1. Rationalist Epistemology Plato Descartes (427-347 B.C.E. )(1596-1650) Plato Descartes (427-347 B.C.E. )(1596-1650)

2. Epistemology  Is the philosophical study of Knowledge. What is knowledge? What is knowledge? What is the difference between knowledge and opinion? What is the difference between knowledge and opinion? What is the origin of knowledge? What is the origin of knowledge? Reason: RationalismReason: Rationalism Experience: EmpiricismExperience: Empiricism

3. How can we know something?  Believe In order for you to know X, you must believe X.  Truth In order for you to know X, X must be true.  Justification In order for you to know X, you must be able to give a justification for your belief.  Gettier Problems.

4. Simile of the Line __________________________________ Pure Reason The Forms __________________________________ Understanding Scientific Concepts __________________________________ Belief Sensible Objects __________________________________ Imagining Images __________________________________ Understanding Scientific Concepts __________________________________ Belief Sensible Objects __________________________________ Imagining Images_________________________________

5. Ontology  Images Shadows and reflections of objects. Objects are more real than shadows because they last longer and are not dependent on shadows.  Sensible Objects They are not absolutely real because they do not last and they are dependent on other things, like the sun. Conceptual Level We can know or understand sensible objects only by grasping them at the conceptual level. You must know and apply the definition of a horse to know you see one. Conceptual Level We can know or understand sensible objects only by grasping them at the conceptual level. You must know and apply the definition of a horse to know you see one.

6. Ontology  Concepts Capture the unchanging relations. Things can fall in many different ways; but the concept of gravity explains these events through one unchanging law.  Forms The archetypes of everything existing in the visible universe. Grasped by the intellect not the senses. Grasped by the intellect not the senses. Move from the definition to the formula. Move from the definition to the formula.

7. A priori Knowledge: Known independent of experience.  Two parallel lines cut by transversal. Prove A=H.  A = D—Opposite angles are congruent.  D = H—Corresponding angles are congruent.  A = H—substitution.  What if we measure and they are not equal?

8. Meno’s Paradox  How will you try to find out something (knowledge), Socrates, when you have no notion at all what it is?  Innate Ideas Ideas present in the soul of the individual from birth. There is nothing the soul has not already learned. Learning is really remembering what we already know. Meno He knew all along how to double the square, Socrates helped him remember. Meno He knew all along how to double the square, Socrates helped him remember.

9. Descartes and the Copernican Revolution  Geocentric View Consistent with religious view that humans are the purpose of creation.  Power of Reason The church and the Non-scientist made irrelevant. The Inquisition Arrested Galileo in 1632 for discovering the moons of Jupiter. The Inquisition Arrested Galileo in 1632 for discovering the moons of Jupiter. The Inquisition The Inquisition Copernicus (1473-1543)

10. Descartes  Reconciling Reason and Faith Scientific advances threaten the authority of the church. Descartes’ view reconciles reason and faith. Uses reason and logic Uses reason and logic To prove existence of God and Soul. To prove existence of God and Soul.

11. Descartes’ Method  Rationalism True knowledge comes from reason. Thus it is a priori, known prior to experience. Innate Ideas Placed in our mind by God. (cp. to Plato’s forms) Innate Ideas Placed in our mind by God. (cp. to Plato’s forms) Mathematical Model Father of Trigonometry. Mathematical Model Father of Trigonometry.

12. Descartes’ Method  Methodic Doubt If you are not sure, consider it false. Need to begin fresh with truthful propositions. Am I Dreaming? The senses cannot be trusted. Am I Dreaming? The senses cannot be trusted. Evil Genius: brain in a vat, or matrix. Evil Genius: brain in a vat, or matrix.  “Clear and Distinct” Standard of truth. Understand the deduction. Standard Subjective? Standard Subjective?

