1. POSC 2200 – International Security, War and Strife Russell Alan Williams Department of Political Science

2. Unit Six: International Security, War and Strife “Managing Insecurity” Required Reading: Required Reading: Mingst, Chapter 8. Mingst, Chapter 8. Mueller, The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World, Mingst and Snyder, pp. 341-346. Mueller, The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World, Mingst and Snyder, pp. 341-346. Outine: Outine: Arms Control Arms Control Collective Security Collective Security Balance of Power Balance of Power

3. 1) Arms Control: “Arms Control”: Restrictions on the research, manufacture and deployment of certain kinds of weapons systems “Arms Control”: Restrictions on the research, manufacture and deployment of certain kinds of weapons systems Reduce the spiral effect of arms races – limit growth Reduce the spiral effect of arms races – limit growth Prevent proliferation of dangerous weapons Prevent proliferation of dangerous weapons Regulate the use of weapons Regulate the use of weapons “Disarmament”: The Policy of eliminating states’ offensive weaponry “Disarmament”: The Policy of eliminating states’ offensive weaponry Reduce stockpiles of weapons - All, or some kinds Reduce stockpiles of weapons - All, or some kinds Assumes that reductions in the number of weapons increases security... Assumes that reductions in the number of weapons increases security... Both key aspects of liberal approach to “managing insecurity”

4. Motivations? 1) Reduce tensions that lead to war... General liberal belief that “security dilemma” can be reversed through cooperation General liberal belief that “security dilemma” can be reversed through cooperation Fear that weapons generate their own “logic of use” Fear that weapons generate their own “logic of use” 2) Save $$$$ Periods of arms control correspond with financial problems Periods of arms control correspond with financial problems 3) Reduce environmental and health hazards E.g. Nuclear weapons testing E.g. Nuclear weapons testing

5. Obstacles? 1. Shadow of the future... What threats will emerge in the future? What threats will emerge in the future? E.g. Post WWII US disarmament E.g. Post WWII US disarmament 2. Verification How do we know arms control agreements are being followed? How do we know arms control agreements are being followed? Technological improvements? “Flyovers” Technological improvements? “Flyovers” 3. Doubts over the value of arms control Arms control may not prevent war – the two are unrelated Arms control may not prevent war – the two are unrelated 4. Domestic political obstacles National pride and “Military-Industrial complex” National pride and “Military-Industrial complex”

6. History: Some ancient examples – Athens and Sparta Some ancient examples – Athens and Sparta Generally, arms control a 20 th Century phenomenon Generally, arms control a 20 th Century phenomenonWhy? Changing technology – weapons became increasingly lethal from WWI onwards.... Changing technology – weapons became increasingly lethal from WWI onwards.... Est. 40,000,000 casualties Est. 40,000,000 casualties

7. Washington Naval Conferences (1921- 1922) Washington Naval Conferences (1921- 1922) US, UK, Japan, France and Italy US, UK, Japan, France and Italy Agreed to limit “tonnage” of battleships – response to “Naval Race” Agreed to limit “tonnage” of battleships – response to “Naval Race” Tied to number of oceans to defend Tied to number of oceans to defend US and UK get large advantage but Japan cheats US and UK get large advantage but Japan cheats Geneva Protocol (1925-1928): treaty prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons Geneva Protocol (1925-1928): treaty prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons E.g. Chlorine Gas E.g. Chlorine Gas Effective???? Chemical & Biological weapons are hard to use... Effective???? Chemical & Biological weapons are hard to use...

8. Post WWII: Bilateral Strategic Nuclear Arms Control Problem: Rapid growth in number of nuclear weapons Problem: Rapid growth in number of nuclear weapons The “missile gap” The “missile gap” 25 Treaties since 1963 25 Treaties since 1963

9. Treaties (US and USSR): “Strategic Arms Limitations Talks – SALT I & II” (1972 & 1979) Tried to stop growth – stabilize arms race Tried to stop growth – stabilize arms race Freeze in number of offensive weapons Freeze in number of offensive weapons “Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty – ABM” (1973) Agreed to stop developing missile defense systems Agreed to stop developing missile defense systems Systems would destroy incoming missiles Systems would destroy incoming missiles Thought to be destabilizing (e.g. Deterrence) Thought to be destabilizing (e.g. Deterrence) US withdrew in 2002.... US withdrew in 2002....

