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Public Choice Theory Microeconomics Dr. D. Foster
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Political Choices... Economic Reasoning should Not how the system should work... does How the system does work. Are politicians/bureaucrats/employees … -- rational ? -- self-interested ? -- like the rest of us ?
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Two Basic Decisions: How much to tax? How much to spend? Vote for a new defense system? Vote for a new social program? What is the downside ? What is the downside ? President Haeger Does President Haeger want more $ for NAU? Paul Gosar Does Paul Gosar want more $ for USGS? Is there any incentive to keep costs down ? Is there any incentive to keep costs down ?
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Characteristics of the Public Sector Characteristics of the Public Sector enforceable Choices are enforceable. -- stop lights -- military draft -- drug laws -- eminent domain restricted Choices are restricted (“lumpy”) -- Grand Canyon: buses or train? -- Chose candidate A or B? -- Is there any difference...
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The Median Voter Model The Median Voter Model If preferences are peaked... If we vote for the person closest to us... Candidates should congregate near the middle! Candidate A wins !! median voter 50% ABA’B’A”
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Voting Systems Voting Systems What’s so great about majority rule? What’s so great about majority rule? -- It is just like football !! proportional The market results in proportional “rule.” inconsistent. Public choices may be inconsistent. inefficient. Public choices may be inefficient. Point voting ? Continuous elections ? Non-geographic voting ?
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Inconsistent outcome: Want a park? Inconsistent outcome: Want a park? City council has 3 choices for land parcel: A – Turn it into a park. B – Use it for low-income housing. C – Allow for commercial development. Polling indicates that: 40% favor A > C > B 35% favor B > A > C 25% favor C > B > A How do you frame a vote between just two ?
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Inefficient outcome: Build a road? Inefficient outcome: Build a road? $ 200 $ 90 $ 80 A road can be built that benefits 3 people. The cost is $300, and each would pay an equal share. They benefit as follows: John – $ 200 George – $ 90 Janet – $ 80 Will they vote to raise taxes to pay ? What can we do to alter the outcome ?
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Why is inefficiency a rational outcome? Why is inefficiency a rational outcome? Voters Voters – information is costly (rational ignorance) -- Does your vote count ? -- Can you trust political ads ? Special interests Special interests -- Spread costs; concentrate benefits. -- How about a Help-Dr.-Foster tax ? It’s a dime. Bureaucrats Bureaucrats -- What are their incentives ? -- Whom do they serve ?
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Case Study: 1986 Congressional Race District #1 – State of Hawaii Case Study: 1986 Congressional Race District #1 – State of Hawaii
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Cec Heftel wants to run for Governor ! He is currently the US Rep. for District 1. Mid-summer 1986 One problem: He must resign to run ! So, he resigns
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Need #1 Need #1: Fill vacancy through Jan. 1987. Need #2 Need #2: Select nominees for general election. Need #3 Need #3: Elect Congressman in November. Mid-summer 1986 Primary September General November Elections Solution: Combine #1 & #2 in September.
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The Players Mid-summer 1986 Primary September General November Elections Pat Saiki (R) Neil Abercrombie (D) Mufi Hanneman (D)
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The Rules Anyone can vote in the primary. Mid-summer 1986 Primary September General November Elections The Twist Saiki has no discernable competition.
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A graphical look at public support Mid-summer 1986 Primary September General November Elections N.A. M.H. P.S.
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September Results: Pat Saiki wins Republican primary. Pat Saiki wins Republican primary. Mufi Hanneman wins Democratic primary Mufi Hanneman wins Democratic primary Mid-summer 1986 Primary September General November Elections Neil Abercrombie wins Special Election !!! Neil Abercrombie wins Special Election !!!
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November Results: Mid-summer 1986 Primary September General November Elections Pat Saiki wins election !!! Pat Saiki wins election !!!
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Republicans voted for Mufi in primary - the “weaker” candidate, and he wins!!! Republicans voted for Mufi in primary - the “weaker” candidate, and he wins!!! Republicans& Democrats have an incentive to vote for their favorite in the special election; Neil wins!!! Republicans & Democrats have an incentive to vote for their favorite in the special election; Neil wins!!! Abercrombie supporters voted for Saiki in general election - retribution against Mufi’s campaign. Abercrombie supporters voted for Saiki in general election - retribution against Mufi’s campaign. What happened ? What happened ?
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Saiki won a second term (1988-1990). Saiki won a second term (1988-1990). Saiki ran for senate in 1990 - lost -- was selected to run SBA by Bush I. Saiki ran for senate in 1990 - lost -- was selected to run SBA by Bush I. Abercromie ran again, and won, in 1990. -- served until 2010. Abercromie ran again, and won, in 1990. -- served until 2010. Hanneman lost 1990 race for District 2. -- later served on Honolulu City Council. Hanneman lost 1990 race for District 2. -- later served on Honolulu City Council. Cec Heftel lost bid for governorship. Cec Heftel lost bid for governorship. Debrief Debrief
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Abercromie wanted to be governor in 2010. -- resigned from District 1 seat in 2010! Abercromie wanted to be governor in 2010. -- resigned from District 1 seat in 2010! Hanneman becomes Honolulu mayor in 2004. -- re-elected in 2008. -- wants to be governor in 2010! Hanneman becomes Honolulu mayor in 2004. -- re-elected in 2008. -- wants to be governor in 2010! Abercromie wins primary and general elections. Abercromie wins primary and general elections. Djou becomes interim Rep. for District 1. -- loses general election. Djou becomes interim Rep. for District 1. -- loses general election. Debrief II Debrief II
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Public Choice Theory Microeconomics Dr. D. Foster
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