1. SIZING UP THE NEIGHBORHOOD

2. PREMISES Prospects for projection onto global arena depend to a considerable extent on position within the hemispheric arena, thus focus on: Relationships with other countries of the region, Relationship with the United States, and Choice of strategic options (a.k.a. “grand strategies”).

4. AFTER THE COLD WAR 1. Collapse of the Soviet Union 2. U.S. military primacy: the “unipolar moment” 3. “The End of History”? 4. Transnationalization and non-state actors 5. Process of “globalization” 6. Shift from geo-politics to “geo-economics” 7. Economic multipolarity: Europe, Japan, China (later), others?

5. CONDITIONS IN LATIN AMERICA Ideological divisions: left, right, center Prevalence of democratic discourse Focus on “strategic options” Unavailable alternatives:  Bolivarian dream of collective unity  Rule of international law, organizations  Social revolution Thus: geo-economic option (with U.S. focused on geopolitics)

6. GEO-ECONOMICS: RULES OF THE GAME 1. Presumably “peaceful” competition 2. Positive-sum, not zero- or negative-sum 3. Goal: increase or guarantee share of economic benefits—without destroying (or even defeating) rivals 4. Repeated iterations 5. Strategy: Maintenance of global “stability” 6. Tactic: formation of “open” blocs

7. GEO-ECONOMICS (ii) Competitive arenas:  Consumer markets, natural resources (energy, water, etc.)  Technology  Financial markets State roles:  Direct participation  Shaping of incentives  Legitimacy on basis of “market discourse” Regional integration:  Strong seek to perpetuate primacy  Weak seek to avoid exclusion  Thus asymmetrical bargaining  Hub-and-spoke configurations

8. RULES OF THE GEOPOLITICAL GAME 1. Nations can respond however they choose—including the use of indiscriminate force. 2. Preventive action is appropriate and acceptable. 3. There is no need to adhere to international treaties or conventions. 4. Alliances are formed around one central issue—the anti-terror campaign under U.S. leadership. Support is black-white. Democracy and human rights are secondary issues. 5. Spectator nations must tread cautiously.

10. RESPONSES FROM LATIN AMERICA Broad sympathy; scores of own citizens Occasional satisfaction OAS support for action “as appropriate” Appeals for proportionality Fidel Castro: against terrorism and against war Preferred option: the sidelines (as “spectators”) Entanglements at the UN

11. … AND BARACK OBAMA? Redefinition of war against terror  Afghanistan > Iraq  Al Qaeda ≠ Taliban  Rules of game more subtly applied Re Latin America, changes in rhetoric and emphasis rather than substance  “Spectator” role regarding war on terror  Immigration  Drugs and drug trafficking  Preference for geo-economic game

12. TWO-LEVEL GAMES Geo-economic game + new geopolitical game, superimposed and simultaneous Geopolitics > geo-economics if necessary  Low priority for region  Benefits of inattention (benign neglect?)  National preferences: which game to play? Examples:  FTAs on basis of geopolitics  Reluctance on immigration reform  Allies in wars on drugs Contradictions and trade-offs

13. PLAYING THE GEOECONOMIC GAME

14. 1. TURN TOWARD THE NORTH Vicente Fox (Mexico)  Hopes for immigration reform  NAFTA as resource  Opposition throughout Latin America Comrades in the War on Terror (Geopolitics too)  Colombia  Guatemala The FTA Club  Chile [special case]  Central America + DR  Peru  Colombia  Panama

15. 2. SUBREGIONAL HEGEMONY Brazil (Lula + Dilma)  Grandeza brasileira  Resistance to FTAA  Mercosul and SAFTA and UNASUR Venezuela (Chávez)  ALBA (Alternativa Bolivariana para las Américas)  International assistance programs  Alliances with Cuba and “pink tide” countries  Denunciations of Bush and USA  Resistance to FTAA (r.i.p.)

16. 3. THIRD WORLD SOLIDARITY Brazil (Lula + Dilma)  WTO  Group of 20+ (a.k.a. 21)  BRICS Venezuela (Chávez)  Non-Aligned Movement  UN Security Council  Petroleum exporters (including Iran)

17. 4. BEYOND THE HEMISPHERE Europe  Divisions over Iraq  Concern about EU future  FTAs with Mexico, Chile  Distancing from/by Spain Asia  Withdrawal of Japan  Eruption of “China fever”  PRC “strategic partnerships” with Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, Mexico; “cooperative partnership” with Chile, “friendly and cooperative relations” with Cuba Iran?  Really?

18. POWER RANKINGS:LATIN AMERICA PopulationGDP (bns)GNP/capita 1. Brazil 195 2,143 9,540 2. Mexico 113 1,035 8,910 3. Venezuela 29 394 11,630 4. Argentina 40 369 8,620 5. Colombia 46 286 5,480 6. Peru 29 154 4,630 7. Chile 17 216 10,750 others…? Note: NWFZ under Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967, 2002).

19. CHOICES AND COROLLARIES  Act alone in global arena (a dubious enterprise)  Act in global arena with allies:  Within hemisphere  Outside hemisphere  Define relationship with United States:  Valued by USA  Critical of USA  Distant but correct  Demonstrate autonomy  Establish links throughout developing world  Seek level playing fields  Focus on geo-economics > geopolitics

20. ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS Exports to China, 2008:  Argentina 9.0%  Brazil12.4%  Chile 4.8%  Mexico 0.7%  Cuba18.4% Liberation from IMF:  Argentina2005 ($9.8 bn)  Brazil2005 ($15.5 bn)  IMF “relegated to sidelines”

21. U.S. SHARES OF TRADE, 2000-2010 Imports__2000_____2010___  Argentina 19.1 13.8  Brazil 23.1 15.0  Chile 17.8 17.0  Mexico 72.0 60.6  Venezuela 33.5 26.6 Exports__2000__ ___2010___  Argentina 12.0 5.4  Brazil 22.4 9.6  Chile 16.8 10.4  Mexico 88.7 73.5  Venezuela 51.9 38.7

22. POLITICAL DIMENSIONS Distaste for GWB and U.S. policies Resuscitation of Cuba (and now?) Regional organizations w/o USA:  Rio Group (1986, 23 members)  Latin American Summit on Integration and Development (2008, 33 members)  CELAC (2010, 33 members)  Ibero-American Summits (1991)  MERCOSUR (1991, 4 members plus)  ALBA (2004, 11 members)  UNASUR (2005)  Alianza del Pacífico (2010, 4 members)

23. The End.