1. The Natural Resource Curse I: Pitfalls of Commodity Wealth Jeffrey Frankel Harpel Professor of Capital Formation & Growth Harvard University Low-Income Countries Seminar International Monetary Fund, April 26, 2011

2. 2 The Natural Resource Curse The NRC pertains especially to oil & minerals, but sometimes to agricultural products, logging & fishing too. The NRC pertains especially to oil & minerals, but sometimes to agricultural products, logging & fishing too. Seminal references: Seminal references: Auty (1990, 2001, 07, 09) Auty (1990, 2001, 07, 09) Sachs & Warner (1995, 2001) Sachs & Warner (1995, 2001) Frankel, “The Natural Resource Curse: Survey,” Frankel, “The Natural Resource Curse: Survey,” NBER Working Paper 15836, 2010. NBER Working Paper 15836, 2010. forthcoming in Export Perils, forthcoming in Export Perils, edited by B.Shaffer (U. of Pennsylvania Press: 2011) edited by B.Shaffer (U. of Pennsylvania Press: 2011)

3. 3 Examples Conspicuously high in oil resources and low in growth: Venezuela & Gabon. Conspicuously high in oil resources and low in growth: Venezuela & Gabon. Conspicuously high in growth and low in natural resources: China & other Asian countries. Conspicuously high in growth and low in natural resources: China & other Asian countries. The overall relationship on average is slightly negative: The overall relationship on average is slightly negative:

4. 4 Growth falls with fuel & mineral exports

5. 5 Are natural resources necessarily bad? Commodity wealth need not necessarily lead to inferior economic or political development. Commodity wealth need not necessarily lead to inferior economic or political development. Rather, it is a double-edged sword, with both benefits and dangers. Rather, it is a double-edged sword, with both benefits and dangers. It can be used for ill as easily as for good. It can be used for ill as easily as for good. The priority for any country should be on identifying ways to sidestep the pitfalls that have afflicted other mineral producers in the past, to find the path of success. The priority for any country should be on identifying ways to sidestep the pitfalls that have afflicted other mineral producers in the past, to find the path of success. No, of course not.

6. 6 The goal is to enjoy the success of The goal is to enjoy the success of Chile, vs. Bolivia Chile, vs. Bolivia Botswana, vs. Congo Botswana, vs. Congo Norway, vs. Sudan. Norway, vs. Sudan. The last section of my paper explores policies & institutional innovations that might help avoid the natural resource curse and achieve natural resource blessings instead. The last section of my paper explores policies & institutional innovations that might help avoid the natural resource curse and achieve natural resource blessings instead.

7. 7 How could abundance of commodity wealth be a curse? How could abundance of commodity wealth be a curse? What is the mechanism What is the mechanism for this counter-intuitive relationship? for this counter-intuitive relationship? At least 7 channels have been suggested: At least 7 channels have been suggested:

8. 8 1. Price trend 2. Price volatility 3. Crowding-out of manufacturing 4. Inhibited development of institutions 5. Unsustainably rapid depletion 6. Proclivity for armed conflict 7. Procyclical macro policy 7 Possible Natural Resource Curse Channels

9. 9 1. World commodity price trend could be downward (Prebisch-Singer); 1. World commodity price trend could be downward (Prebisch-Singer); 2. High volatility of commodity prices could be problematic ; 3. Natural resources could be dead-end sectors (Matsuyama): they may crowd out manufacturing, which may be home to dynamic benefits & spillovers. The 7 NRC Channels Elaborated

10. 10 The 7 NRC Channels continued 4. Countries where physical command natural resources by the government or a hereditary elite automatically confers wealth on the holders may be less likely to develop the institutions that are conducive to economic development (Engerman-Sokoloff …), e.g., rule of law & decentralization of decision-making, e.g., rule of law & decentralization of decision-making, as compared to countries where moderate taxation of a thriving market economy is the only way to finance government. as compared to countries where moderate taxation of a thriving market economy is the only way to finance government.

11. 11 The 7 NRC Channels continued 5. Non-renewable resources are depleted too fast, where it is difficult to enforce property rights, as under frontier conditions. 6. Countries that are endowed with minerals may have a proclivity for armed conflict, which is inimical to economic growth. 7. Procyclical macroeconomic policy can exacerbate effects of swings in commodity prices e.g., the Dutch Disease, via spending & the real exchange rate.

12. 12 (7) Procyclicality Developing countries have historically been prone to procyclicality: Developing countries have historically been prone to procyclicality: Especially procyclical government spending Especially procyclical government spending “Procyclical” = destabilizing. “Procyclical” = destabilizing. particularly among commodity producers. particularly among commodity producers. The Dutch Disease describes unwanted side- effects from a strong, but perhaps temporary, rise in the export commodity’s world price. The Dutch Disease describes unwanted side- effects from a strong, but perhaps temporary, rise in the export commodity’s world price.

13. 13 Volatility in developing countries arises both from foreign shocks, arises both from foreign shocks, including export commodity price fluctuations, including export commodity price fluctuations, and from domestic shocks and from domestic shocks including macroeconomic & political instability. including macroeconomic & political instability.

14. 14 Most developing countries in the 1990s brought chronic runaway budget deficits, money creation, & inflation, under control, Most developing countries in the 1990s brought chronic runaway budget deficits, money creation, & inflation, under control, but many still show monetary & fiscal policy that is procyclical rather than countercyclical: but many still show monetary & fiscal policy that is procyclical rather than countercyclical: They tend to expand in booms They tend to expand in booms and contract in recessions, and contract in recessions, thereby exacerbating the magnitudes of swings. thereby exacerbating the magnitudes of swings.

15. 15 The procyclicality of fiscal policy The procyclicality of fiscal policy Many authors have shown that fiscal policy tends to be procyclical in developing countries, Many authors have shown that fiscal policy tends to be procyclical in developing countries, especially in comparison with industrialized countries. [1] especially in comparison with industrialized countries. [1][1] A reason for procyclical public spending: receipts from taxes or royalties rise in booms; The government cannot resist the temptation or political pressure to increase spending proportionately, or more. A reason for procyclical public spending: receipts from taxes or royalties rise in booms; The government cannot resist the temptation or political pressure to increase spending proportionately, or more. [1][1] Cuddington (1989), Tornell & Lane (1999), Kaminsky, Reinhart, & Vegh (2004), Talvi & Végh (2005), Alesina, Campante & Tabellini (2008), Mendoza & Oviedo (2006), Ilzetski & Vegh (2008), Medas & Zakharova (2009) and Gavin & Perotti (1997). [1]

16. 16 The procyclicality of fiscal policy, cont. The procyclicality of fiscal policy, cont. Procyclicality is especially pronounced in countries where income from natural resources tends to dominate the business cycle. Procyclicality is especially pronounced in countries where income from natural resources tends to dominate the business cycle. Cuddington (1989) and Sinnott (2009) Cuddington (1989) and Sinnott (2009) An important development -- some developing countries, including commodity producers, were able to break the historic pattern in the most recent cycle: An important development -- some developing countries, including commodity producers, were able to break the historic pattern in the most recent cycle: taking advantage of the boom of 2002-2008 taking advantage of the boom of 2002-2008 to run budget surpluses & build reserves, to run budget surpluses & build reserves, thereby earning the ability to expand fiscally in the 2008-09 crisis. thereby earning the ability to expand fiscally in the 2008-09 crisis. Chile is the outstanding model. Chile is the outstanding model.

