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Chapter 15 The Regulation of Markets and Institutions
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Key Ideas Different methods of regulating financial markets Dual banking system and the regulators who oversee it Universal banking and its possible benefits and risks 15-2
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Introduction Financial system is one of most intensely regulated sectors in US economy Objectives of the regulations are: To promote competition To protect individual consumers To maintain stability of financial system To facilitate monetary policy 15-3
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Regulation of the Primary Market Philosophy: Best protection is have adequate information about securities Full disclosure broadens participation in financial markets 15-4
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Regulation of the Primary Market Securities Act of 1933 Requires disclosure of information for newly issued publicly traded securities Privately held firms are not required to reveal financial information to the public at large, only to the lenders Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to administer provisions of 1933 Act Publicly traded security must file registration statement and preliminary prospectus disclosing information about issue 15-5
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Regulation of the Primary Market Securities Exchange Act of 1934 The prospectus does not state the interest rate on a bond issue or price for equity issues determined in the market when sold If information is adequate, SEC approves the statement and sale Approval by the SEC does not imply that it views the new issue as an attractive investment Approval simply means disclosure of information is adequate 15-6
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Regulation of Secondary Market Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Extended 1933 Act Periodic disclosure of relevant financial information For firms trading in secondary market 10K Report Annual financial statement and Information about a firm’s performance and activity Prohibits Insider Trading Prohibit insiders from trading on private information not previously disclosed to public Corporate officers and major stockholders must report all their transactions of their own firm’s stock 15-7
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Regulation of Commercial Banks Principle philosophy: Protect individual depositor Foster a competitive banking system Ensure bank safety and soundness 15-8
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Regulation of Commercial Banks U.S. Banking Regulatory Structure Dual banking system Federal and State banks existing side-by-side Legislation in 1860’s established federally chartered banks under supervision of Comptroller of the Currency (US Treasury Department) Intent was to drive existing state chartered banks out of business by imposing a prohibitive tax on issuance of state banknotes 15-9
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Regulation of Commercial Banks Dual banking system However, state banks survived Stopped issuing banknotes Started to accept of demand deposits State chartered banks are supervised by regulators in their respective state Federally chartered banks tend to be larger in size, but state banks are bigger in number 15-10
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Regulation of Commercial Banks Federal Reserve Act of 1913 Required national banks to become members of the Fed, State banks had option of being a nonmember All state banks (including nonmember) currently fall under regulation of the Fed Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) All member banks of Fed (national and some state banks) are required to carry FDIC insurance A majority of state banks (including non members) have opted to participate in FDIC program 15-11
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Regulation of Commercial Banks U.S. Banking Regulatory Structure Multiple and sometimes conflicting supervisory authority at Federal level Federal Reserve System Comptroller of Currency (Department of the Treasury), and FDIC Some experts suggest that all regulation should be combined in a single agency, but no legislation exists to unify the structure 15-12
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Regulation of Commercial Banks Protecting Individual Depositors and Financial System Stability Regulations do not relying upon disclosure Focus of bank regulation is on: Bank examinations Prompt corrective action (PCA) whenever necessary 15-13
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Regulation of Commercial Banks Primary Liabilities: Demand Deposit Paid on a first-come/first-serve basis Banks need to maintain sufficient liquidity to meet demand deposits It is costly to keep excess reserve or liquid assets Fear that a bank is insolvent will cause a run on the bank or a system-wide bank panic Periodic examination of a bank by regulatory agencies to insure banks are solvent 15-14
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Regulation of Commercial Banks Deposit Insurance FDIC established by Banking Act of 1933 to insure deposits at commercial and mutual savings banks. Created after a large number of bank failures in the early 1930’s Objective is to protect small savers Reduce the incentive for depositors to join a bank run 15-15
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Regulation of Commercial Banks Deposit Insurance Currently insure deposits up to $100,000 for single account Coverage depends on procedure used by FDIC: Payoff Method Bank goes into receivership by FDCI FDIC pays out funds up to $100,000 Purchase and Assumption Method FDIC merges failed bank with a healthy one Deposits of failed bank are assumed by solvent bank 15-16
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Regulation of Commercial Banks Moral Hazard and Deposit Insurance Existence of FDIC eliminates large-scale bank failure and bank run. However, it creates a classic moral hazard problem. With FDIC insurance, depositors have little or no incentive to monitor riskiness of their banks. Without monitoring, bank managers finds it easy to engage in risky activities. 15-17
