1. Transnational Politics Drug trafficking: The power of network analysis

2. Today  Columbian drug cartels: a myth?  The ‘kingpins’ and ‘drug lords’: How to frame and mobilize for a ‘war on drugs’  What can the study of NGOs and TANs (Keck/Sikkink) contribute to our understanding of drug trafficking?  Readings:  From the bottom-up: Michael Kenney, ‘The Architecture of Drug Trafficking: network Forms of Organization in the Colombian Cocaine Trade’  From the top-down: World Drug Report, 2007 Wednesday, 2/13/2008Hans Peter Schmitz

3. The Cartel: a myth?  Key argument: Not vertically organized ‘cartels,’ but small, independent and networked suppliers dominate the drug trade.  Myth of powerful, coordinated price-fixing and strategic planning.  Method: Interviews with law enforcement/traffickers. Wednesday, 2/13/2008Hans Peter Schmitz

4. Four sections  Kenney, p. 236  First section: Literature on criminal networks  Organizational/social network analysis  Second section: Empirical example of the Columbian case  Wheel and chain networks  Third section: Rules of drug trafficking  Routines and experience  Fourth section: Individual participation in the networks Wednesday, 2/13/2008Hans Peter Schmitz

5. 1. Theory: Network analysis  Shared norms and customs.  Fluid networks based on kinship, not hierarchy or formal organization (see Keck/Sikkink).  Social network analysis.  Focus on individuals’ relational ties.  Leads to more transnational ties across societies.  Increased connectivity: decreased costs of communication.  Organizational network analysis.  Focus on groups and cooperation across organizations. Wednesday, 2/13/2008Hans Peter Schmitz

6. Individuals and groups  Compare Kenney to Keck/Sikkink:  Social network analysis: explains why individuals participate in networks (shared norms; K/S: who is part of a TAN?).  Organizational network analysis: explains how groups cooperate (K/S: how does a TAN produce a campaign?) Wednesday, 2/13/2008Hans Peter Schmitz

7. 2. Empirical case: Columbian networks The dilemma (241): Information-sharing is necessary, but increases the risk of exposure (to competitors and law enforcement).  Why networks do better (than hierarchies and markets) in addressing this dilemma:  Better than hierarchies: looser structure, decentralized decision-making, better chances of survival.  Better than markets: more enforcement power and control based on family and other ties. Wednesday, 2/13/2008Hans Peter Schmitz

8. What integrates networks? Shared experiences, communication, and trust (242): TANs: principles such as human rights. Illicit networks: Economic gain, social ties. Inter-group networks: producers > processors > exporters > distributors > money launders > etc. Inter-personal networks: create trust and reciprocity, lower chances of ‘free-riding,’ sharing of knowledge. Wednesday, 2/13/2008Hans Peter Schmitz

9. Wheel and chain networks  Organizational analysis  Wheel (hub, star) networks, 243: A core group has superior capabilities and control. Mode: contract out services.  Advantage: better coordination and more power to corrupt officials.  Disadvantage: vulnerable to ‘head hunting’  Chain networks, 244: No core group and coordination from a center.  Advantage: greater insulation of individual groups.  Disadvantage: less powerful and less capable to deal with internal dissent. Wednesday, 2/13/2008Hans Peter Schmitz

10. 3. The Rules of Drug Trafficking  p. 249: How do ‘flat’ networks actually work?  Illicit networks, just like TANs, frequently operate in hostile environments.  Rules are significant tools to regulate behavior, but rarely written down.  Inter-subjective understandings (compare to def. of norms)  Information politics (K/S): Expertise matters.  Symbolic politics (K/S): Without written rules, symbols, stories, and social interaction dominate networks. Wednesday, 2/13/2008Hans Peter Schmitz

11. 4. Individual participation Secrecy requires steady supply of new participants.  How individuals get involved:  Based on family or other social ties.  Gradual inclusion based on reciprocity and trust.  Based on experience in trafficking in a non-drug related field.  How to get out (p. 255)  Retirement.  Involuntary expulsion.  Arrest and death. Wednesday, 2/13/2008Hans Peter Schmitz

12. Conclusions: An answer? If the ‘kingpin’ strategy has failed, what is Kenney’s recommendations in dealing with illicit drugs as a transnational problem? If Kenney’s analysis is correct, what does this mean for U.S. foreign and domestic drug policies? Looking ahead to the presentations:  Supply vs. demand-driven approaches to illicit drugs.  Pros and cons of legalization. Wednesday, 2/13/2008Hans Peter Schmitz