17. 17 (i) Public investment projects Two large budget items account for much of the increased spending from oil booms: Two large budget items account for much of the increased spending from oil booms: (i) investment projects and (i) investment projects and (ii) the government wage bill. (ii) the government wage bill. Regarding the 1 st budget item, investment in infrastructure can have big long-term pay-off if it is well designed; too often in practice, however, it takes the form of white elephant projects, which are stranded without funds for completion or maintenance when the oil price goes back down. Regarding the 1 st budget item, investment in infrastructure can have big long-term pay-off if it is well designed; too often in practice, however, it takes the form of white elephant projects, which are stranded without funds for completion or maintenance when the oil price goes back down. Gelb (1986). Gelb (1986).

18. 18 (ii) Public sector wage bills Regarding the 2nd budget item, oil windfalls have often been spent on higher public sector wages -- Medas & Zakharova (2009). Regarding the 2nd budget item, oil windfalls have often been spent on higher public sector wages -- Medas & Zakharova (2009). They can also go to increasing the number of workers employed by the government. They can also go to increasing the number of workers employed by the government. Either way, they raise the total public sector wage bill, which is hard to reverse when oil prices go back down. Either way, they raise the total public sector wage bill, which is hard to reverse when oil prices go back down. Figures 2 & 3 plot the public sector wage bill, for two oil producers, Iran & Indonesia. Figures 2 & 3 plot the public sector wage bill, for two oil producers, Iran & Indonesia.

19. 19 Iran’s Government Wage Bill Is Influenced by Oil Prices Over Preceding 3 Years (1974, 1977-1997.) Source: Frankel (2005b)

20. 20 Indonesia’s Government Wage Bill Is Influenced by Oil Prices Over Preceding 3 Years (1974, 1977-1997.) Source: Frankel (2005b)

21. 21 Public sector wage bills, cont. There is a clear positive relationship. There is a clear positive relationship. That the relationship is strong with a 3-year lag shows the problem: oil prices may have fallen over 3 years, but public sector wages cannot easily be cut nor workers laid off. That the relationship is strong with a 3-year lag shows the problem: oil prices may have fallen over 3 years, but public sector wages cannot easily be cut nor workers laid off. Arezki & Ismail (2010) find that current government spending increases in boom times, but is downward-sticky. Arezki & Ismail (2010) find that current government spending increases in boom times, but is downward-sticky.

22. 22 The Dutch Disease: 5 side-effects of a commodity boom 1) A real appreciation in the currency 1) A real appreciation in the currency 2) A rise in government spending 2) A rise in government spending 3) A rise in nontraded goods prices 3) A rise in nontraded goods prices 4) A resultant shift of resources out of non-export-commodity traded goods 4) A resultant shift of resources out of non-export-commodity traded goods 5) Sometimes a current account deficit 5) Sometimes a current account deficit

23. 23 The Dutch Disease: The 5 effects elaborated 1) A real appreciation in the currency 1) A real appreciation in the currency taking the form of nominal currency appreciation if the exchange rate floats taking the form of nominal currency appreciation if the exchange rate floats e.g., floating-rate oil exporters e.g., floating-rate oil exporters Kazakhstan, Mexico, Norway, & Russia. Kazakhstan, Mexico, Norway, & Russia. or the form of money inflows & inflation if the exchange rate is fixed [1] ; or the form of money inflows & inflation if the exchange rate is fixed [1] ; [1] e.g. fixed-rate oil-exporters, the UAE & Saudi Arabia. e.g. fixed-rate oil-exporters, the UAE & Saudi Arabia. 2) A rise in government spending 2) A rise in government spending in response to increased availability of tax receipts or royalties. in response to increased availability of tax receipts or royalties.

24. 24 The Dutch Disease: 5 side-effects of a commodity boom 3) An increase in nontraded goods prices (goods & services such as housing that are not internationally traded), 3) An increase in nontraded goods prices (goods & services such as housing that are not internationally traded), relative to traded goods (manufactures & other internationally traded goods other than the export commodity). relative to traded goods (manufactures & other internationally traded goods other than the export commodity). 4) A resultant shift of resources out of non-export-commodity traded goods 4) A resultant shift of resources out of non-export-commodity traded goods pulled by the more attractive returns in the export commodity and in non-traded goods. pulled by the more attractive returns in the export commodity and in non-traded goods.

25. 25 The Dutch Disease: 5 side-effects of a commodity boom 5) A current account deficit 5) A current account deficit thereby incurring international debt that may be difficult to service when the boom ends [2]. thereby incurring international debt that may be difficult to service when the boom ends [2]. [2] Most developing countries avoided it in 2003-10. Most developing countries avoided it in 2003-10. [2] Manzano & Rigobon (2008): the negative Sachs-Warner effect of resource dependence on growth rates during 1970-1990 was mediated through international debt incurred when commodity prices were high. [2] Manzano & Rigobon (2008): the negative Sachs-Warner effect of resource dependence on growth rates during 1970-1990 was mediated through international debt incurred when commodity prices were high. [2] Arezki & Brückner (2010a): commodity price booms lead to increased government spending, external debt & default risk in autocracies. Arezki & Brückner (2010a): commodity price booms lead to increased government spending, external debt & default risk in autocracies. Arezki & Brückner (2010b): the dichotomy extends also to effects on sovereign spreads paid by autocratic vs democratic commodity producers. Arezki & Brückner (2010b): the dichotomy extends also to effects on sovereign spreads paid by autocratic vs democratic commodity producers.

26. 26 The Natural Resource Curse should not be interpreted as a rule that resource- rich countries are doomed to failure. The question is what policies to adopt to improve the chances of prosperity. The question is what policies to adopt to improve the chances of prosperity. Destruction or renunciation of resource endowments, to avoid dangers such as the corruption of leaders, will not be one of these policies. Destruction or renunciation of resource endowments, to avoid dangers such as the corruption of leaders, will not be one of these policies. The survey concludes with ideas for policies/institutions designed to address aspects of the resource curse and thereby increase the chance of economic success. The survey concludes with ideas for policies/institutions designed to address aspects of the resource curse and thereby increase the chance of economic success.

27. 27

28. 28 Appendices: 1) The other possible NRC channels in detail 2) Skeptics of the NRC

29. 29 Appendix 1: The possible NRC channels in detail (1) The claim of a negative trend in commodity prices on world markets was already dealt with: the data do not suggest a robust long-term trend, certainly not a negative one if updated to 2010.

30. 30 (1) Long-term world price trend (i) Determination of the price on world markets (i) Determination of the price on world markets (ii) The old “structuralist school” (Prebisch-Singer): (ii) The old “structuralist school” (Prebisch-Singer): The hypothesis of a declining commodity price trend The hypothesis of a declining commodity price trend (iii) Hypotheses of a rising price trend (iii) Hypotheses of a rising price trend Hotelling Hotelling Malthus Malthus (iv) Empirical evidence (iv) Empirical evidence Statistical time series studies Statistical time series studies

31. 31 (i) The determination of the export price on world markets Developing countries tend to be smaller economically than major industrialized countries, and more likely to specialize in the exports of basic commodities. Developing countries tend to be smaller economically than major industrialized countries, and more likely to specialize in the exports of basic commodities. As a result, they are more likely to fit the “small open economy” model: As a result, they are more likely to fit the “small open economy” model: they can be regarded as price-takers, they can be regarded as price-takers, That is, the prices of their export goods are generally taken as given on world markets. That is, the prices of their export goods are generally taken as given on world markets.

