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© 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 Over the Router, Through the Firewall, to Grandma’s House We Go George Kurtz & Eric Schultze.

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Presentation on theme: "© 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 Over the Router, Through the Firewall, to Grandma’s House We Go George Kurtz & Eric Schultze."— Presentation transcript:

1 © 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 Over the Router, Through the Firewall, to Grandma’s House We Go George Kurtz & Eric Schultze Ernst & Young LLP

2 e © 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 Session Objective  Discuss common DMZ and host configuration weaknesses  Demonstrate what may happen if a hacker were to exploit these weaknesses  Present countermeasures to help secure the network and related hosts

3 e © 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 Network Diagram 10.1.1.20 10.1.1.10 172.16.1.200 172.16.1.50 192.168.1.20

4 e © 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 Network Design  Internet router is blocking tcp/udp ports 135-139  NT Web Server (SP3) is dual-homed  Firewall allows only outbound http (80) and smtp (25) traffic

5 e © 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 Hacker’s Objective Gain Control over Internal NT Server from the Internet

6 e © 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 SysAdmin’s Objective Identify Holes in the Environment and Close Them

7 e © 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 Target Selection  Ping Sweep  gping, fping  Port Scan  nmap  NetscanTools Pro 2000  OS Identification  nmap -O  queso  Banner Grabbing  VisualRoute, Netcat

8 e © 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 ttdb  Buffer overflow in rpc.ttdbserver  Allows user to execute arbitrary code  Arbitrary code may be executed that will shell back xterm as root

9 e © 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 Netcat Redirection 10.1.1.20 172.16.1.50 172.16.1.200

10 e © 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 Netcat Redirection  Attack Linux listens on 139 and redirects to 1139 on Sparc  Sparc listens on 1139 and redirects to 139 on NT Web Server  Attack NT issues NetBIOS request to Attack Linux  NetBIOS request is forwarded over Router to NT Web Server

11 e © 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 Enumerate NT Information  Null Session  net use \\172.16.1.50\ipc$ “” /user:””  NetUserEnum (local, global, DumpACL)  NetWkstaTransportEnum (Getmac)  RpcMgmt Query (EPDump)

12 e © 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 Privilege Escalation  Plant sechole on NT Server  Execute sechole via http  IUSR account becomes admin  Add new user account (via http)  Add new user account to Administrator group (via http)

13 e © 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 IIS Buffer Overflow  Determine if Server is vulnerable  nc 172.16.1.200 80  GET /.htr HTTP/1.0  Evaluate response  Crash IIS and Send Payload  Target server contacts our web server and downloads payload  payload executes on server and contacts our attack host

14 e © 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 VNC

15 e © 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 Pass The Hash  Modified SMB client can mount shares (C$, etc) on a remote NT host using only the username and password hash  No need to “decrypt” the password hash  Concept first presented by Paul Ashton in an NTBugtraq post

16 e © 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 Pass The Hash v.2  Create an admin account on our own NT host with same name as the admin account for which we have hash values  Upload the hash values into memory on our own NT host  Perform pass-through authentication to target host  No need to “decrypt” the password

17 e © 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 Network Diagram 10.1.1.20 172.16.1.200 172.16.1.50 192.168.1.20

18 e © 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 Shovel The Shell 10.1.1.20 192.168.1.20

19 e © 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 Shovel The Shell  Launch two Netcat Listeners on Attack1a (ports 80 and 25)  Execute Trojan on NT Server:  Netcat TO port 80 on AttackLinux  Commands typed on AttackLinux (port 80) are piped to CMD.exe on NT Server  CMD.exe output is Netcatted TO port 25 on AttackLinux  Type commands in 80 window, view output in 25 window

20 e © 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 Network Countermeasures  Block ALL ports at the border routers  Open only those ports that support your security policy  Review Logs  Implement Network and Host Intrusion Detection

21 e © 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 Unix Countermeasures  TTDB  Kill the "rpc.ttdbserverd" process  Apply vendor specific patches  Block low and high numbered RPC locator services at the border router  Xterm  Remove trusted relationships with xhost -  If sending sessions to another terminal, restrict to a specific terminal  Block ports 6000-6063 if necessary

22 e © 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 NT Countermeasures  Block tcp and udp ports 135, 137, 138 and 139 at the router.  Prevent Information leakage:  Utilize the Restrict anonymous registry key: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\ Control\Lsa\ RestrictAnonymous DWORD =1  Unbind “WINS Client (TCP/IP)” from the Internet-connected NIC

23 e © 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 NT Countermeasures  Password composition  7 characters is the strongest humanly usable length, 14 is the strongest  Use meta-characters within the first 7 characters of your password  Utilize account lockout  Utilize the passfilt.dll to require stronger passwords  Utilize Passprop.exe admin lockout feature

24 e © 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 NT Countermeasures  Apply current service packs and security related hotfixes  Review IIS security checklist: www.microsoft.com/security/products/iis/CheckList.asp

25 e © 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 Countermeasures Disclaimer:  Test all changes on a non- production host before implementing on production servers

26 e © 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 Tools and Concepts  Visual Routewww.visualroute.com  NetScanTools Prowww.nwpsw.com  gping, fpingwww.securityfocus.com  nmapwww.insecure.org/nmap/  quesowww.apostols.org/projectz/  ttdb exploitwww.securityfocus.com  netcatwww.l0pht.com  rinetdwww.boutell.com

27 e © 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 Tools and Concepts  VMWarewww.vmware.com  NT Resource Kitwww.microsoft.com  DumpACLwww.somarsoft.com  secholewww.cybermedia.co.in  pwdumpwww.rootshell.com  L0phtCrackwww.l0pht.com  VNCwww.uk.research.att.com  modified SMB clientwww.ntbugtraq.com

28 e © 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 Security Resources  www.microsoft.com/security  Advisories  Patches  IIS Security Checklist  www.securityfocus.com  Bugtraq Mailing List  Tools, Books, Links  Vulnerabilities and Fixes

29 e © 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 Osborne/ McGraw-Hill Hacking Exposed: Network Security Secrets and Solutions George Kurtz Stuart McClure Joel Scambray Due Out September 1999

30 e © 1999 Ernst & Young LLP e treme hacking Black Hat 1999 Contact Information  George Kurtz  george.kurtz@ey.com  (201) 836-5280  Eric Schultze  eric.schultze@ey.com  (425) 990-6916  Web Site  www.ey.com/security


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