10. End of Cold War – States intensify arms control efforts: “Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty – START I” (1991): Nuclear warheads reduced to 6,000 each Nuclear warheads reduced to 6,000 each 1,600 “delivery vehicles” 1,600 “delivery vehicles” “Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty – START II” (1993) Nuclear warheads to be reduced to 3,000 each (2007) Nuclear warheads to be reduced to 3,000 each (2007) “MIRV’s” banned “MIRV’s” banned Treaty never ratified – Russian response to US missile defense initiatives Treaty never ratified – Russian response to US missile defense initiatives

11. “Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty – SORT” (2002): Further 2/3 reduction in number of warheads Further 2/3 reduction in number of warheads No limitations on MIRV’s No limitations on MIRV’s

12. Implications: Success? Success? Number of warheads cut by at least 80% Number of warheads cut by at least 80% Problems? Problems? MAD doctrine remains in place MAD doctrine remains in place “Tactical” weapons unregulated “Tactical” weapons unregulated Many weapons “mothballed” Many weapons “mothballed”

13. Multilateral Arms Control: Focused on “proliferation” of dangerous weapons – WMD’s Focused on “proliferation” of dangerous weapons – WMD’s Consistent with the security concerns of powerful states (!) Consistent with the security concerns of powerful states (!) 1) “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - NPT” (1968, renewed 1995) Bans sales, acquisition and production of nuclear weapons in all states that were not recognized as nuclear powers: Bans sales, acquisition and production of nuclear weapons in all states that were not recognized as nuclear powers: US, UK, Russia, France and China (note the coincidence?) US, UK, Russia, France and China (note the coincidence?) “Non-nuclear states” subject to IAEA inspections “Non-nuclear states” subject to IAEA inspections

14. 2) “Partial Test Ban Treaty” (1963): Banned atmospheric and underwater testing of nuclear weapons Banned atmospheric and underwater testing of nuclear weapons Number of tests higher after the treaty (!) Number of tests higher after the treaty (!) Did not ban underground tests Did not ban underground tests 3) “Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty” (1996-?): Proposed complete ban on nuclear weapons tests – supported by UN General Assembly Proposed complete ban on nuclear weapons tests – supported by UN General Assembly Legally binding if all 44 countries with atomic energy ratify treaty Legally binding if all 44 countries with atomic energy ratify treaty Status = ? Undermined by existing nuclear powers Status = ? Undermined by existing nuclear powers France, Britain, Russia all ratified France, Britain, Russia all ratified China, Israel, India, Pakistan and the US have not – though some not testing China, Israel, India, Pakistan and the US have not – though some not testing

15. Nuclear non-proliferation regime under strain? New nuclear powers New nuclear powers 1. Non-NPT members: Indian and Pakistan Indian and Pakistan 1. NPT Members (Lies, lies and more lies!!) Israel? Israel? Iran? Iran? Libya and Iraq? Libya and Iraq? North Korea? North Korea? Proliferation is easy and it is the “fast track” to international power Proliferation is easy and it is the “fast track” to international power However, most states have honored the treaty despite incentives to break it However, most states have honored the treaty despite incentives to break it

16. Chemical and Biological Weapons: Building on Geneva Protocol – International law already prohibit use of chemical weapons Building on Geneva Protocol – International law already prohibit use of chemical weapons “Biological Weapons Convention” (1972): States agreed not to develop more, and to get rid of all biological weapons E.g. Anthrax E.g. Anthrax “Chemical Weapons Convention” (1993): All chemical weapons were to be destroyed by 2005 184 signed treaty by 2002 184 signed treaty by 2002 Problems? Problems? Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Syria refused – some in response to Israel's nuclear weapons Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Syria refused – some in response to Israel's nuclear weapons Hard to verify... Hard to verify... Bush administration withdrew some US compliance Bush administration withdrew some US compliance