32. 32 (ii) The old “structuralist school” Raul Prebisch (1950) & Hans Singer (1950) The hypothesis: a declining long run trend in prices of mineral & agricultural products The hypothesis: a declining long run trend in prices of mineral & agricultural products relative to the prices of manufactured goods. relative to the prices of manufactured goods. The theoretical reasoning: world demand for primary products is inelastic with respect to world income. The theoretical reasoning: world demand for primary products is inelastic with respect to world income. That is, for every 1 % increase in income, raw materials demand rises by less than 1%. That is, for every 1 % increase in income, raw materials demand rises by less than 1%. Engel’s Law, an (older) proposition: households spend a lower fraction of their income on basic necessities as they get richer. Engel’s Law, an (older) proposition: households spend a lower fraction of their income on basic necessities as they get richer. Demand => P oil Demand => P oil

33. 33 (iii) Hypotheses of rising trends Hotelling on depletable resources; Malthus on geometric population growth. Persuasive theoretical arguments that we should expect oil prices to show an upward trend in the long run. Persuasive theoretical arguments that we should expect oil prices to show an upward trend in the long run.

34. 34 Assumptions for Hotelling model (1) Non-perishable non-renewable resources: (1) Non-perishable non-renewable resources: Deposits in the earth’s crust are fixed in total supply and are gradually being depleted. Deposits in the earth’s crust are fixed in total supply and are gradually being depleted. (2) Secure property rights: (2) Secure property rights: Whoever currently has claim to the resource can be confident that it will retain possession, unless it sells to someone else, unless it sells to someone else, who then has equally safe property rights. who then has equally safe property rights. This assumption excludes cases where warlords compete over physical possession of the resource. This assumption excludes cases where warlords compete over physical possession of the resource. It also excludes cases where private mining companies fear that their contracts might be abrogated or their holdings nationalized. It also excludes cases where private mining companies fear that their contracts might be abrogated or their holdings nationalized.

35. 35 One more assumption, to keep the Hotelling model simple: (3) The fixed deposits are easily accessible: (3) The fixed deposits are easily accessible: the costs of exploration & extraction are small compared to the value of the mineral. the costs of exploration & extraction are small compared to the value of the mineral. Hotelling (1931) deduced from these assumptions the theoretical principle: Hotelling (1931) deduced from these assumptions the theoretical principle: the price of oil in the long run should rise at a rate equal to the interest rate. the price of oil in the long run should rise at a rate equal to the interest rate.

36. 36 The Hotelling logic: The owner chooses how much mineral to extract The owner chooses how much mineral to extract and how much to leave in the ground. and how much to leave in the ground. Whatever is mined can be sold at today’s price (price-taker assumption) Whatever is mined can be sold at today’s price (price-taker assumption) and the proceeds invested in bank deposits and the proceeds invested in bank deposits or US Treasury bills, which earn the current interest rate. or US Treasury bills, which earn the current interest rate. If the value of the commodity in the ground is not expected to rise in the future, then the owner has an incentive to extract more of it today, so that he earns interest on the proceeds. If the value of the commodity in the ground is not expected to rise in the future, then the owner has an incentive to extract more of it today, so that he earns interest on the proceeds.

37. 37 The Hotelling logic, continued: As minng companies worldwide react in this way, they drive down the price today, As minng companies worldwide react in this way, they drive down the price today, below its perceived long-run level. below its perceived long-run level. When the current price is below its long-run level, companies will expect the price to rise in the future. When the current price is below its long-run level, companies will expect the price to rise in the future. Only when the expectation of future appreciation is sufficient to offset the interest rate will the commodity market be in equilibrium. Only when the expectation of future appreciation is sufficient to offset the interest rate will the commodity market be in equilibrium. Only then will mining companies be close to indifferent between extracting at a faster rate and a slower rate. Only then will mining companies be close to indifferent between extracting at a faster rate and a slower rate.

38. 38 The complication: supply is not fixed. True, at any point in time there is a certain stock of reserves that have been discovered. True, at any point in time there is a certain stock of reserves that have been discovered. But the historical pattern has long been that, as that stock is depleted, new reserves are found. But the historical pattern has long been that, as that stock is depleted, new reserves are found. When the price goes up, it makes exploration & development profitable for deposits farther under the surface. When the price goes up, it makes exploration & development profitable for deposits farther under the surface. …especially as new technologies are developed for exploration & extraction. …especially as new technologies are developed for exploration & extraction.

39. 39 What is the overall statistical trend in commodity prices in the long run? Some authors find a slight upward trend, Some authors find a slight upward trend, some a slight downward trend. [1] some a slight downward trend. [1] [1] The answer seems to depend, more than anything else, on the date of the end of the sample: The answer seems to depend, more than anything else, on the date of the end of the sample: Studies written after the 1970s boom found an upward trend, Studies written after the 1970s boom found an upward trend, but those written after the 1980s found a downward trend, but those written after the 1980s found a downward trend, even when both went back to the early 20th century. even when both went back to the early 20th century. [1][1] Cuddington (1992), Cuddington, Ludema & Jayasuriya (2007), Cuddington & Urzua (1989), Grilli & Yang (1988), Pindyck (1999), Hadass & Williamson (2003), Reinhart & Wickham (1994), Kellard & Wohar (2005), Balagtas & Holt (2009) and Harvey, Kellard, Madsen & Wohar (2010). [1]

40. 40 (2) Effects of Volatility Is volatility per se bad for economic growth? Is volatility per se bad for economic growth? Cyclical shifts of resources back & forth across sectors may incur needless transaction costs. Cyclical shifts of resources back & forth across sectors may incur needless transaction costs. A diversified country may indeed be better than one 100% specialized in minerals. A diversified country may indeed be better than one 100% specialized in minerals. On the other hand, the private sector dislikes risk as much as the government does, and will take steps to mitigate it; On the other hand, the private sector dislikes risk as much as the government does, and will take steps to mitigate it; thus one must think where the market failure lies before assuming that a policy of deliberate diversification is necessarily justified. thus one must think where the market failure lies before assuming that a policy of deliberate diversification is necessarily justified.

41. 41 Effects of volatility, continued Policy-makers may not be better than individual private agents at discerning whether a commodity boom is temporary or not. Policy-makers may not be better than individual private agents at discerning whether a commodity boom is temporary or not. But the government cannot ignore the issue of volatility: But the government cannot ignore the issue of volatility: When it comes to exchange rate or fiscal policy, governments must necessarily make judgments about the likely permanence of shocks. When it comes to exchange rate or fiscal policy, governments must necessarily make judgments about the likely permanence of shocks. More on medium-term cycles when we get to the Dutch Disease More on medium-term cycles when we get to the Dutch Disease

42. 42 (3) Do natural resources crowd out manufacturing? Matsuyama (1992) provided an influential model: Matsuyama (1992) provided an influential model: the manufacturing sector is assumed to be characterized by learning by doing, while the primary sector (agriculture, in his paper) is not. the manufacturing sector is assumed to be characterized by learning by doing, while the primary sector (agriculture, in his paper) is not. Also van Wijnbergen (1984) and Gylfason, Herbertsson & Zoega (1999). Also van Wijnbergen (1984) and Gylfason, Herbertsson & Zoega (1999). The implication: The implication: deliberate policy-induced diversification out of primary products into manufacturing is justified, and deliberate policy-induced diversification out of primary products into manufacturing is justified, and a permanent commodity boom that crowds out manufacturing can indeed be harmful. a permanent commodity boom that crowds out manufacturing can indeed be harmful.

