1. Free Will and Fixed Futures

2. Fatalism “Gappy” Fatalism: Appointment in Samara Aristotelian Fatalism: The Problem of “Tomorrow’s Sea Fight” in light of the Law of the Excluded Middle -- P v ~P (p 1 v ~p 1 ) Instances of the (p 2 v ~p 2 )Law of Excluded Middle (p 3 v ~p 3 ).

3. Aristotelian Fatalism (cont.) If we consider the collection of all of the TRUE PROPOSITIONS, Aristotle worries that they will amount to a comprehensive map of the World – past, present and future. And if this is the case, then it seems that no one can ever do otherwise than what it is already true that they will do! Aristotle worries that from this it follows that such things as deliberation, rational action and moral responsibility DO NOT EXIST.

4. Aristotelian Fatalism (cont.)

5. Responses to Aristotle’s Worry: “Head in the Sand” response: since we don’t (can’t) know the future, there is nothing to worry about. – But Aristotle’s worry is a metaphysical one; our epistemic shortcomings are not a factor “We Make the Future” response: More defensible is the view that the future is FIXED in the way that it is because I make it happen in just that way.

6. God’s Foreknowledge and Human Free Will On another level, the God of the Western religious tradition is OMNISCIENT. But if God knows what I will do in the future, it seems that I cannot do otherwise than what God knows I will do. And if I CANNOT DO OTHERWISE than what God knows I will do, how can God hold me legitimately morally responsible for what I cannot help but do?

7. God’s Foreknowledge and Human Free Will (cont.) Augustine’s Two classic responses: 1.Willings by their nature must be free. (since unfree willings would be “willings against one’s will” which is absurd) 2.From the mere fact that God knows what I will choose, it does not follow that God makes me choose in just that way.

8. Causation, Determinism and Free Will CAUSAL DETERMINISM ALL LAWS OF NATURE. INITIAL CONDITIONS (at some point in time) --------------------------------- EVERY EVENT

9. Causal Determinism

10. Determinism and Moral Responsibility TWO STATEMENTS: (1)Determinism is true. (2) Persons perform free, rational actions for which they can be correctly held morally responsible.

11. Determinism and Moral Responsibility HARD DETERMINISM (1),~(2) FREE WILLISM ~(1),(2) SOFT DETERMINISM (1),(2)

12. Determinism and Moral Responsibility (cont.) COMPATIBILISM LOG. POS. ( (1) & (2) ) (Soft Determinists are Compatibilists but Compatibilists need not be Soft Determinists) INCOMPATIBILISM ~ LOG. POS. ( (1) & (2) ) (Typically, Free Willists and Hard Determinists are Incompatibilists.)

13. Determinism and Moral Responsibility (cont.) The Free Action Principle, a principle about which every one seems to agree: If (person) S performs free action A, then S could have done otherwise. Soft Determinist interpretation: “S could have done otherwise if S had chosen to do otherwise.” Free Willist (and Hard Determinist) interpretation: “S could have done otherwise under exactly similar circumstances.”

14. Mechanism & the Big Bang But suppose Determinism is FALSE since Laws of Nature are NOT universal generalizations but merely statistical generalizations. Nevertheless, if every event unfolds in accord with statistical laws stating the world’s statistical ways of working, we might say that mechanism is the case.

15. Mechanism & the Big Bang CAUSAL MECHANISM ALL (STATISTICAL) LAWS OF NATURE. INITIAL CONDITIONS (at some point in time) --------------------------------- LIKLIHOOD OF EVERY EVENT

16. Mechanism & the Big Bang TWO STATEMENTS: (1)Mechanism is true. (2) Persons perform free, rational actions for which they can be correctly held morally responsible.

17. Mechanism & the Big Bang QUESTION: Are (1) and (2) “COMPATIBLE?”

18. Mechanism & the Big Bang Suppose the “Big Bang” happened in the “standard manner.” That is, suppose that all of space & time (spacetime) came into existence “all at once” as a universe of 4 (or more) dimensions. QUESTION: Since every event is FIXED throughout the history of the universe, ARE FREE ACTIONS POSSIBLE IN SUCH A UNIVERSE?

19. Aristotle’s Worry Revisited