1. THE RISE OF THE NEW LEFT

2. “OLD” v. “NEW” LEFT Old Left (1940s-1980s): sought to seize power through armed revolution; adhered to Marxist ideology; sought to impose radical social programs; most successful against retrograde dictatorships (Batista in Cuba, Somoza in Nicaragua) New Left (1990s-present): seeks to win power through democratic elections; promotes a vague agenda of “social justice” and radical reform (not revolution); most successful under conditions of glaring social inequality (e.g. Venezuela, Brazil)

3. THE NEW LEFT: ORIGINS Economic—lack of growth (through 2003), poverty and inequality, frustration with Washington Consensus Political—weakness of representative institutions, inattention to poor, persistence of corruption; possibility of victory International—war in Iraq, opposition to Bush policies and growing distaste for American society

4. MEMBERSHIP Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela (1998, 2004, 2006, 2011, 2014) Lula, Brazil (2002, 2006) and Dilma Rousseff (2010, 2014) Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández, Argentina (2003, 2007, 2011) Evo Morales, Bolivia (2005, 2009, 2014) Daniel Ortega, Nicaragua (2006, 2011) Manuel Zelaya, Honduras (2006)* Rafael Correa, Ecuador (2006, 2010) Fernando Lugo, Paraguay (2008)* Mauricio Funes and Salvador Sánchez Cerén, El Salvador (2009, 2014) José Mujica, Uruguay (2010) Ollanta Humala, Peru (2011) Near-Miss: Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Mexico (2006) *ousted by “constitutional coup”

6. THE NEW LEFT: GOALS Domestic—winning power, rearranging electoral alignments; overturning status quo, possibly through institutional reform; changing policy direction Hemispheric—gaining support throughout Latin America (invoking “Bolivarian dream”), reducing U.S. hegemony (and opposing FTAA) Global—challenging international order, forging alliances with developing world and non-aligned nations

7. CLARIFICATION Disenchanted masses in Latin America ≠ Voters for pink tide candidates ≠ Leftist candidates for office ≠ Leftist winners of presidential elections ≠ Pro-Chávez chief executives ≠ Hugo Chávez Notes:  Tidal swell is spontaneous, not organized  Rivalries and defections

9. THE PROBLEM WITH HUGO Used language of the street (including the Arab street)—e.g., the “devil” speech Sat atop petroleum Put money where his mouth was Broke established rules of the game Played off resentment of Bush, U.S. power Challenged Washington Consensus Went for high stakes Sought rearrangement of prevailing world order And now…? With changes in leadership?

10. U.S. VISIONS FOR LATIN AMERICA Democratic—with tilt to right or center-right Prosperous—with commitment to free-market policies and ties to United States Unified—under U.S. leadership Peaceful—in view of unanimity Deferential—following U.S. lead in global arena

11. REALITY CHECK Democracy = broad ideological spectrum, from “left” to “right” Prosperity = mixed economies; rejection of Washington Consensus, FTAs, and FTAA Ideology = diversity rather than unity Outlooks = anti-U.S. attitudes strong among large share of population (slight improvement with Obama) Alliances = rejection of U.S. leadership and rules of the game

12. CHALLENGING AMERICAN MYTHS The Cherished Assumption—freely elected leaders will support U.S. policy The Western Hemisphere idea—the new world is distinct from old, will forge common front in international arena Democracy rationale for “regime change”—free elections as protective shield The hegemonic presumption—the United States can dictate political life in Latin America

13. The End.