43. 43Counterarguments There is no reason why learning by doing should occur only in manufacturing tradables. There is no reason why learning by doing should occur only in manufacturing tradables. Nontradable sectors can enjoy learning by doing. [1] Nontradable sectors can enjoy learning by doing. [1] [1] E.g., construction… E.g., construction… The mineral sector can as well. The mineral sector can as well. The USA is one example of a country that has enjoyed big productivity growth in commodity sectors. The USA is one example of a country that has enjoyed big productivity growth in commodity sectors. Productivity gains have been aided by American public investment, Productivity gains have been aided by American public investment, since the late 19th century, in such knowledge infrastructure institutions as the U.S. Geological Survey, School of Mines, and Land-Grant Colleges. [2] since the late 19th century, in such knowledge infrastructure institutions as the U.S. Geological Survey, School of Mines, and Land-Grant Colleges. [2] [2] [1] Torvik (2001) and Matsen & Torvik (2005). [1] Torvik (2001) and Matsen & Torvik (2005). [1] [2] Wright & Czelusta (2003, p.6, 25; 18-21). [2] Wright & Czelusta (2003, p.6, 25; 18-21). [2]

44. 44 Counterarguments, continued Public investment in knowledge infrastructure ≠ government subsidy or ownership of the resources themselves. Public investment in knowledge infrastructure ≠ government subsidy or ownership of the resources themselves. In Latin America, e.g., public monopoly ownership and prohibition on importing foreign expertise or capital has often stunted development of the mineral sector, whereas privatization has set it free. In Latin America, e.g., public monopoly ownership and prohibition on importing foreign expertise or capital has often stunted development of the mineral sector, whereas privatization has set it free. Attempts by governments to force linkages between the mineral sector and processing industries have often failed. Attempts by governments to force linkages between the mineral sector and processing industries have often failed.

45. 45 (4) Institutions Recent thinking in economic development: The quality of institutions is the deep fundamental factor that determines which countries experience good performance. [1] The quality of institutions is the deep fundamental factor that determines which countries experience good performance. [1] [1] It is futile (e.g., for the IMF & World Bank) to recommend good macroeconomic or microeconomic policies if the institutional structure is not there to support them. It is futile (e.g., for the IMF & World Bank) to recommend good macroeconomic or microeconomic policies if the institutional structure is not there to support them. [1][1] Barro (1991) and North (1994). [1]

46. 46 What are weak institutions? A typical list: A typical list: inequality, inequality, corruption, corruption, insecure property rights, insecure property rights, intermittent dictatorship, intermittent dictatorship, ineffective judiciary branch, and ineffective judiciary branch, and lack of any constraints to prevent elites & politicians from plundering the country. lack of any constraints to prevent elites & politicians from plundering the country. “Quality of institutions” has been quantified by World Bank, Freedom House, Transparency International, and others. “Quality of institutions” has been quantified by World Bank, Freedom House, Transparency International, and others. Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi (2003) use a rule of law indicator and protection of property rights (taken from Kaufmann, Kraay & Zoido-Lobaton, 2002). Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi (2003) use a rule of law indicator and protection of property rights (taken from Kaufmann, Kraay & Zoido-Lobaton, 2002). Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson (2001) use a measure of expropriation risk to investors. Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson (2001) use a measure of expropriation risk to investors. Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, & Thaicharoen (2003) use the extent of constraints on the executive. Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, & Thaicharoen (2003) use the extent of constraints on the executive.

47. 47 Institutions can be endogenous: the result of economic growth rather than the cause. the result of economic growth rather than the cause. The same problem is encountered with other proposed fundamental determinants of growth, e.g., openness to trade and freedom from tropical diseases. The same problem is encountered with other proposed fundamental determinants of growth, e.g., openness to trade and freedom from tropical diseases. Many institutions tend to evolve endogenously, in response to the level of income, Many institutions tend to evolve endogenously, in response to the level of income, such as the structure of financial markets, such as the structure of financial markets, mechanisms of income redistribution & social safety nets, tax systems, and intellectual property rules… mechanisms of income redistribution & social safety nets, tax systems, and intellectual property rules…

48. 48 Addressing endogeneity of institutions statistically Econometricians address the problem of endogeneity by means of the technique of instrumental variables. Econometricians address the problem of endogeneity by means of the technique of instrumental variables. What is a good instrumental variable for institutions, an exogenous determinant? What is a good instrumental variable for institutions, an exogenous determinant? Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2001) introduced the mortality rates of colonial settlers. Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2001) introduced the mortality rates of colonial settlers. The theory is that, out of all the lands that Europeans colonized, only those where Europeans actually settled were given good European institutions. The theory is that, out of all the lands that Europeans colonized, only those where Europeans actually settled were given good European institutions. Acemoglu et al figured that initial settler mortality determined whether Europeans settled in large numbers.[1] Acemoglu et al figured that initial settler mortality determined whether Europeans settled in large numbers.[1][1] [1] Glaeser, et al, (2004) argue against the settler variable. Hall & Jones (1999) consider latitude and the speaking of English or other European languages as proxies for European institutions. [1] Glaeser, et al, (2004) argue against the settler variable. Hall & Jones (1999) consider latitude and the speaking of English or other European languages as proxies for European institutions. [1]

49. 49 Institutions: Econometric findings The finding is the same, regardless of IV: The finding is the same, regardless of IV: “Institutions trump everything else” – Rodrik et al (2002) “Institutions trump everything else” – Rodrik et al (2002) Acemoglu et al (2002) Acemoglu et al (2002) Easterly & Levine (2002) Easterly & Levine (2002) Hall & Jones (1999) Hall & Jones (1999) Geography and history matter mainly as determinants of institutions; Geography and history matter mainly as determinants of institutions; which is not to say that institutions don’t also have other important determinants. which is not to say that institutions don’t also have other important determinants. In any case, institutions are important. In any case, institutions are important.

50. 50 The “rent cycling theory” as enunciated by Auty (1990, 2001, 07, 09) : Economic growth requires recycling rents via markets rather than via patronage. Economic growth requires recycling rents via markets rather than via patronage. In oil countries the rents elicit a political contest to capture ownership, In oil countries the rents elicit a political contest to capture ownership, whereas in low-rent countries the government must motivate people to create wealth, whereas in low-rent countries the government must motivate people to create wealth, e.g., by pursuing comparative advantage, promoting equality, & fostering civil society. e.g., by pursuing comparative advantage, promoting equality, & fostering civil society.

51. 51 A related view by economic historians Engerman & Sokoloff (1997, 2000, 2002) Why did industrialization take place in North America, Why did industrialization take place in North America, not Latin America? not Latin America? Lands endowed with extractive industries & plantation crops developed slavery, inequality, dictatorship, and state control, Lands endowed with extractive industries & plantation crops developed slavery, inequality, dictatorship, and state control, whereas those climates suited to fishing & small farms developed institutions of individualism, democracy, egalitarianism, and capitalism. whereas those climates suited to fishing & small farms developed institutions of individualism, democracy, egalitarianism, and capitalism. When the Industrial Revolution came, the latter areas were well-suited to make the most of it. When the Industrial Revolution came, the latter areas were well-suited to make the most of it. Those that had specialized in extractive industries were not, Those that had specialized in extractive industries were not, because society had come to depend on class structure & authoritarianism, rather than on individual incentive and decentralized decision-making. because society had come to depend on class structure & authoritarianism, rather than on individual incentive and decentralized decision-making.

