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Finding Vulnerable Network Gadgets in the Internet Topology Author: Nir Amar Supervisor: Dr. Gabi Nakibly Author: Nir Amar Supervisor: Dr. Gabi Nakibly.

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Presentation on theme: "Finding Vulnerable Network Gadgets in the Internet Topology Author: Nir Amar Supervisor: Dr. Gabi Nakibly Author: Nir Amar Supervisor: Dr. Gabi Nakibly."— Presentation transcript:

1 Finding Vulnerable Network Gadgets in the Internet Topology Author: Nir Amar Supervisor: Dr. Gabi Nakibly Author: Nir Amar Supervisor: Dr. Gabi Nakibly

2 Background  The Internet – composed of some 50,000 autonomous systems (AS).  An AS is a collection of networks and routers which are administered by a single authority, i.e., an ISP, a large corporation or a university.  The routing between the different ASes is done using a protocol called BGP.  The Internet – composed of some 50,000 autonomous systems (AS).  An AS is a collection of networks and routers which are administered by a single authority, i.e., an ISP, a large corporation or a university.  The routing between the different ASes is done using a protocol called BGP.

3 BGP and Relationships

4 Import, Routing and Export policies  Upon receiving a route update for a given set of subnets, needs to decide whether to accept this update (Import policy)  If the update is accepted, need to decide whether to use the proposed route. (routing policy)  If the this path is chosen for routing, need to determine whether to propagate the update to the neighboring As’s. ( export policies)  Upon receiving a route update for a given set of subnets, needs to decide whether to accept this update (Import policy)  If the update is accepted, need to decide whether to use the proposed route. (routing policy)  If the this path is chosen for routing, need to determine whether to propagate the update to the neighboring As’s. ( export policies)

5 How Secure are Secure Interdomain Routing Protocols?  Authors  Sharon Goldberg, Michael Schapira, Peter Hummon and Jennifer Rexford.  Intuition – Shortest Path, Export All  Counter-Intuitive Attacks  Attract More by Announcing Longer Paths  Attract More by Exporting to Less Neighbors  Authors  Sharon Goldberg, Michael Schapira, Peter Hummon and Jennifer Rexford.  Intuition – Shortest Path, Export All  Counter-Intuitive Attacks  Attract More by Announcing Longer Paths  Attract More by Exporting to Less Neighbors

6 Goal

7 Attacking BGP  BGP Attacks Classification  Attraction – Attract traffic  Interception – eavesdrop or tamper with traffic before forwarding it on to the legitimate destination.  Quantifying the impact of attacks  Attraction – Shortest Path, Export All  Interception – Shortest Path, Export All, with Connectivity.  BGP Attacks Classification  Attraction – Attract traffic  Interception – eavesdrop or tamper with traffic before forwarding it on to the legitimate destination.  Quantifying the impact of attacks  Attraction – Shortest Path, Export All  Interception – Shortest Path, Export All, with Connectivity. Middle Dst Src

8 Overall Sequence User parameters: Topology and Attack Simulate BGP using the SW model Assert (Non-deterministic Attack < Intuitive Attack) ExpiSat Counter intuitive attack

9 Findings and Results

10 Topology Generation  Time and Memory Consuming  Two non-deterministic decisions:  How many As'es are in the topology  What is the relation between each As'es pair?  Time and Memory Consuming  Two non-deterministic decisions:  How many As'es are in the topology  What is the relation between each As'es pair?  Characteristics for Reducing Topologies Size

11 Topology Generation – Example Cdcdcsdcdsc dscdscdsc 702 13030 43284 6757 432 654 236 756

12 Interception Attack – Intuitive Cdcdcsdcdsc dscdscdsc 702 13030 43284 6757 432 654 236 756

13 Interception Attack – Counter – Intuitive Cdcdcsdcdsc dscdscdsc 702 13030 43284 6757 432 654 236 756

14 Attack Generation – Interception Attack On Non-Deterministic Topology 702 13030 43284 6757 432 654 236 756

15 Attraction Attack – Intuitive Cdcdcsdcdsc dscdscdsc 702 13030 43284 6757 432 654 236 756

16 Note The topology and the attack creation are un-related!  The user can decide that he have a special topology that he want to find a counter- intuitive attack on it. The software allows such thing to happen.  Same for the case that the user have a specific attack (for example – shortest-path- export-all attack) that he would like to test it on several topologies. The topology and the attack creation are un-related!  The user can decide that he have a special topology that he want to find a counter- intuitive attack on it. The software allows such thing to happen.  Same for the case that the user have a specific attack (for example – shortest-path- export-all attack) that he would like to test it on several topologies.

17 Conclusion Generating non deterministic attacks. Find gadgets and Appropriate "smart / counter-intuitive" attacks using Software Verification tool Generating non deterministic topologies Succeeded to generate topologies (up to size 5-6) in my memory constraints,

18 The End.


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