1. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command TRADOC DCSINT

2. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT FM 7-100.3 Opposing Force: Paramilitary and Nonmilitary Organizations and Tactics Introduction FM 7-100.3 Opposing Force: Paramilitary and Nonmilitary Organizations and Tactics OPFOR

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4. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT To obtain an overview and understanding of the OPFOR doctrine as contained in FM 7-100.3 Paramilitary and Nonmilitary Organizations and Tactics Purpose: Opposing Force: Paramilitary and Nonmilitary Organizations and Tactics FM 7-100.3 In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military. -General Douglas MacArthur OPFOR

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6. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Field Manual 7-100.3 Organization Introduction Chapter 1: Regional and Global Framework Chapter 2: General Paramilitary Tactics Chapter 3: Insurgent Organization and Tactics Chapter 4: Terrorist Organization and Tactics Chapter 5: Internal Security Forces Chapter 6: Drug and Criminal Organizations Chapter 7: Noncombatants FM 7-100.3 Opposing Force: Paramilitary and Nonmilitary Organizations and Tactics OPFOR If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles … Sun Tzu

7. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINTIntroduction Background –Enemy –Threat –Opposing Force Cold War OPFOR Contemporary OPFOR Contemporary Threats and Other Actors –Nation-State Actors –Non-State Actors –Real-world and Training Considerations Statue in Moscow Subway Commemorating Soviet Partisans

8. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINTIntroduction Contemporary Operational Environment –Nature and Stability of the State –Regional and Global Relationships –Economics –Sociological Demographics –Information –Physical Environment –Technology –External Organizations –National Will –Time –Military Capabilities Baseline OPFOR and Nonmilitary Actors –Flexibility –Adaptability –Initiative

9. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT paramilitary or military in opposition The individual, group of individuals (organized or not organized), paramilitary or military force, national entity, or national alliance that is in opposition to the United States, its allies, or multinational partners. (FM 101-5-1) Background Background Enemy adversaryopponent IN SHORT: An adversary or opponent.

10. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Background Threat (Potential Adversary) Background Threat (Potential Adversary) (AR 350-2, Opposing Force Program) with intentions and military capabilitiesthat suggest mean challenge the int Stat Any specific foreign nation or organization with intentions and military capabilities that suggest it could become an adversary or challenge the national security interests of the United States or its allies.

11. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS BOSNIA Proliferation KOREA Worst Case Information Warfare RUSSIA The Transition RUSSIA The Transition Terrorism NEW ALLIANCES The Unknown ? The Unknown ? Libya IRAN AFRICA Israel- Palestinian- Syrian Dynamic Israel- Palestinian- Syrian Dynamic CHINA What Next…? (Taiwan) Counter Drugs KOSOVO CUBA HAITI IRAQ INDIA PAKISTAN Threats in Today’s Operational Environment

12. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Background Background Opposing Force (OPFOR) Military and paramilitary forces Training tool Challenging and non-cooperative sparring partner Has strengths and weaknesses Thinks and acts differently What kind of OPFOR is needed to train for COE ?

13. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT potential adversary An organized force created by and from U.S. Army units to portray a unit of a potential adversary armed force. AR 350-2 (1976). Cold War OPFOR

14. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Many Possible Threats CONUS-Based Forces Capability to Move Our Forces Broad Range of Missions Worldwide Mobile and Lethal Forces Somalia Panama Haiti Bosnia Kosovo How the World has Evolved… How the World has Evolved… Desert Storm Afghanistan ??? Mission Focused on Soviet-Bloc Threat:  Soviet Union  Warsaw Pact  North Korea  Cuba Forward-Deployed Forces Overseas But We Fought Elsewhere North Korea ? Iraq Grenada

15. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Contemporary Opposing Force Contemporary Opposing Force. A plausible, flexible military and/or paramilitary force representing a composite of varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces, used in lieu of a specific threat force, for training and developing U.S. forces. A plausible, flexible military and/or paramilitary force representing a composite of varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces, used in lieu of a specific threat force, for training and developing U.S. forces.

16. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Contemporary Threats & Actors Who are the actors (participants)? Nation-states (countries) Non-state actors

17. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Nation-State Actors Core states Transition states Rogue states (hostile) Failed or failing states (instability) Countries can switch categories Multinational alliances and coalitions

18. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Rogue Actors Insurgent Terrorist Drug-trafficking Criminal Non-State Actors

19. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT International humanitarian relief organizationsInternational humanitarian relief organizations Non-State Actors Non-State Actors Third-Party Actors TRADOC DCSINT RefugeesRefugees Other civilians on the battlefieldOther civilians on the battlefield RefugeesRefugees Other civilians on the battlefieldOther civilians on the battlefield

20. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Information Objective or biased On the battlefield Global information network Manipulation by other actors Affect public opinion and national will Media Third-Party Actors Media Non-State Actors

21. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Non-State Actors Third-Party Actors Transnational Corporations Help build infrastructure Promote economic gain Concern about collateral damage Armed security forces

22. Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) The Operational Environment that exists today and for the clearly foreseeable future TRADOC DCSINT

23. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Critical Variables Critical Variables Nature and Stability of the State How strong or how shaky Where is the real strength Who is in charge Nature and aims of military campaign Kinds of threats present

24. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Critical Variables Critical Variables Regional and Global Relationships Alliances and coalitions Political, economic, military, or cultural Opponents can influence our coalitions Add to military capability and broaden scale of military operations Unpredictability Nonaligned states

25. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Critical Variables Economics “Haves” and “Have-nots”“Haves” and “Have-nots” Economic differences can cause conflictsEconomic differences can cause conflicts Economic vs military superiorityEconomic vs military superiority Ability to buy military technology or to conduct prolonged operationsAbility to buy military technology or to conduct prolonged operations Regional and global relationships can result in military or political assistanceRegional and global relationships can result in military or political assistance “Haves” and “Have-nots”“Haves” and “Have-nots” Economic differences can cause conflictsEconomic differences can cause conflicts Economic vs military superiorityEconomic vs military superiority Ability to buy military technology or to conduct prolonged operationsAbility to buy military technology or to conduct prolonged operations Regional and global relationships can result in military or political assistanceRegional and global relationships can result in military or political assistance TRADOC DCSINT

26. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Critical Variables Sociological Demographics TRADOC DCSINT Cultural, religious, ethnic Extreme devotion to a cause Sympathetic to enemy cause Refugees and displaced persons Urban environments (cities) Cultural, religious, ethnic Extreme devotion to a cause Sympathetic to enemy cause Refugees and displaced persons Urban environments (cities)

27. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Critical Variables Critical Variables Information Information-based society and information technology -Computers -Other information systems -Civilian and military sectors Information warfare -Computer warfare -Information attack -Psychological warfare -Deception ?

28. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Critical Variables Critical Variables Information Media and global information flow -Transparency (access to data) -Publicize U.S. mistakes and failures -Sway public and political opinion Situational awareness -Home field advantage -Commercial systems -Human networks

29. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Critical Variables Physical Environment Terrain and weather Less complex and open environments favor the U.S. Military forces are optimized for certain environments Enemies will try to use urban environments and other complex terrain to their advantage Terrain and weather Less complex and open environments favor the U.S. Military forces are optimized for certain environments Enemies will try to use urban environments and other complex terrain to their advantage

30. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT What nations and others can —What nations and others can — –Develop and Produce –Purchase and Import Overmatch U.S. systems in selected niche areasOvermatch U.S. systems in selected niche areas TRADOC DCSINT Asymmetric counters to U.S. technological advantage Asymmetric counters to U.S. technological advantage Critical Variables Technology Guided Weapon Example: Suicide Bomber versus Smart Bomb Advanced Antiaircraft Weapons could threaten U.S. Air Superiority Advanced Antiaircraft Weapons could threaten U.S. Air Superiority

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32. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Critical Variables Critical Variables External Organizations

33. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Critical Variables Critical Variables National Will People, government, and military Objectives and duration of a conflict Attack the opponent’s national will and try to preserve your own U.S. national will as a vulnerability —a strategic center of gravity Victory often depends on will

34. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Time drives decision making and operations Opponents see time as being in their advantage Time drives decision making and operations Opponents see time as being in their advantage Critical Variables Time - - Adjust the nature of the conflict - Prepare for adaptive operations - Dictate the tempo - Seize opportunities - Outlast the U.S. will to continue - - Adjust the nature of the conflict - Prepare for adaptive operations - Dictate the tempo - Seize opportunities - Outlast the U.S. will to continue

35. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Critical Variables Military Capabilities Most important (from U.S. Army’s point of view) Most important (from U.S. Army’s point of view) All other variables affect military capabilities All other variables affect military capabilities U.S. Special Operations Forces are designed to close with and interact with Paramilitary and Nonmilitary Organizations U.S. Special Operations Forces are designed to close with and interact with Paramilitary and Nonmilitary Organizations

36. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT BASELINE OPFOR AND NONMILITARY ACTORS BASELINE OPFOR AND NONMILITARY ACTORS Paramilitary OPFORs are challenging, uncooperative sparring partners, capable of stressing U.S. battlefield operating systems Nonmilitary elements are integrated actors within the COE - Flexibility - Adaptability -Initiative Paramilitary and nonmilitary organizations and tactics will exhibit:

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