13. Cogito, Ergo Sum  Indubitable Known clearly and distinctly, even if God is an evil genius.  Immaterial Soul I know I exist as a thinking thing when I think. The soul is immaterial and can exist independent of the body. I think, therefore I am.

14. Immaterial Soul  Cartesian Dualism Mind and body separate realms that interact through pineal gland. Independent but form whole.  Mind/Body Problem How does something immaterial affect our material body?

15. God  Solipsism All we can know is our own mind. God needed for Descartes to get out of his mind.  Ontological Argument My idea of God is perfect; this idea must come from something as perfect that exists; God must exist.

16. God  Can’t Be Evil Genius Would not be perfect. Senses and Reason Can therefore be trusted because they come from God. Senses and Reason Can therefore be trusted because they come from God. External World Exists He’s out of his mind. External World Exists He’s out of his mind.  Our knowledge of self and God provide a foundation for all knowledge.

17. Epistemology: the study of the nature, source, limits, & justification of knowledge  Rationalism: we truly know only that of which we are certain. Since sense experience cannot guarantee certainty, reason alone must be the means for getting knowledge Real knowledge about ourselves and the world is a priori (prior to and independent of experience). “Knowledge” gained from sense experience (a posteriori) is guaranteed only by appeal to reason Real knowledge about ourselves and the world is a priori (prior to and independent of experience). “Knowledge” gained from sense experience (a posteriori) is guaranteed only by appeal to reason

18. Rationalism: Sense Experience Does Not Provide Knowledge  Descartes: sense experiences are often wrong; I might be wrong about whether I have a body or if there is a world apart from my imagination (it may be a dream), and even whether my reasoning abilities (e.g., 2+3=5) can be trusted (evil genie) Shankara: we correct our experiences of self and world (e.g., hallucinations, sense perceptions) by knowing the oneness of ultimate reality (Brahman) (788-822)

19. Objections to Descartes’ Method of Doubt  Even if some sense experiences are mistaken, that is no reason to doubt (even hypothetically) all of them  Limiting knowledge only to what we know with certainty is too restrictive: we often know things a posteriori (i.e., based on experience), not on indubitable foundations  If we doubt everything, we must also doubt whether we are truly doubting—which requires us to assume the existence of a public world of language users

20. Descartes’ Escape from Doubt  I cannot doubt that I am doubting (thinking). All other knowledge is based on the undoubtable foundation that I exist: I think, therefore I exist (cogito ergo sum)  I know I exist imperfectly only by first knowing perfect existence (God); and as a perfect being, God would not deceive me or allow me to be deceived when I know something (e.g., wax) clearly and distinctly—that is, as an intelligible (e.g., mathematical) object

21. Innate Ideas: knowledge of ideas or principles is possible only if they are inborn  Plato: our knowledge of certain propositions is based on remembering truths acquired before our birth  Leibniz: our recognition of ideas and truths is based on innate dispositions of the mind  Jainism: past unethical behavior blinds us to our innate knowledge of all things

22. Empiricism  All knowledge of things in the world is a posteriori (that is, based ultimately on experience).  Purely mental (i.e., a priori) operations of reason do not provide knowledge about the world.

23. John Locke (1632-1704): Representational Realism $ The mind at birth is a blank slate (tabula rasa): no ideas are innate $ The mind at birth is a blank slate (tabula rasa): no ideas are innate  Knowledge is based on experience of simple ideas (e.g., yellow) or complex ideas (lemon), relations (father), abstractions (humanity)  We know about the world because our ideas of “primary qualities” (e.g., solidity, shape) represent things as they really are. Ideas of secondary qualities (e.g., colors) represent things only as they appear to us. Qualities are supported by (unknown) substances

24. George Berkeley (1685- 1753) Primary qualities depend on the mind just as much as secondary qualitiesPrimary qualities depend on the mind just as much as secondary qualities  There is no way to show how primary qualities represent real external qualities or substances  What we perceive is the real world, but the only things we perceive are our ideas. So the real world consists only of ideas and the minds that perceive them (including God). That is, the world’s existence consists in its being perceived (esse est percipi) in regular patterns