52. 52 Econometric findings that “point-source resources” such as oil and minerals lead to poor institutions Isham, Woolcock, Pritchett, & Busby (2005) Isham, Woolcock, Pritchett, & Busby (2005) Sala-I-Martin & Subramanian (2003) Sala-I-Martin & Subramanian (2003) Bulte, Damania & Deacon (2005) Bulte, Damania & Deacon (2005) Mehlum, Moene & Torvik (2006) Mehlum, Moene & Torvik (2006) Arezki & Brückner (2009). Arezki & Brückner (2009). The theory is thought to fit Middle Eastern oil exporters well. E.g., Iran. Mahdavi (1970), Skocpol (1982, p. 269 ), and Smith (2007). E.g., Iran. Mahdavi (1970), Skocpol (1982, p. 269 ), and Smith (2007).

53. 53 Which comes first, minerals or institutions? Some question the assumption that mineral discoveries are exogenous and institutions endogenous. Some question the assumption that mineral discoveries are exogenous and institutions endogenous. Mineral wealth is not necessarily the cause and institutions the effect, rather than the other way around. Mineral wealth is not necessarily the cause and institutions the effect, rather than the other way around. Norman (2009): the discovery & development of oil is not purely exogenous, but rather is endogenous with respect to the efficiency of the economy. Norman (2009): the discovery & development of oil is not purely exogenous, but rather is endogenous with respect to the efficiency of the economy.

54. 54 The important determinant is whether the country already has good institutions at the time that minerals are discovered, in which case it is put to use for the national welfare, instead of the welfare of an elite, on average. Mehlum, Moene & Torvik (2006), Mehlum, Moene & Torvik (2006), Robinson, Torvik & Verdier (2006), Robinson, Torvik & Verdier (2006), McSherry (2006), McSherry (2006), Smith (2007) and Smith (2007) and Collier & Goderis (2007). Collier & Goderis (2007). Luong & Weinthal (2010), in a study of the 5 oil-producing former Soviet republics: the choice of ownership structure makes the difference as to whether oil turns out a blessing rather than a curse. Luong & Weinthal (2010), in a study of the 5 oil-producing former Soviet republics: the choice of ownership structure makes the difference as to whether oil turns out a blessing rather than a curse.

55. The combination of development + weak institutions + oil Bhattacharyya & Hodler (2009) find that natural resource rents lead to corruption, but only in the absence of high-quality democratic institutions. Bhattacharyya & Hodler (2009) find that natural resource rents lead to corruption, but only in the absence of high-quality democratic institutions. Collier & Hoeffler (2009) find that when developing countries have democracies, as opposed to advanced countries, they tend to feature weak checks and balances; Collier & Hoeffler (2009) find that when developing countries have democracies, as opposed to advanced countries, they tend to feature weak checks and balances; thus, when developing countries also have high natural resource rents the result is bad for economic growth. thus, when developing countries also have high natural resource rents the result is bad for economic growth.

56. 56 (5) Unsustainably rapid depletion What happens when depletable natural resources are indeed depleted? What happens when depletable natural resources are indeed depleted? This question is important for 3 reasons: This question is important for 3 reasons: Protection of environmental quality. Protection of environmental quality. A motivation for the strategy of economic diversification. A motivation for the strategy of economic diversification. A motivation for the “Hartwick rule”: A motivation for the “Hartwick rule”: Rents from exhaustible natural resources should be invested in other assets, so that future generations do not suffer a loss in total wealth (natural resource + reproducible capital) and therefore in the flow of consumption. Rents from exhaustible natural resources should be invested in other assets, so that future generations do not suffer a loss in total wealth (natural resource + reproducible capital) and therefore in the flow of consumption. Hartwick (1977) and Solow (1986). Hartwick (1977) and Solow (1986).

57. 57 Rapid depletion, continued Each of these problems would be much less severe if full assignment of property rights were possible, Each of these problems would be much less severe if full assignment of property rights were possible, thereby giving the owners adequate incentive to conserve the resource in question. thereby giving the owners adequate incentive to conserve the resource in question. But often this is not possible, But often this is not possible, either physically either physically or politically. or politically. Especially in a frontier situation. Especially in a frontier situation. The difficulty in enforcing property rights over some non-renewable resources constitutes a category of natural resource curse of its own. The difficulty in enforcing property rights over some non-renewable resources constitutes a category of natural resource curse of its own.

58. 58 Unenforceable property rights over depletable resources Unenforceable property rights over depletable resources Some natural resources do not lend themselves to property rights, whether the government wants to apply them or not. Some natural resources do not lend themselves to property rights, whether the government wants to apply them or not. Very different from the theory that the physical possession of point- source mineral wealth undermines the motivation for the government to establish a regime of property rights for the rest of the economy. Very different from the theory that the physical possession of point- source mineral wealth undermines the motivation for the government to establish a regime of property rights for the rest of the economy. Overfishing, overgrazing, & over-use of water are classic examples of the “tragedy of the commons” that applies to “open access” resources. Overfishing, overgrazing, & over-use of water are classic examples of the “tragedy of the commons” that applies to “open access” resources. Individual fisherman or farmers have no incentive to restrain themselves, while the fisheries or pastureland or water aquifers are collectively depleted. Individual fisherman or farmers have no incentive to restrain themselves, while the fisheries or pastureland or water aquifers are collectively depleted.

59. 59 Unenforceable property rights, continued The difficulty in imposing property rights is particularly severe when the resource is The difficulty in imposing property rights is particularly severe when the resource is dispersed over a wide area, as timberland. area, as timberland. But even the classic point-source resource, oil, can suffer the problem, especially when wells drilled from different plots of land hit the same underground deposit. But even the classic point-source resource, oil, can suffer the problem, especially when wells drilled from different plots of land hit the same underground deposit.

60. 60 Unenforceable property rights, continued This market failure can invalidate some standard neoclassical economic theorems in the case of open access resources. This market failure can invalidate some standard neoclassical economic theorems in the case of open access resources. The resource will be depleted more rapidly than the optimization of the Hotelling calculation calls for. [1] The resource will be depleted more rapidly than the optimization of the Hotelling calculation calls for. [1] [1] The benefits of free trade may be another casualty: The benefits of free trade may be another casualty: If exports exacerbate the excess rate of exploitation, If exports exacerbate the excess rate of exploitation, the country might be better worse off. [2] [1] E.g., Dasgupta & Heal (1985). [2] Brander & Taylor (1997). the country might be better worse off. [2] [1] E.g., Dasgupta & Heal (1985). [2] Brander & Taylor (1997). [2] [1] [2] [1] [2]

61. 61 (6) War Where a valuable resource such as oil or diamonds is there for the taking, factions will likely fight over it. Where a valuable resource such as oil or diamonds is there for the taking, factions will likely fight over it. Oil & minerals are correlated with civil war. Oil & minerals are correlated with civil war. Collier & Hoeffler (2004), Collier (2007), Fearon & Laitin (2003) and Humphreys (2005). Collier & Hoeffler (2004), Collier (2007), Fearon & Laitin (2003) and Humphreys (2005). Chronic conflict in such oil-rich countries as Angola & Sudan comes to mind. Chronic conflict in such oil-rich countries as Angola & Sudan comes to mind. Civil war is, in turn, very bad for economic development. Civil war is, in turn, very bad for economic development.