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Regulation of Commercial Banks Moral Hazard and Deposit Insurance Shareholders and directors of banks have incentive to make their banks riskier at the expense of the FDIC “Too big to fail” Doctrine FDIC may extend loans to very large banks in trouble to allow continued operations This doctrine may unintentionally exacerbate the moral hazard problem Recently bank failures have increased due to banking deregulation and commercial banking activities becoming riskier 15-18
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Regulation of Commercial Banks Risk-Based Capital Requirements Bank capital acts as a cushion against failure Banks are required to maintain a capital to asset ratio This ratio measures of bank’s risk exposure Risk-based capital requirements Higher capital requirement for banks with risky assets. With higher risk amount of risk-based asset will go up. This will cause Capital to Asset ratio to go down. These requirements are agreed upon by the United States and members of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 15-19
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Regulation of Commercial Banks Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) Passed as a part of FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 Established procedures to handle troubled banks Designed to close banks before FDIC is exposed to excessive losses Prevent regulatory forbearance when regulators keep an insolvent institution operating in hopes of “turning it around” Banks are ranked according to their perceived risk and more restrictions placed on riskier banks Established a risk-based deposit insurance premium in FDIC charge insurance premium based on the perceived risk of the bank 15-20
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Regulation of Nondepository Regulations are designed based on the type of liabilities they issue Pension funds and life insurance companies Heavily regulated because their liabilities are purchased by small investors and need to protect small investors Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) Established the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation Guarantees defined benefits pension plans, subject to a maximum amount Establishes minimum reporting, disclosure and investment standards 15-21
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Regulation of Nondepository Life Insurance Companies Regulated at the state level Impose risk-based capital requirements Perform periodic audits Implicit and explicit restrictions on pricing of particular products 15-22
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Regulation of Nondepository Finance companies Raise funds by issuing debt and equity Have virtually no regulation beyond the securities laws governing publicly traded securities Mutual Funds Regulated by the SEC Also subject to state regulations Objective is to protection of individual investors through full disclosure 15-23
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The Glass-Steagall Act Segregated the banking industry from the rest of the financial services industry Banks are barred from owning corporate stock and other activities deemed too risky The Genesis of Glass-Steagall Prior to 1933, investment banking and commercial banking were conducted under same roof Following the financial collapse of the 1930s, it was felt that investment banking activities were too risky for banks 15-24
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The Glass-Steagall Act The Genesis of Glass-Steagall This combination represented a substantial threat to financial system stability Although there was little empirical evidence to support this contention, the legislation mandated separation of the two activities 15-25
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The Glass-Steagall Act The Erosion of Glass-Steagall Commercial banks exerted pressure on the Federal Reserve and courts to reduce the barriers caused by Glass-Steagall Bank-holding Companies Permitted banks to conduct nonbanking activities through subsidiaries In 1970 Federal Reserve was given power to determine what activities were permissible Activities had to be closely related to traditional banking During the 1970s and 80s banks acquired more freedom to engage in nontraditional banking activities 15-26
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The Glass-Steagall Act The Erosion of Glass-Steagall In 1989 the Federal Reserve granted five banks the power to underwrite corporate debt through a Section 20 affiliate Gradually the Federal Reserve granted more and more banks the right to underwrite corporate debt 15-27
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The Glass-Steagall Act The Erosion of Glass-Steagall The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1999) Allowed affiliates of financial holding companies to engage in various banking activities and insurance underwriting Overall responsibility for regulation lies with the Federal Reserve through its role as the “umbrella” regulator Federal Reserve has power to ensure capital adequacy of holding companies, safety and soundness of their activities Individual affiliates of holding companies are subject to regulation by functional supervisors such as the SEC This regulation framework blends the disclosure-based and inspection-based approaches to regulation 15-28
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The Glass-Steagall Act The Risk of Universal Banking Some concern that the risk of securities activities, especially the underwriting business, may jeopardize the stability of the banking system Would bank losses in securities activities lead to more bank failures and significant losses to FDIC Just because investment banking is riskier than commercial banking, this does not mean that the combination of the two will be riskier 15-29
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Universal Banking The Risk of Universal Banking The portfolio theory of risk suggests that diversification may reduce risk when commercial banking combine with investment banking and life insurance activities Perhaps it is time to let the banks decide for themselves whether universal banking reduces risk 15-30
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