1. Designing tools for enhanced monitoring of railway safety performance of the European Union and its Member States Vojtech EKSLER & Cecilia LIND Safety Unit

2. Part I: Introducing SMS for Europe

3. Introduction (1) “You cannot manage what you cannot measure.” Kelvin, Kaplan …so you cannot improve what you cannot monitor.  Railway safety management in Europe has been evolving into a three management layer system (Railway Undertakings, National Safety Authorities, ERA) with each having distinct responsibilities.  Tools for each levels are needed for effective management.

4. Introduction (2) Safety monitoring through outcomes: Fatal train collisions and derailments per billion train-km in the EU

5. Introduction (3) PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION Less than ten fatal train collisions and derailments per year at EU level. With continuous improvement in railway safety, relying on accident data becomes unsustainable. Difficult to improve the system with accident data only (reactive approach). EU and national regulators rely on analytical approaches that is only one element of system approach to safety.

6. SMS for Europe (1) Concept of an SMS applied until now only at the operators’ level to be extended to national (MSs) and supranational (EU) level. Hazards are not always limited geographically and sometimes their identification may only be possible when considering relevant data available across the EU. SMS for Europe should add value, not replace the existing system at national level.

7. SMS for Europe (2) First building blocks of the European SMS: 1.EU/National safety plans  Enabling legal framework currently under discussion with MSs 2.Common database of occurrences  Top-level occurrences to be mandatory shared at EU level, lower-level occurrences reported in a harmonized way 3.Enhanced monitoring  Enhanced monitoring of outcomes and system monitoring (regulatory regime).

8. Enhanced monitoring Two parts: Outcomes monitoring and regulatory regime monitoring I II

9. Enhanced monitoring of outcomes Current legal framework for outcomes reporting in the EU Current incident indicators SPADs Wrong-side signaling failure Broken rail Broken axle Broken wheel Additional incident indicators Unauthorized departure Buffer stop collision Runaway Level crossing protection failure Wrong route setting Based on a study for ERA by TRL (UK)study

10. Part II: Monitoring regulatory regime performance

11. Understanding risk regulation regimes

12. Stems from modern management theories, notably Stewhart’s cycle for continuous improvements and quality control Other sources: ISO standards, safety management in other sectors, study by DNV for ERAstudy Theoretical basis

13. The Regulatory Monitoring Matrix Elements of control schemeElements of RMMSub-elements sought Planning and organizing SteeringGoal setting and management Leadership Board governance OrganizingEstablishment and responsibilities Accountability Organisational structure Communication Interface arrangements Safety culture management Record keeping StaffingWorker involvement Competence Performing Risk-based approach Target setting Resource management Change management Control – Supervision and enforcement Control – Approval Learning – Accident investigation Learning – Monitoring Promoting the safety regulatory framework Analyzing Evaluating Monitoring Audit Learning from failure/success Review ImprovingCorrective action

14. Levels of performance 1. Ad-hoc 2. Initializing 3. Implementing 4. Managing 5. Optimizing

15. Example of application (1) Elements of control schemeElements of RMMSub-elements sought Planning and organizing SteeringGoal setting and management Leadership Board governance OrganizingEstablishment and responsibilities Accountability Organisational structure Communication Interface arrangements Safety culture management Record keeping StaffingWorker involvement Competence Performing Risk-based approach Target setting Resource management Change management Control – Supervision and enforcement Control – Approval Learning – Accident investigation Learning – Monitoring Promoting the safety regulatory framework Analyzing Evaluating Monitoring Audit Learning from failure/success Review ImprovingCorrective action

16. Example of application (2) Lacks legal powers. Lacks funding. Sector still regulating itself. No job descriptions. Overlaps and gaps in NIB/NSA powers. Starting to sort out funding problems. Sector aware of roles and resp. of NIB/NSA but confused about gaps. Tasks are allocated but not in a systematic way. Legal powers in place. Receives enough funding. Roles, tasks and responsibilities are clear to the sector. Documented job descriptions in place. Contradiction between powers sought out. Funding planned on long- term basis. R/T and R are regularly communicated to sector. Job descriptions correspond with business objectives. Possibilities to add value to railway safety sought out. Funding used in efficient and effective way. NSA/NIB establishes safety best practice and guidance for sector. Regular review of tasks: staff in right place at right time. 2.1 Establishment and responsibilities

17. Areas for use Prioritise ERA tasks Input to safety analysis (trends) Voluntary health checks of individual MSs Input to work-streams and missions Impact assessments

18. Timing PART I: New legal framework in 2014 Preparatory works ongoing PART II Currently running a pilot with 5 countries Evaluation by summer 2014

19. Thank you for your attention! Contact: Vojtech.EKSLER@era.europa.eu +33 (0)3 27 09 65 75 Cecilia.LIND@era.europa.eu +33 (0)3 27 09 67 38 http://www.era.europa.eu/Core-Activities/Safety/Pages/Home.aspx