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Making Simple Decisions Copyright, 1996 © Dale Carnegie & Associates, Inc. Chapter 16.

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Presentation on theme: "Making Simple Decisions Copyright, 1996 © Dale Carnegie & Associates, Inc. Chapter 16."— Presentation transcript:

1 Making Simple Decisions Copyright, 1996 © Dale Carnegie & Associates, Inc. Chapter 16

2 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/20052 Outline Combining beliefs and desires under Uncertainty The basis of Utility Theory Utility functions Multiattribute Utility functions Decision Networks The value of Information Decision-Theoretic Expert Systems

3 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/20053 Combining beliefs and desires Decision-theoretic agent An agent that can make rational decisions based on what it believes and what it wants. Can make decisions in contexts where uncertainty and conflicting goals. Has a continuous measure of state quality. Goal-based agent Has a binary distinction between good(goal) and bad(non-goal) states. We can make decision based on probabilistic reasoning (Belief Networks), but it does not include what an gent wants. An agent’s preferences between world states are captured by a utility function - it assigns a single number to express the desirability of a state. Utilities are combined with the outcome probabilities for actions to give an expected utility for each action.

4 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/20054 The utility function U(S) An agent’s preferences between different states S in the world are captured by the Utility function U(S). If U(Si) > U(Sj) then the agent prefers state Si before state Sj If U(Si) = U(Sj) then the agent is indifferent between the two states Si and Sj

5 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/20055 Combining Belief and Desires Utility: captures the desirability of a state, U(S) A: nondeterministic action Result i (A): Outcome states of action A E: available evidences of the world Do(A): perform action A EU: expected utility EU(A|E) = ∑ i P(Result i (A) | Do(A), E) * U(Result i (A))

6 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/20056 MEU MEU: maximum expected utility A rational agent should choose an action that maximizes the agent ’ s expected utility Simple decision: (single action) Complex decision: sequences decisions This is a framework where all of the components of an AI system fit If an agent maximizes a utility function that correctly reflects the performance measure by which its behavior is being judged, then it will achieve the highest possible performance score if we average over the environments in which the agent could be placed.

7 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/20057 16.2 The basis of utility theory Why should maximizing the average utility be so special? Constraints on rational preferences are orderability, transitivity, continuity, substitutability, monotonicity, decomposability. The six constraints form the axioms of utility theory. The axioms of utility: Utility principle Maximum Expected Utility principle

8 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/20058 Constraints on rational preference

9 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/20059

10 10 The six axioms of utility theory

11 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200511 Utility principle If an agent ’ s preferences obey the axioms of utility, then there exists a real-valued function U that operates on states such that U(A) > U(B) if and only if A is preferred to B and U(A) = U(B) if and only if the agent is indifferent to A and B. U(A) > U(B)  A > B U(A) = U(B)  A ~ B Maximum Expected Utility principle The utility of a lottery is the sum of the probability of each outcome times the utility of that outcome. U([p 1, S 1 ; … ; p n, S n ]) = ∑ p i U(S i )

12 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200512 16.3 Utility functions Utility functions map states to real numbers. Agent can have any preference it likes. Preferences can also interact. Utility theory has its roots in economics -> the utility of money

13 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200513 Utility of money, Figure 16.2 Monotonic preference for definite amounts of money. Expected Monetary Value, EMV S n : the state of processing wealth $n take $1000 or 50% chance of $3000 EU(Accept) =.5 *U(S k ) +.5*U(S k+3000 ) EU(Decline) = U(S k+1000 )

14 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200514 Utility of money

15 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200515 Utility of money Risk averse Risk seeking Certainty equivalent Risk neutral Utility scales and utility assessment Utility functions are not unique  U ’ (S) = k 1 + k 2 * U(S), k 2 > 0 Normalization Standard lottery  u ┬, best possible outcome, 1  u ┴, worst possible outcome, 0 Micromort (1:1,000,000 chance of death), $20 in 1980 QALY: quality-adjusted life year

16 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200516 6.4 MULTIATTRIBUTE UTILITY FUNCTIONS Problem’s outcomes are characterized by two or more attributes, are handled by multiattribute utility theory. The attributes X = X 1,..., X n ; a complete vector of assignments will be x = (x 1,..., x n ). Each attribute is generally assumed to have discrete or continuous scalar values.

17 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200517 Dominance Suppose that airport site S1 costs less, generates less noise pollution, and is safer than site S2. One would not hesitate to reject S2. We then say that there is strict dominance of S1 over S2. In general, if an option is of lower value on all attributes than some other option, it need not be considered further. Strict dominance is often very useful in narrowing down the field of choices to the real contenders, although it seldom yields a unique choice.

18 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200518 Strict dominance

19 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200519 Stochastic dominance

20 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200520 CDF

21 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200521

22 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200522 Preference without uncertainty

23 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200523 Preference with uncertainty

24 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200524 6.5 Decision networks Extend Bayesian nets to handle actions and utilities a.k.a. influence diagrams Make use of Bayesian net inference Useful application: Value of Information

25 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200525 Decision network representation Chance nodes: random variables, as in Bayesian nets Decision nodes: actions that decision maker can take Utility/value nodes: the utility of the outcome state.

26 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200526 R&N example

27 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200527 Simplified representation

28 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200528 Evaluating decision networks Set the evidence variables for the current state. For each possible value of the decision node (assume just one): Set the decision node to that value. Calculate the posterior probabilities for the parent nodes of the utility node, using BN inference. Calculate the resulting utility for the action. Return the action with the highest utility.

