern better?
Is democracy good for the poor? (eg. increase in education, opportunity)?
Lowers the Intensity of Distributional Conflicts? (greater equality?)

17. Does Prior Regime Type Matter? Conventional Wisdom before 1989
Authoritarian Regimes Can Democratize (Totalitarian cannot)
Private Sector Exists
“Resurrection” of Civil Society
Restoring democratic institutions
Changing “regime” easier than changing whole system

18. Does Priori Regime Type Matter? (Cont.)
Totalitarian Regimes Cannot Democratize
No Private Sector
No Civil Society to “Resurrect”
Stakes of Change Too High
Political and economic power intertwined

19. Does Prior Regime Type Matter? The New Conventional Wisdom, (Geddes)
Military Juntas Easier to democratize
Soldiers go back to barracks
Old institutions can be revived
“Re”democratization easier
Personalist Regimes
Small group relying on state for wealth
Who governs after death of dictator?
Hegemonic Party Systems
Have bigger “selectorate”
Can withstand crises better than generals, personalist dictators: cooption

20. Survivability Rates of Autocracies (1946-1999)
Military Regimes: 9 years
Personalist Regimes: 15 years
Single-party regimes: 23 years
Theocracies
Islamic Republic of Iran (27 years)
Taliban in Afghanistan (5 years)

21. 2. Does institutional choice matter?
Parliamentary vs. Presidential Systems:
Transitions to Dictatorship
39 Presidential Systems
13 Parliamentary Systems
2 Mixed Systems

22. Expected Life of Democracies 1950-1990
Parliamentary Systems: 73 Years
Presidential Systems: 21 Years

23. How to Undermine Democracy (and Development):
Lessons from Russia
----- Meeting Notes (10/25/12 16:48) -----

24. Quick refresher on fall of Soviet Union
Gorbachev,
Perestroika and glasnost
Halting economic reform
Opens up electoral process
Attempted coup against him in August 1991; fails but Boris Yeltsin effectively takes over
Soviet Union collapses Dec. 25, 1991
15 independent countries emerge

25. Boris Yeltsin Elected first President of Russia in June 1991
Former Commie Boss and member of Politburo (so old regime technically)
Conflict with Gorbachev
1991 August is his finest moment
Economic turmoil (not all his fault)
Gives democracy a bad name “kleptocracy” because of economic reforms of
Chechen war
Appoints Putin PM in August 1999
Resigns in December 1999 and tells Putin “Take care of Russia” also apologizes to Russians!

26. Fast forward to last year or so
“…there are no steps forward. On the contrary, they are pulling us back into the past, while the country is urgently in need of modernization…
Putin wants to stay in power, but not so that he can finally solve our most pressing problems: education, healthcare, poverty. The people are not being asked, and the parties are puppets of the regime…”
--Mikhail Gorbachev, August 16, 2012
Transition and Democ opening at collapse of Soviet Union – can debate the 1990s and degree to which was “free” but most would agree that the “freedom train” has slipped back down the tracks since about INSERT FH SLIDE

27. Source: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2012/russia
Population: million
GNI/capita, PPP: US$19,240
Source: The data above were provided by The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2012.
Ratings are based ona scale of 1 to 7 with 1 = highest level of democ progress and 7 the lowest. Democ Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. The democ score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked ina given year. Freedom House scores it as “not free” and classifies it as “Consolidated Authoritarian Regime.” 2005 is first NOT FREE; Polity 4 calls it “open anocracy” which means a mixed or incoherent authority regime that is neither anfully instiutitonalized autocracy nor a fully institutionalized democracy. Clear in both cases, Russia is not developing as a consolidated democracy despite its growth. Truth be told, its leaders don’t really care.
Source:

28. Modernization (a refresher)
Economic growth leads to social change
Emergence of propertied middle class
Urbanization
Education levels rise
Middle class demand representation and accountable government in return for taxation by state
Mobilization of society leads to political liberalization and eventually democratic institutions of accountability
Modernization requires mobilization of society, not suppression of society or a state that overpowers society

29. Modernization Defied? Putin 2.0
Is Putin’s Russia defying modernization theory ?
Russian economy grew 7-8 percent year on year from ; emergence of urban middle class in big cities at least
Content, if not formal institutions, of democracy steadily eroded, but now erosion is accelerating under Putin version 2.0
What are implications for political and economic development in the next 5-11 years?