62. 62 Summary: Channels of the NRC (1) Commodity price volatility is high, imposing risk & costs. (1) Commodity price volatility is high, imposing risk & costs. (2) Specialization can crowd out the manufacturing sector. (2) Specialization can crowd out the manufacturing sector. (3) Depletion can be unsustainably rapid, (3) Depletion can be unsustainably rapid, especially if property rights are not adequately protected. especially if property rights are not adequately protected. (4) Mineral riches can lead to civil war. (4) Mineral riches can lead to civil war. (5) Mineral endowments can lead to poor institutions, such as corruption, inequality, class structure, chronic power struggles, and absence of rule of law and property rights. (5) Mineral endowments can lead to poor institutions, such as corruption, inequality, class structure, chronic power struggles, and absence of rule of law and property rights. (6) The Dutch Disease. A commodity boom: => real currency appreciation and increased government spending, => which expand nontraded sector and render uncompetitive non- commodity export sectors such as manufactures. (6) The Dutch Disease. A commodity boom: => real currency appreciation and increased government spending, => which expand nontraded sector and render uncompetitive non- commodity export sectors such as manufactures.

63. 63 Appendix 2: Skeptics argue that commodity exports are endogenous. [1] [1] On the one hand, basic trade theory says: A country may show a high mineral share in exports, not necessarily because it has a higher endowment of minerals than others (absolute advantage) but because it does not have the ability to export manufactures (comparative advantage). On the one hand, basic trade theory says: A country may show a high mineral share in exports, not necessarily because it has a higher endowment of minerals than others (absolute advantage) but because it does not have the ability to export manufactures (comparative advantage). This could explain negative statistical correlations between mineral exports and economic development, This could explain negative statistical correlations between mineral exports and economic development, invalidating the common inference that minerals are bad for growth. invalidating the common inference that minerals are bad for growth. [1] Maloney (2002) and Wright & Czelusta (2003, 04, 06). [1] Maloney (2002) and Wright & Czelusta (2003, 04, 06). [1]

64. 64 Commodity exports are endogenous, continued. On the other hand, skeptics also have plenty of examples where successful institutions and industrialization went hand in hand with rapid development of mineral resources. On the other hand, skeptics also have plenty of examples where successful institutions and industrialization went hand in hand with rapid development of mineral resources. Countries that were able to develop efficiently their resource endowments as part of strong economy-wide growth include: Countries that were able to develop efficiently their resource endowments as part of strong economy-wide growth include: the USA during its pre-war industrialization period [1], the USA during its pre-war industrialization period [1], [1] Venezuela from the 1920s to the 1970s, Australia since the 1960s, Norway since 1969 oil discoveries, Chile since adoption of a new mining code in 1983, Peru since a privatization program in 1992, and Brazil since the lifting of restrictions on foreign mining participation in 1995. [2] Venezuela from the 1920s to the 1970s, Australia since the 1960s, Norway since 1969 oil discoveries, Chile since adoption of a new mining code in 1983, Peru since a privatization program in 1992, and Brazil since the lifting of restrictions on foreign mining participation in 1995. [2] [2] [1] David & Wright (1997). [1] David & Wright (1997). [1] [2] Wright & Czelusta (2003, pp. 4-7, 12-13, 18-22 ). [2] Wright & Czelusta (2003, pp. 4-7, 12-13, 18-22 ). [2]

65. 65 Commodity exports are endogenous, continued. Examples of countries that were equally well-endowed geologically but that failed to develop their natural resources efficiently include: Examples of countries that were equally well-endowed geologically but that failed to develop their natural resources efficiently include: Chile and Australia before World War I, Chile and Australia before World War I, and Venezuela since the 1980s.[3] and Venezuela since the 1980s.[3][3] [3] Hausmann (2003, p.246 ): “Venezuela’s growth collapse took place after 60 years of expansion, fueled by oil. If oil explains slow growth, what explains the previous fast growth?” [3] Hausmann (2003, p.246 ): “Venezuela’s growth collapse took place after 60 years of expansion, fueled by oil. If oil explains slow growth, what explains the previous fast growth?” [3]

66. The Natural Resource Curse II: Recommendations to Avoid the Pitfalls Jeffrey Frankel Harpel Professor, Harvard University LIC Seminar Series, IMF, April 26, 2011

67. Institutions & Policies to Address the Natural Resource Curse Institutions & Policies to Address the Natural Resource Curse A wide variety of measures have been tried to cope with the commodity cycle. [1] A wide variety of measures have been tried to cope with the commodity cycle. [1] [1] Some work better than others. Some work better than others. [1][1] E.g., Davis, et al (2003) and Sachs (2007). [1]

68. Devices to share risks 1. In contracts with foreign companies, index to the world commodity price. 2. Hedge commodity revenues in options markets 3. Denominate debt in terms of commodity price Summary: 10 recommendations for commodity exporting countries

69. 4. Allow some currency appreciation in response to a rise in world prices of export commodities, but only after accumulating some foreign exchange reserves. 5. If the monetary regime is to be Inflation Targeting, consider using as the target, in place of the CPI, a price measure that puts more weight on the export commodity ( e.g., PPT). 6. Emulate Chile: to avoid over-spending in boom times, allow deviations from a target surplus only in response to permanent commodity price rises, as judged by independent expert panels. Summary: 10 recommendations for commodity producers continued Macroeconomic policy PPT

70. 7. Run Commodity Funds transparently & professionally. 8. Invest in education, health, & roads. 9. Publish What You Pay. Consider lump-sum distribution of oil wealth, equal per capita. 10. Mandate an external agent, e.g., a financial institution that houses the Commodity Fund, to provide transparency and to freeze accounts in the event of a coup. Summary: 10 recommendations for commodity producers, continued Good governance institutions

71. Policies/Institutions to Deal with the NRC I. Monetary / Exchange rate policy II. Saving in boom times Appendix – Coping with volatility microeconomically: Devices to share risk

72. I. Monetary/ Exchange Rate policy Fixed vs. floating exchange rates Fixed vs. floating exchange rates Nominal anchors as alternatives to the exchange rate Nominal anchors as alternatives to the exchange rate Inflation targeting Inflation targeting Orthodox implementation: the CPI Orthodox implementation: the CPI Unorthodox version for commodity exporters Unorthodox version for commodity exporters PPT

73. Fixed vs. floating exchange rates Each has its advantages. Each has its advantages. The main advantages of a fixed exchange rate: The main advantages of a fixed exchange rate: it reduces the costs of international trade, it reduces the costs of international trade, it is a nominal anchor for monetary policy, it is a nominal anchor for monetary policy, helping the central bank achieve low-inflation credibility. helping the central bank achieve low-inflation credibility. A few commodity exporters have firmly fixed: A few commodity exporters have firmly fixed: Gulf oil producers & Ecuador. Gulf oil producers & Ecuador. The main advantage of floating, for commodity exporters: The main advantage of floating, for commodity exporters: automatic accommodation to terms of trade shocks. automatic accommodation to terms of trade shocks. During a commodity boom, the currency appreciates, During a commodity boom, the currency appreciates, thus moderating danger of overheating. thus moderating danger of overheating. The reverse, during a commodity bust. The reverse, during a commodity bust. A few commodity producers have floated fairly freely: A few commodity producers have floated fairly freely: Chile & Mexico Chile & Mexico

74. Recommendation Balancing of these pros & cons => an intermediate exchange rate regime such as managed floating. Balancing of these pros & cons => an intermediate exchange rate regime such as managed floating. Over the last decade many followed the intermediate regime: Over the last decade many followed the intermediate regime: While they officially declared themselves as floating (often under IT), in practice these intermediate countries intervened heavily, taking perhaps ½ the increase in demand for their currency in the form of appreciation but ½ in the form of increased forex reserves. While they officially declared themselves as floating (often under IT), in practice these intermediate countries intervened heavily, taking perhaps ½ the increase in demand for their currency in the form of appreciation but ½ in the form of increased forex reserves. Examples among oil-producers include Kazakhstan & Russia. Examples among oil-producers include Kazakhstan & Russia.

