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Electronic Voting Machine Insecurity Michael Plasmeier theplaz.com.

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Presentation on theme: "Electronic Voting Machine Insecurity Michael Plasmeier theplaz.com."— Presentation transcript:

1 Electronic Voting Machine Insecurity Michael Plasmeier theplaz.com

2 A Hack

3 Harri Hursti

4 Video of hack animation

5

6 Question“Yes”“No”Total Votes Memory Card Set 5-50 “Zero Tape”000 Actual Ballots268 Machine Total718

7

8

9 Question“Yes”“No”Total Votes Memory Card Set 5-50 “Zero Tape”000 Actual Ballots268 Machine Total718

10

11 Question“Yes”“No”Total Votes Memory Card Set 5-50 “Zero Tape”000 Actual Ballots268 Machine Total718

12 Ballot scanning

13

14 Question“Yes”“No”Total Votes Memory Card Set 5-50 “Zero Tape”000 Actual Ballots268 Machine Total718 8

15 Scientists at Berkeley University confirmed the Hursti Hack and found 16 more security flaws

16 Diebold’s Response “a very foolish and irresponsible act” “leaving a car’s keys in the ignition and the windows down”

17 Why does the memory card support negative counts? Why then, did the machine print an incorrect “zero tape”????

18 Ion Sancho, Leon County trouble buying new machines got court order to allow still uses not many people actually use takes extra precautions no overnight

19 How this Came to Be

20 Florida

21 Help Americans Vote Act 2002 $3.9 billion $$$

22 Business and $$ Before no $$ in voting machines Old lever machines used for 40 years Counties did not buy them Not as much attention on them

23 Diebold’s Business Diebold was $3 billion ATM maker Bought a smaller company Which got the touch screen technology from a company making machines for the mall No emphasis on security

24 First get into a business you don't understand, selling to customers who barely understand it either. Then roll out your product without adequate testing. Don't hire enough skilled people. When people notice problems, deny, obfuscate and ignore. Finally, blame your critics when it all blows up in your face. -2006

25 The Real Problem

26 Secrecy Code is secret No design documents public Reviews/Audits secret Independent investigations discouraged

27 Secrecy One NJ county wanted to loan Princeton researchers some Sequoia machines to test Sequoia threaten to sue Violate the license agreement

28 Secrecy Claimed machines tested by Independent Testing Agencies (ITA) “shocking history of sloppy, incomplete and non-existent testing“ EAC on CIBER 2006

29 Mitigating Factors

30 VVPAT

31 Mitigating Factors Open Source Less vendor control Firefox is percepted to be very secure SSL is used by millions of people to conduct business online

32 Why?

33 Essential to Democracy Transparency Can’t secure from admin Must maintain vigilance


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