30. Russia’s Economic Growth 1999-2012 (with projected 2013)
GDP
Source: The World Bank, Perspectives on Development blog. Worldbank.org

31. Russian Economic Overview 2013
ECONOMY OVERVIEW
REGION Eastern Europe & Central Asia
INCOME CATEGORY Upper middle income
POPULATION 141,930,000
GNI PER CAPITA (US$) 10,400
DOING BUSINESS 2013 RANK 112
DOING BUSINESS 2012 RANK 118
CHANGE IN RANK
(Source:

32. Doing business in russia, 2013 Source:http://www. doingbusiness
TOPIC RANKINGS Change in Rank
Starting a Business
Dealing with Construction Permits
Getting Electricity No change
Registering Property
Getting Credit
Protecting Investors
Paying Taxes
Trading Across Borders
Enforcing Contracts
Resolving Insolvency
(rank is out of 185 countries)

33. What is Putinism?
Undermining Development:
Excessive dependence on natural resource revenues, even post 2008
Crony capitalism
Extreme inequality
Low investment in human capital
Low investment in infrastructural capital (even in oil)
Weak rule of law and uncertain property rights discourage foreign investment
Development though requires a state that is institutionalized ,not just one capable of maintaining stability; but capable of taking investment and turning it into higher outputs, longer lives, better infrastructure (roads, oil wells, etc.)

34. What is Putinism? Undermining Democracy
Weak accountability; elections don’t bring accountability, participation, or legitimacy
Personalization of power; informal rules matter more than formal institutions
Media control; weak and selective rule of law
All opposition viewed as subversive rather than “loyal” or constructive
state works against society in favor of private interests over public; corruption flourishes; security services discourage participation in public politics
State is a resource to drain– society to be controlled and manipulated so public interests don’t overwhelm those of private actors
TI – Russia has dropped from 76th in 1998 to 154th by 2010 of 182 countries.
-ease of doing business rank is 112th just ahead of El Salvador in 2012 INSERT EASE OF DOING BUSINESS INFO

35. Undermining legitimacy?
“Castling” of Medvedev/Putin in
Reactions to electoral results Dec and then protests in January and May 2012
Democracy not as easily managed as once was so must manage further and ultimately undermine it
Crackdown on civil society
Create imaginary enemies
Get rid of foreign influence
Undermining elections and even appearance of choice of leaders undermined legitimacy. So we get social protest; reaction is crackdown

36. Fall 2011

37. December 2011

38. Spring 2012

40. Spring 2012

41. Arab Spring, but no Russian Winter
Putin is still a relatively popular incumbent whereas Mubarak, etc. were not.
Got 60%+ of vote in March 2012 with some fraud (probably)
No real prospect of overthrow
No real alternative to Putin given poorly organized opposition and his persecution of potential opposition
Be careful not to generalize based on politics “Inside the Garden Ring” vs. “Rest of Russia”

42. Evolution vs. Revolution
Not all protests need to lead to regime change to have some positive effect
“Russian Winter” lead, at least initially, to evolutionary, not revolutionary, change in Russia
Putin forced to campaign (sort of )
Promises of some change and reform and now has to pay for those
Even evolutionary, incremental change, is better than no change at all
But change we seem to be seeing now is more evolving and hardening of autocracy, not democracy

43. The Modern Development Paradigm (Fukuyama)
Economic Growth
Social Mobilization
Legitimacy
State-building
Rule of Law
Accountability

44. Lessons Wealth and democracy Institutions matter
Sequence of development?
Performance legitimacy
External Influence on transition ineffective?