1. A survey of Internet infrastructure reliability Presented by Kundan Singh PhD candidacy exam May 2, 2003

2. 2 Agenda Introduction Routing problems Route oscillations, slow convergence, scaling, configuration Reliability via DNS, transport, application Effect on VoIP http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~kns10/research/readings/

3. 3 Overview of Internet routing AT&T (inter-national provider) Regional provider MCI Regional provider Campus OSPF (optimize path) BGP (policy based) Autonomous systems Cable modem provider

4. 4 Border gateway protocol TCP OPEN, UPDATE, KEEPALIVE, NOTIFICATION Hierarchical peering relationship Export all routes to customers only customer and local routes to peers and providers Path-vector Optimal AS path satisfying policy 12 543 67 ProviderCustomer Peer Backup d: 31247 e: 3125... d d: 1247 d: 247 d: 47 d: 247 0 [1] A border gateway protocol (BGP-4), RFC 1771

5. 5 Route selection Local AS preference AS path length Multi-exit discriminator (MED) Prefer external-BGP over internal-BGP Use internal routing metrics (e.g., OSPF) Use identifier as last tie breaker AS1 AS3 AS2 AS4 B1 B2 B3 B4 R1 R2 C1 C2

6. 6 Route oscillation Each AS policy independent Persistent vs transient Not if distance based Solution: Static graph analysis Policy guidelines Dynamic “flap” damping 0 12 [2] Persistent route oscillations in inter-domain routing

7. 7 Static analysis Abstract models: Solvable? Resilience on link failure? Multiple solutions? Sometimes solvable? Does not work NP complete Relies on Internet routing registries [7] An analysis of BGP convergence property

8. 8 Policy guidelines MUST Prefer customer over peer/provider Have lowest preference for backup path “avoidance level” increases as path traverses Works even on failure and consistent with current practice Limits the policy usage [3] Stable internet routing without global co-ordination [4] Inherently safe backup routing with BGP

9. 9 Convergence in intra-domain IS-IS – millisecond convergence Detect change (hardware, keep-alive) Improved incremental SPF Link “down” immediate, “up” delayed Propagate update before calculate SPF Keep-alive before data packets Detect duplicate updates OSPF stability Sub-second keep-alive Randomization Multiple failures Loss resilience Distance vector Count to infinity [5] Towards milli-second IGP convergence [6] Stability issues in OSPF routing

10. 10 BGP convergence 0 12 R ( R, 1R, 2R) (0R, 1R, R)(0R, R, 2R) [7] An analysis of BGP convergence properties [8] Experimental study of delayed internet routing convergence

11. 11 BGP convergence 0 12 R ( -, 1R, 2R) (0R, 1R, - )(0R, -, 2R) 0->1: 01R 0->2: 01R 1->0: 10R 1->2: 10R 2->0: 20R 2->1: 20R

12. 12 BGP convergence 0 12 R ( -, 1R, 2R) (01R,1R, - )( -, -, 2R) 1->0: 10R 1->2: 10R 1->0: 12R 1->2: 12R 2->0: 20R 2->1: 20R 2->0: 21R 2->1: 21R 01R

13. 13 BGP convergence 0 12 R ( -, -, 2R) (01R,10R, - )( -, -, 2R) 1->0: 12R 1->2: 12R 2->0: 20R 2->1: 20R 2->0: 21R 2->1: 21R 2->0: 201R 2->1: 201R 10R 0->1: W 0->2: W

14. 14 BGP convergence MinRouteAdver To announcements In 13 steps Sender side loop detection One step 0 12 R ( -, -, - ) After 48 steps

15. 15 BGP convergence [2] Latency due to path exploration Fail-over latency = 30 n Where n = longest backup path length Within 3min, some oscillations up to 15 min Loss and delay during convergence “up” converges faster than “down” Verified using experiment [8] An experimental study of delayed internet routing convergence [9] The impact of internet policy and topology on delayed routing convergence

16. 16 BGP convergence [3] Path exploration => latency More dense peering => more latency Large providers, better convergence Most error path due to misconfiguration or software bugs [9] The impact of internet policy and topology on delayed routing convergence

17. 17 BGP convergence [4] Route flap damping To avoid excessive flaps, penalize updated routes Penalty decays exponentially. “suppression” and “reuse” threshold Worsens convergence Selective damping Do not penalize if path length keeps increasing Attach a preference with route [10] Route flap damping exacerbates Internet routing convergence,

18. 18 BGP convergence [5] 12R and 235R are inconsistent. Prefer directly learnt 235R Order of magnitude improvement Distinguish failure with policy change 1 20R 35 12R 235R 2R [11] Improving BGP convergence through consistency assertions

19. 19 BGP scaling Full mesh logical connection within an AS Add hierarchy

20. 20 BGP scaling [2] Route reflector More popular Upgrade only RR Confederations Sub-divide AS Less updates, sessions [12] A comparison of scaling techniques for BGP

21. 21 BGP scaling [3] May have loop If signaling path is not forwarding path Persistent oscillations possible Modify to pass multiple route information within an AS RR C2 RR C1 Q P Signaling path Choose QChoose P Logical BGP session Physical link [13] On the correctness of IBGP configuration [14] Route oscillations in I-BGP with route reflections

