1. Survival by Defense- Enabling Partha Pal, Franklin Webber, Richard Schantz BBN Technologies LLC Proceedings of the Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems(2003) Presented by J.H. Su

2. Authors(1/3) Partha Pal a Division Scientist at BBN Technologies. His research interest is in the area of survivable distributed systems.

3. Authors(2/3) Franklin Webber a software engineer, have primarily been supporting BBN Technologies doing DARPA-sponsored research on strengthening the resistance of computer systems to malicious attack.

4. Authors(3/3) Richard Schantz Works At Intelligent Distributed Computing Department in BBN.

5. Outline Introduction “Survival by Defense” of Critical Application Acquisition of Privilege Control of Resources Use of Defensive Adaptation in Application’s Survival Issues and Limitations Related Work Conclusion

6. Introduction(1/4) Attack survival The ability to provide some level of service despite an ongoing attack by tolerating its impact.

7. Introduction(2/4) Attack prevention Lead to the development of what is known as a trusted computing base (TCB). Attack detection and situational awareness Lead to the development of various intrusion detection system (IDS).

8. Trusted Computing Base (TCB) Confidentiality Authentication Integrity

9. Introduction(3/4) Drawback In fact, many of the world’s computer systems today run operating systems and networking software that are far from the TCB ideal. IDS mostly works off-line, without any direct runtime interaction or coordination with the applications (and with other IDSs) that they aim to protect.

10. Introduction(4/4) Survival by protection Seeks to prevent the attacker from gaining privileges Survival by defense Includes protection but also seeks to frustrate an attacker in case protection fails and the attacker gains some privileges anyway

11. “Survival by Defense” of Critical Application(1/5) Focus on The specific need of a specific type of applications. What is a critical applications? These applications are critical in the sense that the functions they implement are the main purpose of the computer system on which they run.

12. “Survival by Defense” of Critical Application(2/5) Assumption We can modify or extend the design and implementation of the critical applications.

13. “Survival by Defense” of Critical Application(3/5) Corruption An application that does not function correctly Reasons of Application corrupt An accident, such as a hardware failure, or because of malice; Flaws in its environment or in its own implementation cause it to misbehave.

14. “Survival by Defense” of Critical Application(5/5) The Goal The attacker’s acquisition of privileges must be slowed down. The defense must respond and adapt to the privileged attacker’s abuse of resources.

15. Acquisition of Privilege(1/4) Divide the system into several security domains, each with its own set of privileges The domains are chosen and configured to make best use of the existing protection in the environment to limit the spread of privilege. The domains must not overlap. Each security domain may offer many different kinds of privilege. The attacker cannot accumulate privileges concurrently in any such set of domains.

16. Acquisition of Privilege(2/4) Kinds of Privilege anonymous user privilege domain user privilege domain administrator privilege application-level privilege

17. Acquisition of Privilege(3/4) Three ways for an attacker to gain new privileges Convert domain or anonymous user privilege into domain administrator privilege. Convert domain administrator privilege in one domain into domain administrator privilege in another. Convert domain administrator privilege into application-level privilege.

18. Acquisition of Privilege(4/4) Solution for Case1 Careful configuration of hosts and firewalls. Solution for Case2 Proper host configuration and administration Having a heterogeneous environment with various types of hardware and operating systems. Solution for Case3 Use cryptographic techniques

19. Control of Resource(1/3) The attacker and the critical applications compete over system resources Use of redundancy Monitoring Adaptation

20. Control of Resource(2/3) Use of redundancy Replicate every essential part of the application and place the replicas in different domains. The replicas must be coordinated to ensure that, as a group, they will not be corrupted when the attacker succeeds in corrupting some of them.

21. Control of Resource(3/3) Monitoring QoS Self-checking whether the application continues to satisfy invariants specified by its developers.

22. Use of Defensive Adaptation in Application’s Survival(1/4) A classification of defensive adaptations Dimension1 ： The level of system architecture at which these adaptations work. Dimension2 ： how aggressively the attack can be countered.

23. Use of Defensive Adaptation in Application’s Survival(2/4) Defeat AttackWork Around Attack Guard Against Future Attack Application level Retry failed request Redirect request ;degrade service Increase self- checking QoS management level Reserve CPU, bandwidth migrate replicasTighten cryptographic, access control Infrastructure level Block IP sourcesChange ports, protocols Configure IDSs

24. Use of Defensive Adaptation in Application’s Survival(3/4) The importance of the capability to change between various modes and the associated trade-offs. Defensive adaptation is mostly reactive. Defensive adaptation could be pro-active.

25. Use of Defensive Adaptation in Application’s Survival(4/4) Make these adaptive responses unpredictable. some uncertainty needs to be injected. Separate the design of the functional (or business) aspects of the application from the design of defensive adaptation. Put the latter into middleware. reusable for many different applications.

26. Issues and Limitations The reliance on crypto systems. It is not simple to combine multiple mechanisms in a defense strategy. selection of appropriate mechanism, potential conflict analysis and resolution has to be done manually by an expert. Relies on the fact that attacks proceed sequentially

27. Related Work MAFTIA an ESPRIT project developing an open architecture for transactional operations on the Internet. The “Survivability Architectures” project Aims to separate survivability requirements from an application’s functional requirements. The “An Aspect-Oriented Security Assurance Solution” project implement security-related code transformations on an application program.

28. Conclusion We are implementing technology for defense enabling under the DARPA project titled “Applications that Participate in their Own Defense” (APOD). Defense enabling can increase an application’s resistance to malicious attack. Greater survivability for the application on its own and an increased chance for system administrators to detect and thwart the attack before it succeeds.

29. Thanks for your listening