17. New Areas – related to “human security”: Antipersonnel landmines Antipersonnel landmines Small arms Small arms

18. “Campaign to Control Small Arms” NGO Campaign NGO Campaign E.g. “Project Ploughshares” E.g. “Project Ploughshares” Supporting UN “Human Security” initiatives to limit spread of “small arms” Supporting UN “Human Security” initiatives to limit spread of “small arms” One person per minute killed One person per minute killed Goals? A UN “Arms Trade Treaty” Limit illicit spread of weapons Limit illicit spread of weapons Regulate legal trade – where weapons likely to be used to violate human rights Regulate legal trade – where weapons likely to be used to violate human rights http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/ArmsTradeTreaty/html/ATT.shtml

19. 2) Collective Security: Key part of liberal strategy for managing insecurity Key part of liberal strategy for managing insecurity “Collective Security”: Concept that aggression against a state should be defeated collectively – because aggression against one state is aggression against all.... “Collective Security”: Concept that aggression against a state should be defeated collectively – because aggression against one state is aggression against all.... League of Nations and UN – less effective League of Nations and UN – less effective Assumes it easy to identify the aggressor and that the aggressor is always outside of international norms Assumes it easy to identify the aggressor and that the aggressor is always outside of international norms Military Alliances – more effective Military Alliances – more effective Can only work if aggressors come to believe that states will act against them Can only work if aggressors come to believe that states will act against them

20. 3) The Balance of Power: Realist approach to managing insecurity Realist approach to managing insecurity =Ensure peace through the acquisition of military capabilities and alliances that make war with you undesirable Arms control and collective security are for lawyers - Probably do more harm then good Arms control and collective security are for lawyers - Probably do more harm then good E.g. Powers involved in the “Naval Race” were right! E.g. Powers involved in the “Naval Race” were right! Helped Britain win WWI Helped Britain win WWI

21. “Deterrence Theory”: Assumes that rational decision makers will avoid war where costs are going to be high Seek peaceful resolutions Seek peaceful resolutions Key Claim: Effective military capabilities make the costs of war higher Key Claim: Effective military capabilities make the costs of war higher Meaning... Arm your state and probably acquire WMD’s Meaning... Arm your state and probably acquire WMD’s

22. Risks of deterrence theory: Role of non-state actors in modern security environment Role of non-state actors in modern security environment Problem of proliferation Problem of proliferation Problem of “non-state armies” Problem of “non-state armies” Modern “imbalance of power” Modern “imbalance of power” Logic of deterrence and offensive realism suggests US “primacy” should be used Logic of deterrence and offensive realism suggests US “primacy” should be used E.g. China’s Nuclear weakness.... E.g. China’s Nuclear weakness....

23. 4) Conclusions – Security War & Strife: 1) Is conventional “general war” becoming obsolete? Yes, but... mechanisms of preventing war focus only on these kind of conflicts – still a lot of wars Yes, but... mechanisms of preventing war focus only on these kind of conflicts – still a lot of wars 2) What is the impact of the advent of WMD’s on the nature of war? Theoretical question – no consensus Theoretical question – no consensus 3) Why is modern war a mainly “southern” phenomenon Because southern states lack power to deter attack (Waltz) Because southern states lack power to deter attack (Waltz) Because northern states have a normative consensus against war with each other (Mueller) Because northern states have a normative consensus against war with each other (Mueller) Because southern states are “weak” and “artificial” – resolve internal political problems through violence Because southern states are “weak” and “artificial” – resolve internal political problems through violence

24. 5) For Next Time... Unit Seven: International Political Economy Required Reading: Mingst, Chapter 9. Mingst, Chapter 9. Scott, The Great Divide in the Global Village, Mingst and Snyder, pp. 421-430. Scott, The Great Divide in the Global Village, Mingst and Snyder, pp. 421-430.