1. 1 Topics covered in the course Games in extensive and strategic (normal form) Games in extensive and strategic (normal form) Backwards induction (zermelo’s theorem) Backwards induction (zermelo’s theorem) Values of strict competitive games Values of strict competitive games Saddle points and Nash Equilibria Saddle points and Nash Equilibria Sub-game Perfect Equilibria Sub-game Perfect Equilibria Games with Chance Moves Games with Chance Moves Von Neumann - Morgenstern utility functions Von Neumann - Morgenstern utility functions

2. 2 Information sets, games with simultaneous moves Information sets, games with simultaneous moves Dominating and dominated strategies Dominating and dominated strategies The Prisoners’ Dilemma The Prisoners’ Dilemma Successive deletion of dominated strategies Successive deletion of dominated strategies The Stag Hunt game The Stag Hunt game The Battle of the Sexes The Battle of the Sexes Nash Demand Game Nash Demand Game * Motivating examples in BLUE Topics covered in the course* *

3. 3 Matching Pennies Matching Pennies Mixed Strategies Mixed Strategies The Inspection game The Inspection game Reporting a crime Reporting a crime Maximin, minimax and security strategies Maximin, minimax and security strategies All Pay Auction All Pay Auction The Centipede Game The Centipede Game * Motivating examples in BLUE

4. 4 Topics covered in the course* Correlated Equilibria Correlated Equilibria Repeated Games and cooperation Repeated Games and cooperation Strategies as Automata Strategies as Automata Axelrod’s Tournament Axelrod’s Tournament The folk theorem (minimax strategies) The folk theorem (minimax strategies) Incomplete Monitoring Incomplete Monitoring Social Contract Social Contract * Motivating examples in BLUE

5. 5 Topics covered in the course Incomplete Information Incomplete Information Information partition, Bayes’ Law Information partition, Bayes’ Law Bayesian Games Bayesian Games Bayesian Equilibria Bayesian Equilibria Auctions (1 st and 2 nd price auctions) Auctions (1 st and 2 nd price auctions) Optimality of Auctions Optimality of Auctions Signalling Games (Education, Information, Quality) Signalling Games (Education, Information, Quality)