25. David Hume: Skepticism All knowledge of the world is a posteriori—based on and limited to sense impressions or copies of those impressions or creations of imagination (ideas) All knowledge of the world is a posteriori—based on and limited to sense impressions or copies of those impressions or creations of imagination (ideas)  We have no impressions of self or causality (other than temporal priority & continguity, but no necessary connection)—only habit  Notions of cause-effect and self are based on custom and natural inclination, not knowledge 1711-1776

26. The Empiricists on Cause  Locke: powers in material objects cause our ideas; ideas of primary qualities represent external things  Berkeley: the concept of material objects outside our ideas is unintelligible; God causes our ideas  Hume: because the concept of cause is a relation of our ideas, a cause of our ideas is unintelligible God External material bodies Ideas in our mind “cause” is merely a habit of mind

27. Immanuel Kant (1724- 1804)  Rationalism is wrong: we are not born with innate ideas (e.g., equality, God, shortest distance is a straight line, future events will always have causes); we know things about the world only through perceptions  Empiricism is wrong: sense data alone do not give us knowledge of the world. We can know only if our minds are not blank slates or passive receptacles of neutral sense data

28. Kant’s Epistemology: Transcendental Idealism  We know about things in the world not as they are in themselves (as noumena) but only insofar as they appear to us (as phenomena), universally structured by the mind’s categories (e.g., space, time, cause) Objections: (1) If we are limited to phenomena, we cannot know whether the world is really as it appears; (2) categories differ culturally and linguistically (Sapir–Whorf hypothesis) Objections: (1) If we are limited to phenomena, we cannot know whether the world is really as it appears; (2) categories differ culturally and linguistically (Sapir–Whorf hypothesis)

29. Principles of Scientific Knowledge  Using inductive reasoning and preferring the simplest generalizations, we can derive probable laws from observations and repeated confirmations The problem of induction: past experiences can be used to predict the probability of future ones only if the future is like the past—and that is unknown The problem of induction: past experiences can be used to predict the probability of future ones only if the future is like the past—and that is unknown  Instead of relying on induction, theories (e.g., evolution) use the hypothetical method to formulate experiments that are falsifiable Francis Bacon J. S. Mill Karl Popper

30. Scientific Paradigms, Revolutions, and Pseudoscience Scientific knowledge is organized according to paradigms (sets of theories and practices adopted by scientists to explain observations) Scientific knowledge is organized according to paradigms (sets of theories and practices adopted by scientists to explain observations)  When “anomalies” occur with regularity, one paradigm replaces another in a scientific revolution. This new way of organizing research transforms the discipline, changes the objects studied, and generates new discoveries: progress is thus not gradual or incremental Pseudoscience is not falsifiable and does not suggest new experiments to be tested Pseudoscience is not falsifiable and does not suggest new experiments to be tested Thomas Kuhn

31. Definition of Knowledge To say that you know X means:  you believe X to be true  there is some reason or justification (warrant) for thinking that X is true  X is, in fact, true Gettier problem: you could have a warranted true belief and still not know Gettier problem: you could have a warranted true belief and still not know E. Gettier (1927- )

32. Theories of Truth  Correspondence: truth is an objective relation between beliefs and extramental reality (i.e., facts) Objection: we cannot access extramental reality Objection: we cannot access extramental reality  Coherence: a proposition or belief is true if it is coherent with other accepted beliefs Objection: coherent systems of intersubjectively accepted beliefs could still be false Objection: coherent systems of intersubjectively accepted beliefs could still be false  Pragmatic: if acting on a belief satisfies our expectations—that is, if it works—it is true Objections: (a) justified beliefs are not necessarily true; (b) this make all truths relative; (c) beliefs are not true because they “work”; they work because they are true Objections: (a) justified beliefs are not necessarily true; (b) this make all truths relative; (c) beliefs are not true because they “work”; they work because they are true

