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1 Objective and Secure Reputation-Based Incentive Scheme for Ad-Hoc Networks Dapeng Oliver Wu Electrical and Computer Engineering University of Florida (Joint work with Qi He and Pradeep Khosla at Carnegie Mellon University)
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2 What’s the Problem? Mobile ad hoc network (MANET) has no fixed infrastructure Communications rely on intermediate nodes But why should intermediate nodes relay? Need incentive mechanism for packet forwarding in non-cooperative MANET
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3 Outline Problem and motivation Previous work Reputation-based schemes Pricing-based schemes Our scheme Design objective Basic scheme Security enhancement Conclusion
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4 Watchdog: identifies selfish nodes Mitigating Routing Misbehavior (S. Marti et al, Stanford University, 2000) S A B C D X S A B C D X Y Pathrater: gets around identified selfish nodes
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5 Pros and Cons Pros: Improve throughput Cons: Unfairly makes well behaving nodes busier Indirectly encourages misbehavior (S. Marti et al, Stanford University, 2000)
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6 Detect misbehavior of neighbors Share reputation information with friends Punish selfish nodes based on the shared information CONFIDANT Protocol System (S. Buchegger and J-Y Le Boudec, IBM and EPFL, 2002)
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7 Pros and Cons Pros Use keys to authenticate nodes Identify and punish misbehavior Cons How to build a network of friends is not clear Key distribution is not addressed Globally shared reputation makes it not scalable (S. Buchegger and J-Y Le Boudec, IBM and EPFL, 2002)
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8 Where are we? Problem and motivation Previous work Reputation-based schemes Pricing-based schemes Our scheme Design objective Basic scheme Security enhancement Conclusion
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9 Enforcing Service Availability Scheme Virtual currency (nuglet) Centralized authority issuing nuglets Same amount of packets to forward Tamper-resistant hardware Problem: Require balanced traffic (L. Buttyan and Hubaux, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology -- EPFL, 2000)
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10 Micro-payment Scheme Encouraging Collaboration Multi-hop Cellular Networks (hybrid network) Mobile nodes form ad-hoc networks Base stations are connected to a backbone network M. Jakobsson, J-P Hubaux, and L. Buttyan RSA Lab, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, 2003 backbone
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11 $ Micro-payment Protocol 1.Select a reward Forward the packet Keep the MAC for reward 1.Check MAC 2.Send service record to clearing house Accounting Center (Clearing house) backbone M. Jakobsson, J-P Hubaux, and L. Buttyan RSA Lab, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, 2003 Registers to home network which shares a secret key move MAC 2.Generate an MAC 3.Send out the packet
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12 Pros and Cons Pros Symmetric key crypto: reduce computational cost Payment aggregation: lower communication cost Cons Substantial communication overhead Requirement of infrastructure Centralized trust authority M. Jakobsson, J-P Hubaux, and L. Buttyan, RSA Lab, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology 2003
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13 Where are we? Problem and Motivation Previous work Reputation-based schemes Pricing-based schemes Our scheme Design objective Basic scheme Security enhancement Conclusion
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14 Our Design Objectives Practicality Available technologies Realistic context of ad-hoc networks Efficiency Affordable computational cost Moderate communication overhead
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15 Assumptions Nodes are non-cooperative No collusion among nodes Broadcast transmission All participating nodes desire to communicate Invariant identity Selfish but not malicious Promiscuous mode (listening mode)
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16 Where are we? Problem and motivation Previous work Reputation-based schemes Pricing-based schemes Our scheme Design objectives Basic scheme Security enhancement Conclusion
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17 Neighbor Monitoring Each node N maintains a Neighbor Node List (NNL N ) RFP N (X): (Requested to Forward Packets) The number of packets N requests X to forward HFP N (X): (Has Forwarded Packets) The number of packets that have been forwarded by X and noticed by N LER N (X): Local Evaluation Record {G N (X), C N (X)} Generosity Confidence
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18 Reputation Propagation Every neighbor has its local evaluation record about X. node i earned from N. Everyone periodically broadcasts its LER(X). G B (X), C B (X) Compute Overall Evaluation Record OERN(X) X N A B C A (X), G A (X) C B (X), G B (X) C N (X), G N (X) C A (X), G A (X) ****** ****** if RFP N (X) 0 otherwise Credibility Everyone periodically broadcasts its LER(X). Compute Overall Evaluation Record OERN(X) if RFP N (X) 0 otherwise Credibility
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19 Remarks Quantified by objective observations Weighted by confidence for accuracy Weighted by credibility to limit impact of selfish nodes e.g., fake a non-existing node to broadcast information
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20 Punishment Action if otherwise Drop packets from X with a probability p : Selfishness q = 1 - OER N (X)
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21 Simulation Setup Network Simulator (NS-2) Total number of nodes: 50 (5 selfish nodes) Area: 670X670m 2 IEEE 802.11 for medium access control DSR for routing CBR traffic: 1 packet/s No. of connections: 10 Connection duration: 10s Random waypoint mobility model Max speed of movement: 20m/s
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22 Simulation Results
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23 Where are we? Problem and motivation Previous work Reputation-based schemes Pricing-based schemes Our scheme Design objectives Basic scheme Security enhancement Conclusion
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24 Potential Vulnerability Impersonate a node with a good reputation to propagate fake observation information X N A B C A (X), G A (X) C B (X), G B (X) C A (X), G A (X)
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25 Identification and Authentication … … … ID … … … f ff f f Computationally infeasible to impersonate other nodes without knowing their keys
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26 Conclusion Incentive scheme with punishment mechanism Reputation objectively quantified by observations Punishment action quantitatively suggested by reputation Effectively identify and punish selfish nodes Security enhancement Identification and authentication constructed collectively Protection from impersonation
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27 Thank you!
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