75. At the early stages of a boom, there is a good case for foreign exchange intervention, adding to reserves, At the early stages of a boom, there is a good case for foreign exchange intervention, adding to reserves, especially if the alternative is abandoning an established successful exchange rate target. especially if the alternative is abandoning an established successful exchange rate target. Perhaps with sterilization, to resist excessive money growth. Perhaps with sterilization, to resist excessive money growth. In subsequent years, if the increase in world commodity prices looks to be long-lived, there is a stronger case for accommodating it through appreciation of the currency. In subsequent years, if the increase in world commodity prices looks to be long-lived, there is a stronger case for accommodating it through appreciation of the currency. A loose recommendation, continued

76. Nominal anchors for monetary policy If the exchange rate is not to be nominal anchor, If the exchange rate is not to be nominal anchor, something else must be… something else must be… especially where institutions lack credibility especially where institutions lack credibility 2 alternatives for nominal anchor 2 alternatives for nominal anchor have had ardent supporters in the past, but are no longer in the running: the price of gold, as 19th century gold standard; the price of gold, as 19th century gold standard; the money supply, the choice of monetarists; and the money supply, the choice of monetarists; and Inflation targeting Inflation targeting Orthodox implementation: the CPI Orthodox implementation: the CPI Unorthodox versions for commodity producers Unorthodox versions for commodity producers PPT

77. Professor Jeffrey Frankel Inflation targeting has, for 10 years, been the conventional wisdom for how to conduct monetary policy. among economists, central bankers, IMF… among economists, central bankers, IMF… A narrow definition of Inflation Targeting? 1/ IT is defined as setting yearly CPI targets, to the exclusion of:- asset prices A narrow definition of Inflation Targeting? 1/ IT is defined as setting yearly CPI targets, to the exclusion of:- asset prices - exchange rates - export prices, Some reexamination may be warranted. 1/ A broad definition: Flexible inflation targeting ≡ “Have a long run target for inflation, and be transparent.” Then who could disagree? Some reexamination may be warranted. 1/ A broad definition: Flexible inflation targeting ≡ “Have a long run target for inflation, and be transparent.” Then who could disagree?

78. Professor Jeffrey Frankel The shocks of 2007-2010 showed disadvantages to Inflation Targeting. The shocks of 2007-2010 showed disadvantages to Inflation Targeting. One disadvantage of IT: no response to asset price bubbles. One disadvantage of IT: no response to asset price bubbles. Another disadvantage : Another disadvantage : It gives the wrong answer in case of trade shocks: It gives the wrong answer in case of trade shocks: In response to a rise in prices of export commodities, it does not allow monetary tightening & appreciation. In response to a rise in prices of export commodities, it does not allow monetary tightening & appreciation. In response to a fall in world prices of exports, it does not allow a depreciation to help equilibrate. In response to a fall in world prices of exports, it does not allow a depreciation to help equilibrate. In response to a rise in prices of oil & food imports, it requires monetary tightening & appreciation. In response to a rise in prices of oil & food imports, it requires monetary tightening & appreciation.

79. Professor Jeffrey Frankel Implications of external shocks for choice of exchange rate regime Old wisdom regarding the source of shocks: Old wisdom regarding the source of shocks: Fixed rates work best if shocks are mostly internal demand shocks (especially monetary); Fixed rates work best if shocks are mostly internal demand shocks (especially monetary); floating rates work best if shocks tend to be real shocks (especially external terms of trade). floating rates work best if shocks tend to be real shocks (especially external terms of trade). Commodity exporters face big trade shocks => accommodate by floating. Commodity exporters face big trade shocks => accommodate by floating. Edwards & L.Yeyati (2003)

80. Professor Jeffrey Frankel 6 proposed nominal targets and the Achilles heel of each:

81. Professor Jeffrey Frankel Proposal for Product Price Targeting Intended for countries with volatile terms of trade, e.g., those specialized in commodities. The authorities peg the currency to a basket that gives heavy weight to prices of its commodity exports, rather than to the $ or €, or CPI. The regime combines the best of both worlds: (i)The advantage of automatic accommodation to terms of trade shocks, together with (ii)the advantages of a nominal anchor. PPT

82. Professor Jeffrey Frankel Product Price Targeting : Target an index of domestic production prices. [1] [1] The important point: include export commodities in the index and exclude import commodities, so money tightens & currency appreciates when world price of export commodity rises, not world price of import commodity. The CPI does it backwards. [1][1] Frankel (2011). PPT

83. II. Make National Saving Procyclical Hartwick rule: rents from mineral wealth should be saved, against the day when deposits run out. Hartwick rule: rents from mineral wealth should be saved, against the day when deposits run out. At the same time, traditional macroeconomics says that government budgets should be countercyclical: running surpluses in booms, & spending in recessions. At the same time, traditional macroeconomics says that government budgets should be countercyclical: running surpluses in booms, & spending in recessions. Mineral producers tend to fail both these principles: they save too little on average and more so in booms. Mineral producers tend to fail both these principles: they save too little on average and more so in booms. They need institutions to insure that export earnings are put aside during the boom time, They need institutions to insure that export earnings are put aside during the boom time, into a commodity saving fund, into a commodity saving fund, with rules governing the cyclically adjusted budget surplus. with rules governing the cyclically adjusted budget surplus. Davis et al (2001a,b, 2003). Davis et al (2001a,b, 2003).

84. Chile’s fiscal institutions Chile’s fiscal policy is governed by a set of rules. Chile’s fiscal policy is governed by a set of rules. 1 st rule: Each government must set a budget target. 1 st rule: Each government must set a budget target. This may sound like the budget deficit ceilings under Europe’s SGP or a US balanced budget amendment, This may sound like the budget deficit ceilings under Europe’s SGP or a US balanced budget amendment, but such attempts have failed. but such attempts have failed. They are too rigid to allow the need for deficits in recessions, counterbalanced by surpluses in good times. They are too rigid to allow the need for deficits in recessions, counterbalanced by surpluses in good times. The alternative of letting politicians explain away deficits by declaring them the result of unexpected slow growth also does not work, because it imposes no discipline. The alternative of letting politicians explain away deficits by declaring them the result of unexpected slow growth also does not work, because it imposes no discipline. 2nd rule: The government can run a deficit to the extent that: 2nd rule: The government can run a deficit to the extent that: (1) output falls short of potential, in a recession, or (1) output falls short of potential, in a recession, or (2) the price of copper is below its equilibrium. (2) the price of copper is below its equilibrium.