33. Scientific Truth  Instrumentalism: theoretical entities are simply practical means for making predictions; they do not describe extra-theoretical realities Parallels Pragmatic theory of truth Parallels Pragmatic theory of truth  Realism: claims about theoretical entities are true only if they describe the real world Parallels Correspondence theory of truth Parallels Correspondence theory of truth  Conceptual Relativism: claims about reality are intelligible only in terms of the theoretical frameworks in which observations are made Parallels Coherence theory of truth Parallels Coherence theory of truth

34. How Claims of Knowledge Are Justified  Foundationalism: knowledge claims are based on indubitable foundations I can doubt whether there is a world, whether my reasoning can be trusted, and even if I have a body, but I cannot doubt that I am doubting (thinking). Knowledge of God and the world is based on intuitive knowledge of my own existence I can doubt whether there is a world, whether my reasoning can be trusted, and even if I have a body, but I cannot doubt that I am doubting (thinking). Knowledge of God and the world is based on intuitive knowledge of my own existence Only sense experience can provide real knowledge of the world Only sense experience can provide real knowledge of the world

35. How Claims of Knowledge Are Justified  Coherent: knowledge claims are justified only if they are consistent with other beliefs (including empirical beliefs) that support and complete the whole set of beliefs  Objections: Against foundationalism: why think that any belief (intuitive or empirical) is justified? Against foundationalism: why think that any belief (intuitive or empirical) is justified? Against coherentism: why think that a belief is true just because it coheres with others? Against coherentism: why think that a belief is true just because it coheres with others?

36. Knowledge and Justified True Belief  Traditionally, “x knows p” means: x believes that p; p is true; x is justified in believing that p x believes that p; p is true; x is justified in believing that p  Gettier problem: all three conditions could hold and still not have knowledge Externalism (Plantinga): I might be warranted in my belief (if my procedure for getting the information is reliable) without being justified (i.e., I might not know how my belief is based on that procedure) Externalism (Plantinga): I might be warranted in my belief (if my procedure for getting the information is reliable) without being justified (i.e., I might not know how my belief is based on that procedure)

37. Hermeneutics: The Study of Interpretation Schleiermacher: a true interpretation reveals the historical author’s real intentions Schleiermacher: a true interpretation reveals the historical author’s real intentions  Early Wittgenstein: propositions that really picture the structure of the world are true  Later Wittgenstein: meaning varies with use in life Gadamer: our interpretations combine our “prejudices” and authorial intentions Gadamer: our interpretations combine our “prejudices” and authorial intentions To determine truth in texts and actions, we have to interpret them (literally, symbolically)

38. Epistemology: the study of the nature, source, limits, & justification of knowledge Skepticism: doubt that knowledge is possible Taoism: the differentiation of things is relative; all things are really one Chuang Tzu (369-286 BCE) Sextus Empiricus (2 nd Century) Pyrrhonism: we should refuse to make dogmatic claims to know because all knowledge is relative

39. Cartesian Doubt  Sense experiences are often wrong  I might be wrong about whether I have a body or if there is a world apart from my imagination (it may be a dream)  I might be wrong even about whether my reasoning abilities (e.g., 2+3=5) can be trusted (evil genius); so I should suspend judgment René Descartes (1596-1650)

40. Objections to Descartes’ Method of Doubt  To think some experiences are wrong is to assume that some are right  To doubt everything, we must doubt whether we are truly doubting, and that requires us to assume a public world of language users  Limiting knowledge only to what we know with certainty is too restrictive: we often know things not based on indubitable foundations

41. Hume: Skepticism about the External World  The continued existence of things apart from our experience cannot be known, for we cannot compare our experience (or self) with anything outside it as its supposed cause  Problem of induction: we cannot say that something is probable without assuming that the future will resemble the past Induction itself is unjustifiable (Strawson) Induction itself is unjustifiable (Strawson)

