1. Y-12 Integration of Security and Safety Basis, Including Firearms Safety David Sheffey Safety Analysis, Compliance, and Oversight Manager B&W Technical Services Y-12, LLC August, 2009

2. BIO B&W Technical Services Y-12 –Manager Safety Analysis Compliance and Oversight 22 years (B&W Y-12 and predecessor operating contractor companies) managing Facility Safety programs in Oak Ridge DOE, Oak Ridge Operations Office – 10 years as a Facility Safety Engineer Omaha Public Power –Licensing Manager Calhoun 2 USAF –27 years Command Pilot (active + guard) Education –U of Tenn: BS Engineering Physics, MS Nuclear Physics –U of Neb: MA Business Management, graduate Air War College –USAF: Air War College

3. In the Beginning…. No significant weapons changes for years Outdated analysis primarily focused on muzzle velocities and penetration capabilities with consequences not quantified One nuclear facility safety basis had evaluated the potential for accidental discharge of firearms– Analysis did not indicate consequences of concern No real recognition of need to evaluate security changes against safety basis

4. Safeguards and Security Nuclear Operations and Facility Safety

5. Whoa! ….Lessons Learned Several security related changes were made that affected assumptions in safety basis documents.

6. Aha! Recognized the need to evaluate the potential for nuclear related consequences from the accidental discharge of firearms during routine operations in light of increased firepower needs, e.g., armor piercing, DBT needs, etc. Recognized the potential for physical security changes to impact nuclear facilities and the associated safety bases

7. Actions Taken Communication –B&W Facility Safety Engineering & Site Security organizations –Wackenhut (WSI) –Y-12 Site Office Hazard Evaluation Study (HES) prepared to evaluate accidental discharges of weaponry

8. Focus/Assumptions of HES Focus –Increased consequences of currently analyzed accidents resulting from new initiators –Creation of new, unanalyzed accidents –Impacts on credited controls –Adequacy of existing firearm controls Assumptions –Any and all containment structures penetrated –Weapon can fire multiple rounds –Projectile goes anywhere –Projectile impacts SSCs

9. Key Elements of Safety/Security Measures WSI Firearms Safety Program and HES for Accidental Discharge treated as part of the Y-12 Safety Basis Integrated configuration management, software QA, change control, and USQ processes Captured key programmatic elements of firearm safety (training, live round excluders, etc.) Key safety assumptions and controls for security- related activities protected (No difference between application of the change control/USQ processes for security modifications than for any other facility modification) Required surveillances on design features highlighted

10. Safeguards and Security Nuclear Operations and Facility Safety Firearms Accidental Discharge Hazard Analysis Firearms Safety Management Program Security Projects Subject to USQ Process and Change Control Maintenance job requests for security now subject to USQ Process

11. Present Sitewide analysis of accidental discharge of firearms: –Analyzes impacts to all Category 2 and 3 nuclear facilities –Firearms safety program credited and summarized in the Y-12 Site SAR –Configuration management applied to trigger the USQ process for changes to the firearms safety procedure

12. Present (Cont.) All security projects follow site configuration management, software QA, and USQ processes All security maintenance activities follow site maintenance process, including application of the USQ process –Maintenance procedure requires application of USQ process on work within 200 ft of nuclear facility Data base established for information sharing among sites

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