85. Chile’s fiscal institutions, continued 3 rd rule: two panels of experts have the job, each year, to judge: what is the output gap and the 10-year equilibrium copper price 3 rd rule: two panels of experts have the job, each year, to judge: what is the output gap and the 10-year equilibrium copper price Thus in the copper boom of 2003-08 when, as usual, the political pressure was to declare the higher copper price permanent, thereby justifying spending on a par with export earnings, the panel ruled that most of the price increase was temporary Thus in the copper boom of 2003-08 when, as usual, the political pressure was to declare the higher copper price permanent, thereby justifying spending on a par with export earnings, the panel ruled that most of the price increase was temporary so most of the earnings had to be saved. so most of the earnings had to be saved. This turned out right, as the 2008 spike reversed in 2009. This turned out right, as the 2008 spike reversed in 2009. The fiscal surplus approached 9 % when copper prices were high. The fiscal surplus approached 9 % when copper prices were high. The SWF saved 12 % of GDP. The SWF saved 12 % of GDP. This allowed big fiscal easing in the 2009 recession, when the stimulus was most sorely needed. This allowed big fiscal easing in the 2009 recession, when the stimulus was most sorely needed.

86. Commodity funds or Sovereign Wealth Funds Commodity funds or Sovereign Wealth Funds Reducing net inflows during booms Reducing net inflows during booms Lump sum distribution Lump sum distribution Invest in education, health, & roads. Invest in education, health, & roads. Other fiscal institutions

88. Appendices: I. Recommended ways to reduce price volatility I. Recommended ways to reduce price volatility II. Non-recommended ways to reduce price volatility II. Non-recommended ways to reduce price volatility III. Attempts to impose external checks III. Attempts to impose external checks

89. Appendix I: Recommendation for dealing with volatility: Accept its existence and adopt institutions to cope with it 3 micro devices to share risk efficiently 1. For commodity exporters who sign contracts with foreign companies. 2. For producers who sell their minerals themselves. 3. For debtors dependent on commodity revenues.

90. 1. Price setting in contracts with foreign companies Contracts between producing countries & foreign mining companies are often plagued by “time inconsistency”: (i) A price is set by contract. Contracts between producing countries & foreign mining companies are often plagued by “time inconsistency”: (i) A price is set by contract. (ii) Later the world price goes up, and the government wants to renege. It doesn't want to give the company all the profits, and why should it? (ii) Later the world price goes up, and the government wants to renege. It doesn't want to give the company all the profits, and why should it? But this is a “repeated game.” But this is a “repeated game.” The risk that the locals will renege makes foreign companies reluctant to do business in the first place. The risk that the locals will renege makes foreign companies reluctant to do business in the first place. It limits the availability of capital to the country. It limits the availability of capital to the country. The process of renegotiation can have large transactions costs, including interruptions in the export flow. The process of renegotiation can have large transactions costs, including interruptions in the export flow.

91. Solution for price setting in contracts Indexed contracts: Indexed contracts: the two parties agree ahead of time, “if the world price goes up 10%, then the gains are split between the company and the government” in some particular proportion. the two parties agree ahead of time, “if the world price goes up 10%, then the gains are split between the company and the government” in some particular proportion. Indexation shares the risks of gains and losses, Indexation shares the risks of gains and losses, without the costs of renegotiation or without the costs of renegotiation or damage to a country’s reputation from reneging. damage to a country’s reputation from reneging.

92. 2. Hedging in commodity futures markets Producers who sell their minerals on international spot markets, Producers who sell their minerals on international spot markets, are exposed to the risk that the $ price rises or falls. are exposed to the risk that the $ price rises or falls. The producer can hedge the risk by selling that quantity on the forward or futures market. The producer can hedge the risk by selling that quantity on the forward or futures market. Hedging => no need for costly renegotiation if world price changes. Hedging => no need for costly renegotiation if world price changes. as with indexation of the contract price. as with indexation of the contract price. The adjustment happens automatically. The adjustment happens automatically. Mexico has hedged its oil revenues in this way. Mexico has hedged its oil revenues in this way. One drawback, if a government ministry hedges: the Minister receives no credit for having saved the country from disaster when the world price falls, but is excoriated for having sold out the national patrimony when the price rises. One drawback, if a government ministry hedges: the Minister receives no credit for having saved the country from disaster when the world price falls, but is excoriated for having sold out the national patrimony when the price rises. Mexico thus uses options to eliminate only the risk of a fall in price. Mexico thus uses options to eliminate only the risk of a fall in price.

93. 3. Denomination of debt in terms of the mineral price A copper-producer should index its debt to the copper price. A copper-producer should index its debt to the copper price. So debt service obligations automatically rise & fall with the world price. So debt service obligations automatically rise & fall with the world price. Debt crises hit Mexico in 1982 and Indonesia, Russia & Ecuador in 1998, Debt crises hit Mexico in 1982 and Indonesia, Russia & Ecuador in 1998, when the $ prices of their oil exports fell, when the $ prices of their oil exports fell, and so their debt service ratios worsened abruptly. and so their debt service ratios worsened abruptly. This would not have happened if their debts had been indexed to the oil price. This would not have happened if their debts had been indexed to the oil price. As with contract indexation & hedging, adjustment in the event of fluctuations in the oil price is automatic. As with contract indexation & hedging, adjustment in the event of fluctuations in the oil price is automatic.

94. Appendix II: Non-recommended attempts to dealing with volatility A number of institutions have been implemented in the name of reducing volatility. A number of institutions have been implemented in the name of reducing volatility. Most have failed to do so, and many have had detrimental effects. Most have failed to do so, and many have had detrimental effects. Marketing boards Marketing boards Taxation of commodity production Taxation of commodity production Producer subsidies Producer subsidies Other government stockpiles Other government stockpiles Price controls for consumers Price controls for consumers OPEC and other international cartels OPEC and other international cartels

95. Appendix III: Efforts to Impose External Checks The Chad experiment The Chad experiment The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative: “Publish What You Pay” The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative: “Publish What You Pay” More drastic solutions More drastic solutions

96. External checks: The Chad experiment In 2000 the World Bank agreed to help Chad, a new oil producer, to finance a new pipeline. Its government is ranked by Transparency International as one of the two most corrupt in the world. The agreement stipulated that Chad would spend 72 % of its oil export earnings on poverty reduction (health, education & road-building) & put aside 10 % in a “future generations fund.”

97. External checks: The Chad experiment, continued ExxonMobil was to deposit the oil revenues in an escrow account at Citibank; the government was to spend them subject to oversight by an independent committee. But once the money started rolling in, the government reneged on the agreement.

98. External checks, continued Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, launched in 2002, includes the principle “Publish What You Pay,” Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, launched in 2002, includes the principle “Publish What You Pay,” International oil companies commit to make known how much they pay governments for oil, International oil companies commit to make known how much they pay governments for oil, so that the public at least has a way of knowing, when large sums disappear. so that the public at least has a way of knowing, when large sums disappear. Legal mechanisms adopted by São Tomé & Principe void contracts if information relating to oil revenues is not made public. Legal mechanisms adopted by São Tomé & Principe void contracts if information relating to oil revenues is not made public.

99. Further proposals would give extra powers to a global clearing house or foreign bank where the Natural Resource Fund is located, e.g. freezing accounts in the event of a coup. [1] Further proposals would give extra powers to a global clearing house or foreign bank where the Natural Resource Fund is located, e.g. freezing accounts in the event of a coup. [1] [1] Well-intentioned politicians may spend commodity wealth quickly out of fear that their successors will misspend whatever is left. Well-intentioned politicians may spend commodity wealth quickly out of fear that their successors will misspend whatever is left. If so, adopt an external mechanism that constrains spending both in the present in the future. If so, adopt an external mechanism that constrains spending both in the present in the future. [1][1] Humphreys & Sandhu (2007, p. 224-27). [1] When Kuwait was occupied by Iraq, access to Kuwaiti bank accounts in London stayed with the Kuwaitis. External checks, continued