42. Rationalism: Knowledge Is Acquired through Reason, not the Senses  We know only that of which we are certain. Sense experience cannot guarantee certainty, so all that we know comes from reason alone and is a priori (i.e., prior to experience)  Our (innate) knowledge of certain propositions is based on remembering truths acquired before birth Plato (427-347 BCE)

43. Empiricism: Knowledge about the World Is A Posteriori (Based on Experience Alone)  At birth the mind is a blank slate (tabula rasa), containing no innate ideas. Even if some ideas were known universally, that does not prove they are innate  Knowledge comes from sensation or reflection  Ideas of “primary qualities” (e.g., solidity, shape) represent things as they really are; ideas of secondary qualities (e.g., colors) represent things only as they appear to us

44. Naïve Realism: We Do Not Perceive Ideas; We Perceive Their Objects  Perceptions are always “intentional,” that is, about something; and when our perceptions are caused by the things they are about, we can be said to know those things  Perceptions are not purely passive; they are affected by one’s background knowledge and beliefs John Searle

45. Analytic and Synthetic Judgments  Hume: propositions are either relations of ideas (analytic, a priori) or matters of fact (synthetic, a posteriori)  Kant: propositions in mathematics (7+5=12) and metaphysics (“all events have causes”) are synthetic a priori judgments  Quine: meanings of terms in even a priori analytic propositions depend on experience David Hume Immanuel Kant

46.  A “free” act is simply one that is caused (i.e., preceded) by our choice or act of will. We are free when we can do what we want. Objection: aren’t choices caused by “external” forces (e.g., genetics, culture, upbringing)? Compatibilism: freedom is compatible with determinism Hum e act choice/will/personality external threats/constraints cause (free) (not free)

47. The Justification for Compatibilism  Free actions are not only compatible with determinism; they assume determinism. That is, we assume that an action is “free” only if it is based on (i.e., caused by) a person’s character and desires  If an action is not linked to a person’s decision to do it, it is either coerced or random. In either case, it is not done freely

48. Implications of Compatibilism 1. Even though all our actions are caused, we still can have reasons for our actions. We might not choose those reasons or goals freely, but they are our goals 2. The achievement of goals requires that we act. Deliberation still makes sense because it is essential in bringing about an outcome

49. More Implications of Compatibilism 3. People are responsible only for those acts that are intentional (i.e., acts that are not mistaken, accidental, coerced, or done out of ignorance or as a result of insanity). However, intentional acts are still caused 4. Even if people are not responsible for their actions, they can still be held responsible

50. What Does It Mean to Know Something?  Externalism: I know something if my belief correctly matches the “external” world (even if I don’t know how it does) A belief is warranted if it is based on a procedure that yields true beliefs; and it is justified if it is based on reliable information produced by such a procedure (reliabilism) A belief is warranted if it is based on a procedure that yields true beliefs; and it is justified if it is based on reliable information produced by such a procedure (reliabilism) Production of such information is due to facts about the world (naturalism) Production of such information is due to facts about the world (naturalism) Planting a

51. An Objection to Externalism Even if the information I have is reliable and correct, I cannot be said to know it unless I (internally) know that it is reliable and correct Keith Lehrer

52.  Good thinkers learn to spot what is reliable and correct by developing virtues of mind. For example, they strive to:  accept reliable testimony, avoid hasty generalizations, consider counter- arguments, be open-minded, persevere in inquiry, integrate beliefs, explain complex sets of data, recognize how knowledge is social  this is not a procedure; it is a way of life Linda Zagzebski Virtue Epistemology

53. How Can We Know Anything about the World Around Us? Idealism: we can know about the world because it is comprised of our ideas Idealism: we can know about the world because it is comprised of our ideas Phenomenalism: physical objects are knowable, but only as bundles of sense data Phenomenalism: physical objects are knowable, but only as bundles of sense data Naïve Realism: we do not perceive ideas or mental representations Naïve Realism: we do not perceive ideas or mental representations

