1. Changing Factors contributing to the reorientation of TFP after the 27 May 1960 coup d’Etat  The emergence of an avowedly socialist movement for the first time in the history of Republic. The formation of the new Left after the 27 may coup d’Etat: -The advent of the new Turkish left was marked by the publication of the weekly Yön ( 1961) around which gathered a handful of highly educated young leftist intellectuals seeking radical changes in the social structure. -The establishment of the Turkish Workers’ Party (TIP):seeks the establisment of a socialist system through support from a mass constituency within the context of a parlimentary system. -The foreign policy advocated by both Yön and TIP are an extension of their socialist approach: They believed that no socialist transformation could be effected in the country if Turkey maintains her existing ties with the West, especially with the U.S. They demanded the abrogation of Turkey’s treaty relations with the West and normalization of relations with neutralist and communist countries.

2.  The emergence of anti-american sentiments after 1964. Not until the Cyprus crisis of 1964 did the emergence anti-American trends at the top of find wide popular response.  After 1964, Cyprus issue became one of the most important issues of TFP. Cyprus issue became a highly emotional matter affecting national pride. ( The attempt of enonis of Greek majority was seemed by Turkish public opinion as a step toward re-establishment of Byzantine Empire.)  The deterioration of Turkish-American relations after 1964: In 1964 the Turks exaggerated their importance to the Western alliance and the U.S. The Turkish expectation of support was based on the assumption that Turkey was more important to the U.S than Greece because of its greater contribution to NATO and its more strategic location. The reasons of American opposition to Turkish demand of intervention in Cyprus in 1964: - The withdraw of Jupiter missiles ( short-range missiles) from Turkish soil during the Cuban Missile Crisis eclated between the U.S and the S.U in 1961 and the advent of İntercontinental ballistic missile by the U.S effected U.S position towards Turkey and as a result they seeked to maintain balance of power.

3. -The existence of a large and well-organized Greek community in the U.S and the pressure they excerced on the U.S Congress and Senat. -The existence of world christian protest in response to the limitations placed on the activities of the “Ecumenical” Patriarchate of Istanbul. -U.S fear of eclatement of a war between two NATO members, Turkey and Greece in East Mediterranean. An eventual war between these 2 countries could fragilize the eastern flank of NATO and lead to Soviet expansionnism in Mediterranean ( the existence of close relations between Makarios-S.U, Makarios appeared as the leader of the neutralist bloc because of his attempts of independance against Western İmperialism, especially to the Britain and his refusal of American intervention in Cyprus affair/ The existence of a strong pro-communist party in Cyprus: The Akel Party) -The U.S supported a policy of neutrality between Turkey and Greece.  Turkey’s rapprochement with the S. U and Soviet satellite countries and Arab-Muslim world.  After the Johnson letter, Turkey reached to these conclusions about the U.S Cyprus policy:  1) They did not desire to see an independant Cyprus that would be governed by a communist government under the Akel Pary rule supported by the S. U (This factor also explains why the U.S decided to engage in mediation between 2 communities in 1967. )

4. They did not favor the partition solution either because this could lead to the same difficulties afflicting the partionned lands of Korea and Viet nam. According to the RPP’s ( CHP) reasonning the U.S favored the enosis, union with Greece. They doubted American mediation plans that did not support enosis in principle.  Institutionnalization of anti-americanism in the country ( the RPP’s efforts to fix the blame on the U.S) that effected negatively the Turkish-American relations. Major changes in TFP after the Cyprus dispute of 1964: 1)The rapprochement with the S.U and communist bloc. 3 reasons of this rapprochement: -to gain the support of communist states in the United Nations regarding the Cyprus issue. -desire of inönü to deny Makarios’s call of Soviet help in order to threaten the Turks -An eventual Soviet-Turkish rapprochement could lead to put pressure on the U.S and NATO members which would play a more active role in forcing the Greeks to accept a Cyprus settlement satisfactory to Turkey. -to receive economic aid from the USSR.

5. Aspects of Turkish-Soviet rapprochement: -A series of high level diplomatic exchanges in 1964: *Feridun Erkin foreign minister Moscow visit in October-November 1964 Suat Hayri Ürgüplü, prime minister’s Moscow in August 1965 *Soviet foreign minister’s Ankara visit in May 1965, premier’s visit in January 1967, Soviet presidium member’s visit in January 1965 These visits resulted in the communist bloc’s abstention in the General -These visits resulted in the communist bloc’s abstention in the General Assembly voting on Cyprus in December 1965 and in conclusion of economic and cultural accords with communist bloc countries. 2)The pursuance of a more independant course from the West general from the U.S in particular: from the U.S in particular: In 1965 Ankara announced the withdrawal of its support for the proposed MLF ( Multilateral nuclear force), a project of vital importance for Washington. In addition, Turkey had refused to effect projected increases in its armed forces committed to NATO and complained that the military aid given to Turkey by the alliance was not sufficient.

6. - Turkey’s displeasure with the existing NATO agreements. In January 1966 the Foreign Ministry of Turkey asked for modifications in these agreements -The arrival of the Justice Party of Suleyman Demirel to power in October 1965 elections: continuation of independant foreign policy began under İnönü and Ürgüplü during Cyprus dispute: the reluctance of Ürgüplü and Demirel to support the U.S policy in Viet- nam. The U.S demand of sending troops to Viet Nam from Demirel government was refused. - Turkish request to revise some of the 54 executive agreements ( which had been in force when the JP came to power in 1965) concluded by the former Menderes government concerning the status of U.S forces in Turkey ( Totaly 91 bilateral agreements had been signed with the U.S under article 3 of NATO Pact and new NATO strategy) Of these 54 agreements 13 had been signed under the 1954 Military force status agreement.

7. Reminder: IX. Inonu Government (25 June 1962-25 December 1963) X. Inonu Government (25 December 1963-20 February 1965) Urguplu Government (20 February 1965-27 October 1965) Demirel Government (27 October 1965-3 November 1969)Demirel II. Demirel Government (3 November 1969-6 March 1970)Demirel III. Demirel Government (6 March 1970-26 March 1971)Demirel I. Erim Government (26 March 1971-11 December 1971) II. Erim Government (11 December 1971-22 May 1972) Melen Government (22 May 1972-15 April 1973) Talu Government (15 April 1973-26 January 1974) I.Ecevit Government (26 January 1974-17 November 1974)Ecevit Irmak Government (17 November 1974-31 March 1975) IV. Demirel Government (31 March 1975-21 June 1977)Demirel II. Ecevit Government (21 June 1977-21 July 1977)Ecevit V. Demirel Government (21 July 1977-5 January 1978)Demirel III. Ecevit Government (5 January 1978-12 November 1979)Ecevit VI. Demirel Government (12 November 1979-12 September 1980)Demirel

8. 3)The rise of anti-americanism in Turkey: problems arising from the American presence in Turkey have had a deteriorating influence on U.S-Turkish relations. In the Turkish view, Americans working in Turkey-diplomats, aid personnel, soldiers and others lack sufficient training in the Turkish culture and language, especially when compared with their British, Russian and French colleagues. The incomparably high standard of living enjoyed by Americans and what the Turks consider to be American misuse of the status of forces agreement have also contributed to the worsening of Turkish feelings toward U.S. personnel. Turkish distrust toward Americans: the presence of the Central Intelligence Agency in the country. In the 50’s when the Turks regarded American and Turkish interets as identical, the nature and the extent of intelligence activities had not been questionned. The Turks viewed the CIA as a major force determining force of the course of their country’s internal politics. The legitimacy of the CIA presence has become the subject of heated debate in Parliment.