29 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200529 Exercise: Umbrella network Weather Forecast Umbrella Happiness take/don’t take f w p(f|w) sunny rain 0.3 rainy rain 0.7 sunny no rain 0.8 rainy no rain 0.2 P(rain) = 0.4 U(lug, rain) = -25 U(lug, ~rain) = 0 U(~lug, rain) = -100 U(~lug, ~rain) = 100 Lug umbrella P(lug|take) = 1.0 P(~lug|~take)=1.0

30 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200530 16.6 The value of information One of the most important parts of decision making is knowing what questions to ask. For example, a doctor cannot expect to be provided with the results of all possible diagnostic tests and questions at the time a patient first enters the consulting room. Tests are often expensive and sometimes hazardous (both directly and because of associated delays). Their importance depends on two factors: whether the test results would lead to a significantly better treatment plan, and how likely the various test results are.

31 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200531 Information value theory information value theory, which enables an agent to choose what information to acquire. The acquisition of information is achieved by sensing actions. Because the agent's utility function seldom refers to the contents of the agent's internal state, whereas the whole purpose of sensing actions is to affect the internal state, we must evaluate sensing actions by their effect on the agent's subsequent "real" actions. Thus, information value theory involves a form of sequential decision making.

32 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200532 Simple example Suppose an oil company is hoping to buy one of n indistinguishable blocks of ocean drilling rights. Let us assume further that exactly one of the blocks contains oil worth C dollars and that the price of each block is C/n dollars. If the company is risk-neutral, then it will be indifferent between buying a block and not buying one. Now suppose that a seismologist offers the company the results of a survey of block number 3, which indicates definitively whether the block contains oil. How much should the company be willing to pay for the information? With probability 1/n, the survey will indicate oil in block 3. In this case, the company will buy block 3 for C/n dollars and make a profit of C - C/n = (n - 1)C/n dollars. With probability (n-1)/n, the survey will show that the block contains no oil, in which case the company will buy a different block. Now the probability of finding oil in one of the other blocks changes from 1/n to 1/(n — 1), so the company makes an expected profit of C/(n - 1) -C/n = C/n(n - 1) dollars.

33 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200533 Simple example The value of information derives from the fact that with the information, one's course of action can be changed to suit the actual situation. One can discriminate according to the situation, whereas without the information, one has to do what's best on average over the possible situations. In general, the value of a given piece of information is defined to be the difference in expected value between best actions before and after information is obtained.

34 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200534 Value of Perfect Information (VPI) How much is it worth to observe (with certainty) a random variable X? Suppose the agent ’ s current knowledge is E. The value of the current best action  is: EU(α | E) = max A ∑ i U(Result i (A)) p(Result i (A) | E, Do(A)) The value of the new best action after observing the value of X is: EU(α ’ | E,X) = max A ∑ i U(Result i (A)) p(Result i (A) | E, X, Do(A)) … But we don ’ t know the value of X yet, so we have to sum over its possible values The value of perfect information for X is therefore: VPI(X) = ( ∑ k p(x k | E) EU(α xk | x k, E)) – EU (α | E) Probability of each value of X Expected utility of the best action given that value of X Expected utility of the best action if we don’t know X (i.e., currently)

35 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200535 Example

36 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200536 VPI exercise: Umbrella network Weather Forecast Umbrella Happiness take/don’t take f w p(f|w) sunny rain 0.3 rainy rain 0.7 sunny no rain 0.8 rainy no rain 0.2 P(rain) = 0.4 U(lug, rain) = -25 U(lug, ~rain) = 0 U(~lug, rain) = -100 U(~lug, ~rain) = 100 Lug umbrella P(lug|take) = 1.0 P(~lug|~take)=1.0 What’s the value of knowing the weather forecast before leaving home?

37 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200537 The value of information One of the most important parts of decision making is knowing what questions to ask. To conduct expensive and critical tests or not depends on two factors: Whether the different possible outcomes would make a significant difference to the optimal course of action The likelihood of the various outcomes Information value theory enables an agent to choose what information to acquire.

38 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200538 Properties of the value of information

39 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200539 Information-gathering agent

40 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200540 16.7 Decision-theoretic expert systems The decision maker states preferences between outcomes. The decision analyst enumerates the possible actions and outcomes and elicits preferences from the decision maker to determine the best course of action. The addition of decision networks means that expert systems can be developed that recommend optimal decisions, reflecting the preferences of the user as well as the available evidence.

41 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200541 Design process Create a causal model. Determine what are the possible symptoms, disorders, treat­ments, and outcomes. Simplify to a qualitative decision model. Assign probabilities. Probabilities can come from patient databases, literature studies, or the expert's subjective assessments. Assign utilities. When there are a small number of possible outcomes, they can be enumerated and evaluated individually. Verify and refine the model. To evaluate the system we will need a set of correct (input, output) pairs; a so-called gold standard to compare against.

42 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200542 Design process Perform sensitivity analysis. This important step checks whether the best decision is sensitive to small changes in the assigned probabilities and utilities by systematically varying those parameters and running the evaluation again. If small changes lead to significantly different decisions, then it could be worthwhile to spend more resources to collect better data. If all variations lead to the same decision, then the user will have more confidence that it is the right decision. Sensitivity analysis is particularly important, because one of the main criticisms of probabilistic approaches to expert systems is that it is too difficult to assess the

43 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200543 Inference diagram

44 Der-Rong Din CSIE/NCUE/200544 Summary Probability theory describes what an agent should believe based on evidence Utility theory describes what an agent wants Decision theory puts the two together to describe what an agent should do A rational agent should select actions that maximize its expected utility. Decision networks provide a simple formalism for expressing and solving decision problems.


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