54. Idealism: George Berkeley (1685- 1753)  What we perceive is the real world, but the only things we perceive are our ideas. So the world consists only of ideas and the minds that perceive them (including God). That is, the world’s existence consists in its being perceived (esse est percipi) Objection: this seems to deny that physical bodies exist Objection: this seems to deny that physical bodies exist

55. Phenomenalism: John Stuart Mill (1806-73)  Things are knowable because they are simply phenomena (things that appear to us under certain conditions)  We know things in the world because they are “permanent possibilities of sensation” Objection: things don’t exist because they are experienceable; they are experienceable because they exist Objection: things don’t exist because they are experienceable; they are experienceable because they exist

56. Transcendental Idealism: Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)  We know about things not as they are in themselves but only as they appear to us (as phenomena), structured by the mind’s categories (e.g., space, time, cause) Objections: (1) If we are limited to phenomena, we can’t know what the world is really like; (2) categories differ culturally; (3) this does not explain why we have only these categories Objections: (1) If we are limited to phenomena, we can’t know what the world is really like; (2) categories differ culturally; (3) this does not explain why we have only these categories

57. Naïve Realism: We Do Not Perceive Ideas; We Perceive Their Objects  Perceptions are always “intentional,” that is, about something; and when our perceptions are caused by the things they are about, we can be said to know those things  Perceptions are not purely passive; they are affected by one’s background knowledge and beliefs John Searle

58. Social Constructionism: Knowledge is a Creation Based on Social Interests Science is not the objective accumulation of facts, because “facts” are answers to questions framed in incommensurable theoretical frameworks (paradigms) Epistemological Relativism: knowledge varies in conceptual schemes with different criteria for justification, truth, & rationality Communal interests determine how to evaluate different paradigms Communal interests determine how to evaluate different paradigms Thomas Kuhn

59. The Gendered Character of Knowledge  Feminine characterizations of knowledge aim at explanation and understanding instead of an adversarial determination of “facts” removed from their contexts  This does not imply that women are “naturally” different from men (e.g., more sensitive or less objective); such essentialism ignores how even gender is a social construct  What is knowable is determined by relations of power in a discipline Lorraine Code Michel Foucault

60. The Gendered Character of Knowledge  Feminine characterizations of knowledge aim at explanation and understanding instead of an adversarial determination of “facts” removed from their contexts Lorraine Code Feminism questions philosophical assumptions about mind and thinking by showing how emotions and feelings are sources of truth and guides for reasoning Morwenna Griffiths

61. “Feminism, Feelings, and Philosophy”  Emotions (e.g., fear, love, pride) are not simply intellectual judgments that result in action, and feelings (e.g., sexuality, hunger) are not simply bodily sensations  This insight challenges the philosophic inclination to portray emotions and feelings in terms of a dualism of mind and body  Emotions and feelings cannot easily be linked to mind or body exclusively, and neither mind nor body dominates

62. The Feminist Alternative  Feelings become meaningful as human emotions over time and in social (e.g., linguistic) contexts when they are understood and acted upon  This means that feelings affect and are affected by our understanding and our communal interactions—and thus guide our philosophical enquiries

63. Constructivist Confusions: Alan Sokal  To say that “physical reality is a social and linguistic construct” is to confuse: objects in the world with what we say about them objects in the world with what we say about them how we get knowledge with its reliability how we get knowledge with its reliability knowledge about the world with social, political, or ethical uses of such knowledge knowledge about the world with social, political, or ethical uses of such knowledge  Reply: objective/subjective distinctions are naïve, unjustified, and even dangerous

64. The Alternative to Foundationalist Epistemology  Knowledge is not based on insights into indubitable principles about things in the world or sense experiences of the world  Rather, our knowledge is an interlocking web of beliefs in terms of which we agree to speak in ways that we acknowledge are open to later revision