1. Application Layer Firewalling With ISA Server 2004 Fred Baumhardt Lead Security Technology Architect Microsoft EMEA

2. Call to Action A quantum shift in thinking is needed to avoid a cataclysmic failure in global network security I don’t have all the answers in this session, lots of questions We have all been lucky major global worms have not carried class 0 (evil evil) payloads like format disk and flash BIOS Question all “experts” you hear and draw your own conclusion

3. Agenda The roots of the Internet and security The problem with conventional firewalls Advantage of application layer inspection Application inspection with ISA server Pre-authentication (OWA + IIS + Apache) Inbound SSL termination and inspection Filtration of HTTP content and URLs Other Application Filters Putting it all together

4. Internet Security Roots Lets be honest – from a security perspective: IPv4 is not great – not designed for Security The Internet used to require Security clearance to use – physical access was restricted – no need for protocol security Resistance to Nuclear attack was more important than protecting traffic Everyone on the network was trusted TCP/IP was thus designed without security in mind – added as a bolt-on

5. Security and HTTP We assume that HTTP is good business protocol– block almost all others outbound SO: Developers start using tunnelling over port 80- to deliver apps and data- call it web services Microsoft does it with Outlook and Exchange 2003 – we call it a feature (easy Outlook Conn) Joe Smith tunnels and uploads your HR database to your competition – you call him a hacker More concerned at blocking porn (by dest) than checking that the content is valid (by deep insp)

6. Tunneling When someone puts some sort of data in one port/socket– encapsulates it in some sort of packet – and sends it do a destination you allow (because you think it is doing something else) Example – HTTP-TUNNEL.com where you stick any (eg terminal server) traffic that is otherwise blocked- in TCP 80 and for 19.95 a month, they send it to the server you really want to talk to.

7. HTTP Tunnel

8. Lets Rip open a packet Currently – most firewalls check only basic packet information Real world equivalent of looking at the number and destination of a bus – and not looking at the passengers

9. Fundamental Assumptions L3/L4 We trust that traffic on a port is what we think it should be (TCP80==HTTP) We implicitly trust that the traffic going through is clean (as we admit we cant scan it) We don’t place these devices to protect from internal networks as our users are trusted The user in machine 1.2.3.4 must be the one that always uses that machine TCP 80 is almost always open to everywhere – The Universal Firewall Bypass and Avoidance Protocol Most of these mistakes result in a security breach which is usually blamed on the OS, or the app – but came over network

10. OK Guys, how would you do it ? Some keys to application inspection Segmentation of Logical Components in network – ALF can only inspect to/from somewhere Encryption only where required – with trusted context – it usually invalidates inspection, IDS Understanding the purpose of the traffic you are trying to filter, and blocking non consistent traffic Strategic depth-countermeasures covering entire classes of attacks, especially against worms Heuristical systems supplemented with behavioural systems, and intelligence

11. Built In Application Filters HTTP Syntax analysis, signature blocking OWA Forms Based Authentication SMTP Command and message filtering RPC Interface blocking FTP Read only support DNS Intrusion detection POP3 H.323 Allows H.323 traffic MMS Enables Microsoft media streaming All filters: - validate protocol RFC conformance - enable NAT traversal

12. Examples Of 3rd Party Filter Add-ons Expected to be available soon after ISA Server 2004 availability FiltersCompanies IMAkonix SOCKS 5 CornerPost Software SOAP/raw XML Forum Systems, Inc. Antivirus McAfee, GFI, Panda URL Filtering SurfControl, Futuresoft, FilterLogix, Cerberian, Wavecrest Intrusion Detection ISS, GFI Many add-ons in other firewall areas available For details see: http://www.microsoft.com/isaserver/partners

13. RPC server (Exchange) RPC client (Outlook) ServiceUUIDPortExchange{12341234-1111…4402 AD replication {01020304-4444…3544 MMC{19283746-7777…9233 RPC services grab random high ports when they start, server maintains table RPC – A typical challenge RPC 101 135/tcp Client connects to portmapper on server (port 135/tcp) Client knows UUID of service it wants {12341234-1111…} Client accesses application over learned port Client asks, “What port is associated with my UUID?” Server matches UUID to the current port… 4402/tcp Portmapper responds with the port and closes the connection 4402/tcp Due to the random nature of RPC, this is not feasible over the Internet All 64,512 high ports & port 135 must be opened on traditional firewalls

14. RPC Filter Security Learn the protocol and use its features to improve security Firewall only allows specific UUIDs Only DC Replication, or Only Exchange/Outlook Not defined UUIDs such as MMC, Printing blocked Takes back control of RPC behaviour Tunneling not allowed – as syntax is checked Exchange specific – like enforce client encryption ISA Server with Feature Pack 1 Exchange / RPC Server Outlook/ RPC Client RPCRPC Internal network External network

15. Protecting HTTPS Traditional firewall Web Srv/ OWA clientclient Web server prompts for authentication — any Internet user can access this prompt SSLSSL SSL tunnels through traditional firewalls because it is encrypted… …which allows viruses and worms to pass through undetected… …and infect internal servers! ISA Server 2004 with HTTP Filter Basic authentication delegation ISA Server pre-authenticates users, eliminating multiple dialog boxes and only allowing valid traffic through URLScan for ISA Server SSL or HTTP SSLSSL ISA Server can decrypt and inspect SSL traffic inspected traffic can be sent to the internal server re-encrypted or in the clear. URLScan for ISA Server HTTP filter for ISA Server can stop Web attacks at the network edge, even over encrypted inbound SSL Internet

