1. John Locke Second Treatise on Government

2. Locke’s Second Treatise I.Property and Labor II.State of Nature 2 III.Mutual Advantage & the Social Contract

3. Property & Labor Source of Private Property?

4. Property & Labor 2 Caveats though: no spoilage must leave as good in kind for others to appropriate that is, after you take your share, there’s still enough left for others to take their share

5. State of Nature 2 Add money economy Effect on our relations?

6. Individuals Wealth A BCD Inequality in the State of Nature I

7. Individuals Wealth A BCD Inequality in the State of Nature I Rough Equality (chp. 5,par. 37; par 41)

8. Individuals Wealth A BCD Inequality in the State of Nature 2 After the introduction of a money economy, inequality becomes much more extreme

9. Individuals Wealth A BCD Inequality in the State of Nature 2 After the introduction of a money economy, inequality becomes much more extreme But everyone is better off (chp. 5, par. 47)

10. III.Mutual Advantage & the Social Contract If we have social relations... And we have economic relations... Why do we need political relations? Why won’t people be able to get along? Why do we need politics?

11. Prisoners’ Dilemma Scenario: You and an accomplice are arrested on suspicion of committing some nasty crime The District Attorney and the police have been unable to produce enough evidence to convict you of that offense

12. Prisoners’ Dilemma We do have enough evidence to convict you of some lesser charge The only way the DA can nail you for the more serious offense is if one of you rats out the other Conversely, you and your partner can largely elude prosecution if you both stay silent You and your partner are placed in separate holding cells and are unable to communicate with each other DA enters and offers you the following:

13. Rat Hang Tough Prisoners’ Dilemma

14. Don’t Cooperate with each other (rat) Don’t Cooperate with each other (rat) Cooperate with each other (hang tough) Cooperate with each other (hang tough) Prisoners’ Dilemma From your perspective, you and your accomplice are faced with the following:

15. Rat Hang Tough Prisoners’ Dilemma 0, 10

16. 10, 0 Rat Hang Tough Prisoners’ Dilemma 0, 10

17. Rat Hang Tough Prisoners’ Dilemma 10, 0 0, 10 Row Player Column Player

18. Rat Hang Tough Prisoners’ Dilemma 10, 0 5, 50, 10

19. Rat Hang Tough Prisoners’ Dilemma 10, 0 5, 50, 10 1, 1

20. Rat Hang Tough Prisoners’ Dilemma 10, 0 5, 50, 10 1, 1 What to do? Which strategy should you select?

21. Rat Hang Tough Prisoners’ Dilemma 10, 0 5, 50, 10 1, 1 Dominant Strategy Dominant Strategy

22. Rat Hang Tough Prisoners’ Dilemma 10, 0 5, 50, 10 1, 1 Dominant Strategy Dominant Strategy

23. Rat Hang Tough Prisoners’ Dilemma 10, 0 5, 50, 10 1, 1 Nash Equilibrium Neither player can improve his/her position,

24. Rat Hang Tough Prisoners’ Dilemma 10, 0 5, 50, 10 1, 1 Nash Equilibrium Neither player can unilaterally improve his/her position

25. Prisoners’ Dilemma Generalized Form: Rank Outcomes, from most preferred to least preferred 1 = first choice 2 = second choice 3 = third choice 4 = fourth choice Choice is “cooperate” or “not cooperate”

26. Don’t Cooperate Don’t Cooperate Cooperate Prisoners’ Dilemma 4, 1 3, 31, 4 2, 2

27. Prisoners’ Dilemma Symbolic Form: We’re in a Prisoner’s Dilemma situation whenever: T > R > P > S Temptation to defect > Rewards of Cooperation Rewards > Punishment for Not Cooperating Punishment > Sucker’s Payoff

28. Prisoners’ Dilemma Note that even if we start at the cooperative outcome, that outcome is not stable Each player can improve his/her position by adopting a different strategy

29. Don’t Cooperate Don’t Cooperate Cooperate Prisoners’ Dilemma 4, 1 3, 31, 4 2, 2

30. Prisoners’ Dilemma But since both players have changed strategy we end up at the non-cooperative outcome, where both players are worse off than if they had chosen to cooperate

31. Don’t Cooperate Don’t Cooperate Cooperate Prisoners’ Dilemma 4, 1 3, 31, 4 2, 2

32. Prisoners’ Dilemma And, as we noted, this non-cooperative outcome is also a Nash equilibrium outcome; Neither player has any incentive to change strategy since whoever changes will do immediately worse by making the move

33. Don’t Cooperate Don’t Cooperate Cooperate Prisoners’ Dilemma 4, 1 3, 31, 4 2, 2

34. III.Mutual Advantage and the Social Contract Prevent defections and allow for cooperative behavior What kind of political life? Need to insure that everyone agrees to terms of contract What sort of terms would arise?

35. Sovereign We the People

36. Sovereign We the People Reciprocal Obligations

37. Sovereign We the People The Social Contract Binds the Sovereign and the People

38. III.Mutual Advantage and the Social Contract Locke’s Social Contract then includes: Rights to protect us against the government Popular sovereignty Legislative power supreme (rather than the executive as in a monarchy) Basis for this -- fundamental equality of all human beings