22. 22 BGP stability Initial experiment (’96) 99% redundant updates <= implementation or configuration bug After bug fixes (97-98) Well distributed across AS and prefix [15] Internet routing instabilities [16] Experimental study of Internet stability and wide-area backbone failures

23. 23 BGP stability [2] Inter-domain experiment (’98) 9 months, 9GB, 55000 routes, 3 ISP, 15 min filtering 25-35% routes are 99.99% available 10% of routes less that 95% available [16] Experimental study of Internet stability and wide-area backbone failures

24. 24 BGP stability [3] Failure More than 50% have MTTF > 15 days, 75% failed in 30 days Most fail-over/re-route within 2-days (increased since ’94) Repair 40% route failure repaired in < 10min, 60% in 30min Small fraction of routes affect majority of instability Weekly/daily frequency => congestion possible [16] Experimental study of Internet stability and wide-area backbone failures [24] End-to-end routing behavior in the Internet

25. 25 BGP stability [4] Backbone routers Interface MTTF 40 days 80% failures resolved in 2 hr Maintenance, power and PSTN are major cause for outages (approx 16% each) Overall uptime of 99% Popular destinations Quite robust Average duration is less than 20s => due to convergence [16] Experimental study of Internet stability and wide-area backbone failures [17] BGP routing stability of popular destinations

26. 26 BGP under stress Congestion Prioritize routing control messages over data Routing table size AS count, prefix length, multi-home, NAT Effects: Number of updates; convergence Configuration, no universal filter Real routers “malloc” failure Cascading effect Prefix limiting option Graceful restart CodeRed/Nimda Quite robust Some features get activated during stress Cascading failures [18] Routing Stability in Congested Networks: Experimentation and Analysis [19] Analyzing the Internet BGP routing table [20] An empirical study of router response to large BGP routing table load [21] Observation and analysis of BGP behavior under stress [22] Network Resilience: Exploring Cascading Failures within BGP

27. 27 BGP misconfiguration Failure to summarize, hijack, advertise internal prefix, or policy. 200-1200 prefix each day ¾ of new advertisement as a result 4% prefix affect connectivity Cause Initialization bug (22%), reliance on upstream filtering (14%), from IGP (32%) Bad ACL (34%), prefix based (8%) Conclusion user interface, authentication, consistency verification, transaction semantics for command [23] Understanding BGP misconfiguration

28. 28 Reactive routing Resilient overlay network Detect failure (outages, loss) and reroute Application control of metric, expressive policy Scalability suffers Failure often, everywhere 90% of failure last 15min, 70% less than 5min, median is just over 3min Many near edge, inside AS Helps in case of multi-homing Failures in core more related with BGP [26] Resilient overlay networks [27] Measuring the effect of Internet path faults on reactive routing

29. 29 Reliable multicast Reliable, sequenced, loosely synchronized Existing TCP ACK aggregation Local recovery possible Performance Linux-2.0.x BSD packet filter, IP firewall and raw socket [30] IRMA: A reliable multicast architecture for the Internet

30. 30 Transport layer fail-over Server fail-over Front-end bottleneck or forge IP address Migrate TCP Works for static data (http pages) Needs application stream mapping Implemented in Apache 1.3 Huge overhead for short service [29] Fine grained failover using connection migration

31. 31 DNS performance Low TTL Latency grows by 2 orders Client and local name server may be distant Embedded object 23% no answer, 13% failure answer 27% sent to root server failed TTL as low as 10min Share DNS cache by < 10-20 clients [33] On the effectiveness of DNS-based server selection [32] DNS performance and effectiveness of caching

32. 32 DNS replication Replicate entire DNS in distributed servers [31] A replicated architecture for the domain name system Network RNS AS

33. 33 Reliable server pooling [34] Architecture for reliable server pooling [35] Requirements for reliable server pooling [36] Comparison of protocols for reliable server pooling

34. 34 PSTN failures Switch vendors aim for 99.999% availability Network availability varies (domestic US calls > 99.9%) Study in ‘97 Overload caused 44% customer-minutes Mostly short outages Human error caused 50% outages Software only 14% No convergence problem [37] Sources of failures in PSTN

35. 35 VoIP Backbone links underutilized Tier-1 backbone (Sprint) have good delay, loss characteristics. Average scattered loss.19% (mostly single packet loss, use FEC) 99.9% probes have <33ms delay Most burst loss due to routing problem Mean opinion score: 4.34 out of 5 Customer sites have more problems Internet backbone Can be provided by some ISP But many lead to poor performance Adaptive delay is needed for bad paths Mostly due to reliability and router operation, not traffic load Choice of audio codec [28] Understanding traffic dynamics at a backbone POP [39] Impact of link failures on VoIP performance [38] Assessing the quality of voice communications over Internet backbones

36. 36 VoIP [2] Prevalent but not persistent path Very asymmetric loss; bursty Outages = more than 300ms loss More than 23% losses are outages Outages are similar for different networks Call abortion due to poor quality Net availability = 98% [25] Measurement and interpretation of Internet packet loss [41] Assessment of VoIP service availability in the current Internet

37. 37 Future work End system and higher layer protocol reliability and availability Mechanism to reduce effect of outages in VoIP Redundancy of VoIP systems during outages Convergence and scaling of TRIP, which is similar to BGP Scaling (DNS) + Reliable (server pool)