16. Pre-Authentication No L7 password = no access to internal system – excellent failsafe Potential attackers go from 7 Billion to the number of people who have credentials to your network Worms will not have your credentials (hopefully ) ISA 2000 can also do this by RSA secure ID for HTTP (though not for RPC/HTTP with sec ID) Cookie pre-authentication for Outlook Web Access 2003 also available

17. Protecting HTTP and (S) cont. The Big Picture Understanding the protocol – how it works, what its rules are, and what to expect is critical Inbound HTTPS termination is easy (you control the cert) outbound is difficult Human behaviour is easy – FW admins close all ports so we use 80, thus we need to learn now to filter 80

18. Web Publishing Protection Worms usually go by IP or network range, they seldom know the FQDN (yet) Publish by FQDN https://mail.yc.com/exchange https://mail.yc.com/exchange Nothing gets in unless it asks firewall for the exact URL (in HTTP language) not just 212.30.12.1:T80 212.30.12.1:T80 Use HTTP Filter verbs – signature strings, and method blocking to eliminate entire classes of attacks Lets look at some examples

19. Example: Protecting A Web Server General Limit header length, query and URL length. Verify normalization. Methods Allow only specified methods: GET, HEAD, POST Extensions Block specified extensions (allow all others):.exe,.bat,.cmd,.com,.htw,.ida, idq,.htr,.idc,.shtm,.shtml,.stm,.printer,.ini,.log,.pol,.dat, ….. Signatures (Request URL) Block content containing these signatures..,./, \, :, %, &

20. Demonstration of HTTP Filtration

21. Example: Protocol Level Countermeasures HTTP General Limit header length, query and URL length. Verify normalization. Methods Allow only specified methods: GET, HEAD, POST Extensions Block specified extensions (allow all others):.exe,.bat,.cmd,.com,.htw,.ida, idq,.htr,.idc,.shtm,.shtml,.stm,.printer,.ini,.log,.pol,.dat, ….. Signatures (Request URL) Block content containing these signatures..,./, \, :, %, &

22. Example: Blocking Apps Over HTTP Application Search in HTTP header Signature MSN Messenger Request headers User-Agent: MSN Messenger Windows Messenger Request headers User-Agent:MSMSGS AOL Messenger (and Gecko browsers) Request headers User-Agent:Gecko/ Yahoo Messenger Request headers Hostmsg.yahoo.com Kazaa P2P-Agent Kazaa, Kazaaclient: Kazaa Request headers User-Agent:KazaaClient Kazaa X-Kazaa-Network:KaZaA Gnutella User-Agent:GnutellaGnucleus Edonkey User-Agent:e2dk Morpheus Response header ServerMorpheus

23. DNS Protection Rudimentary protection General anti- tunneling protection through T/U 53

24. Mail Protection Lots of Antispam and antivirus vendors cover the relay points- what about: IS TCP 25 really SMTP? Is someone sending a buffer overflow to the RCPT: command ? Can I block someone using the VRFY command ? Can I strip an attachment, or block a user Why not do the Protocol level protection at the network device, use the firewall to add a layer of defence for the mail system.

25. Mail Filtration Examples Requires another box to do the storage of mail Must link the box to ISA via RPC Applies Protocol validation and some keyword and attachment stripping Def in Dep – not primary mail solution

26. Encapsulated Traffic IPSEC (AH and ESP), PPTP etc can not be scanned at ISA server if published or allowed through If you tunnel traffic through these ports ISA will log the tunnel – can not look inside unless it is terminating the VPN Your call – open more ports with app filters or tunnel traffic through with no inspection – most DC protocols have no filters Be aware of the implications of NAT Be aware of the implications of NAT

27. VPN Termination ISA currently does intra-tunnel VPN inspection, so traffic coming in via VPN will be inspected at the application layer VPN Client Traffic is treated as a dedicated network – so you can control where it goes and its Application Filter rules Windows Server 2003 Quarantine with ISA VPN fully supported – excellent functionality

28. Extending The Platform Firewalls are placed in different locations for different reasons. Understand the requirement and filter accordingly Extend core functionality with protocol filters covering your specific scenario No one device will ever be the silver bullet, solutions are more important than devices

29. One Vision for Secure Networking Internet Redundant Routers ISA Firewalls VLAN DC + Infrastructure NIC teams/2 switches VLAN Front-end VLAN Backend Intrusion Detection First Tier Firewalls URL Filtering for OWA RPC Termination for Outlook One or more Switches Implement VLANs and Control Inter-VLAN Traffic like Firewalls do – VLANs are not bullet proof (but neither are servers) Traffic is allowed or blocked based on requirements of the application, filters understand and enforce these requirements.

30. Debunking Network Security Myths People DON’T play by the rules – unless you make them and ports are not intent – you need to check Hardware devices are NOT more secure – they are more convenient – that’s all Invest in getting to know the device, what it can/t do – don’t buy what you know – buy what you need Don’t let just the network people control and purchase firewalls – it takes application awareness

31. © 2003 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. This presentation is for informational purposes only. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, IN THIS SUMMARY.