1. Russia and the Global Disorder

2. Signs of global disorder The world economic crisis  Role of US a key question Changing balance in the global economy – new powers rising Climate change Energy security Food security Water security Political conflicts, viability of states Wars

3. In this new time of troubles, what role is Russia playing in the world?

4. Russia’s international rankings World’s 7th largest economy World’s 3d largest assets in gold and hard currency 1/3 or more of global natural resources A nuclear superpower A space superpower A permanent member of UN Security Council A member of G8 A key international actor across Eurasia (involved in more international organizations and projects than any other state except US)

5. "Russia is never as strong as she looks; Russia is never as weak as she looks."  Attributed to Talleyrand, Metternich, and Churchill  Putin, May 2002: "Russia has never been as strong as it has wanted to be and never as weak as it is thought to be."

6. Pierre Morelle, EU Special Rep to Central Asia: “I am struck by the contrast between our interdependence and the problems in our relations which remain unresolved. It is a contrast between practical cooperation and psychological confrontation. Ties between the two worlds are strengthening on a scale which was unthinkable in the past – and yet psychological tensions remain. Even though experience implies that it is better to learn together – and even if we experience disappointments, we will achieve a lot if we move forward working together.” Март 2008 :: Пьер Морель. По одну сторону стола. http://sr.fondedin.ru/new/admin/print.php?id=1206353430&archive=1206354399 http://sr.fondedin.ru/new/admin/print.php?id=1206353430&archive=1206354399

7. Why this psychological confrontation? No one in 1999 expected that Russia would experience this turn of fortunes And no one expected that the West would be confronting such a formidable array of challenges as today – from the economic crisis to Afghanistan to climate change – without ready solutions to deal with them So, on the Western side, there is discomfort and unease about Russia’s resurgence And a desire to find ways to delegitimize it (“Russia is not playing by the rules”)

8. In Russia, there was a recovery of self-confidence – until the end of 2008 And a a belief that while being a Western client was bad for Russia, putting Russia’s own interests first and driving hard bargains with the West does bring results But also: like winning huge in a lottery and scrambling to find ways to spend the money Assertiveness mixed with insecurity, a fear that this moment is fleeting, that things may change for the worse very quickly

9. Russia’s resurgence and Western troubles can be too easily pictured as a zero-sum game But it is anything but a zero-sum game Tremendous exaggeration of:  The degree of differences between interests  And of the ability to succeed without cooperation from the other side Russia cannot, and does not plan to, thrive on Western troubles Neither can the West hope to gain by undercutting Russia’s resurgence Win-win is possible – but both sides do need new thinking

10. Spheres of influence in Europe in the Cold War

16. Arctic maritime routes: the Northwest and Northeast Passages

17. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) A Eurasian counterbalance to NATO?

18. Putin on the Ritz: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f nVwjw2Un4k http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f nVwjw2Un4k

19. And then came August 2008…

22. Western concerns Russia is authoritarian again A revival of Russian imperialism Russia is using energy resources as tools in the struggle for influence Conclusion: Containment of Russia is necessary NATO is a natural instrument for this It may become a new Cold War

23. Russian concerns The West wants to undermine the current regime – that is, push Russia back into chaos The West wants to prevent the rise of Russia’s influence The West wants to control Russia – in particular, to grab Russia’s resources The West is not playing fair NATO continues to expand, despite Russian objections – or even because of Russian objections Conclusion: Russia needs to be strong and vigilant. Confrontation with the West is not desirable, but Russia must be prepared to defend its interests

24. Both sets of concerns do reflect some realities On both sides, there are forces which see the world through the prism of zero-sum games And they feed on each other And there are vested interests feeding this Manichean view And there is the organizing power of simplistic, binary thinking – Us vs. Them Ironically, both believe in American omnipotence Perhaps, this is the cardinal flaw

25. But, apart from the logic of zero-sum thinking, the accumulating weight of Western and Russian mutual interests is a fact of life – And these interests stem from the fact that important changes have taken place, while thinking and policies on both sides have not caught up with these changes The West is much less confident about the future Russia is more confident about the future But we are much better equipped today to develop new security concepts and new international policies through joint efforts - dialog, negotiations between Russia and the West, Russia and NATO

26. So, let us discuss both sets of concerns to see where they are coming from – and what follows from them 1. Russia is authoritarian again Yes, 20 years after Gorby persuaded the Communist Party to hold competitive elections, democratic governance in Russia remains a thing of the future Is it a matter of concern? Of course – BUT:  Has a communist system been restored?  Do Russians feel unfree?  What are the exact parametres of Russia’s new authoritarianism?  Why has the authoritarian regression taken place?  How far can it go?  What can be expected in the coming years?  What should the West do?

27. 2. Revival of Russian imperialism What exactly is Russia doing? Russia’s military power – traditionally, a key element of Russia’s power Contrast w. USSR and the preceding Romanov Empire Defence spending, 2006 (SIPRI) $35 bln (1.7% of GDP, USSR – 25%)  Canada – 1.1% of GDP  US - $580 bln (16 times more than Russia, 4.4% of GDP)

28. NATO – Russia military balance Total armed forces personnel 3:1 Military aircraft 10:1 Tanks 3:1 Artillery 2:1 Naval ships 2:1 Submarines 3:1 Aircraft carriers 19:1 How real is this picture? Partly And - Russia’s rebuilding its military Questions about Russian military power

29. How is Russia maintaining its influence in Eurasia? The post-Soviet space is characterized by a growing tendency of all states in the area to assert their national interests, as they are perceived by the ruling elites – and to form partnerships and associations with other states based on these perceptions. The post-Soviet space remains largely open for wider international cooperation. The defining pattern of international politics in the area is not centralized control exercised from Moscow, but rather a set of complex multiplayer games in which Russia is only one of the players.

30. Russia’s interests were not well served by some of the methods employed by Moscow and mistakes it has made in its newly assertive policy in the post- Soviet space, which have generated anti-Russian trends in the politics of several neighbouring countries

31. But it seems that no matter by what means Russia would have tried to reassert its interests in the area, intensification of geopolitical competition was inevitable. In that competition, Russia’s main assets are security, economic and cultural ties with post-Soviet states.

32. The Network Principle The Russians are discovering that what works for Russia is networking Not hegemony, not building imperial hierarchies But networking Based on pragmatic pursuit and matching of national interests In the growing network of Russia’s ties with the world, the West is only one segment, even if the most important

33. Business expansion is top priority for the Kremlin Russian business is trying to expand into every market available And the post-Soviet space is a natural market for it Europe, North America? Complaints about obstacles being put in the way Moscow has tried to limit freedom of operations for foreign multinational corporations inside Russia and in the post- Soviet space – with limited success From time to time, Moscow tries to pressure some neighbouring countries – again, with minimal success Withdrawing subsidies – a sign of failure of hegemony

34. Sphere of influence? Does Moscow have a right to express concerns about events and especially government decisions in neighbouring countries?  Imagine Canada joining Shanghai Cooperation Organization and agreeing to let Russia build BMD radars and missiles on its territory  Imagine US reaction  Imagine Ottawa saying: We are a sovereign nation, you cannot dictate to us how we assure our security

35. 3. Energy security A bit of zero-sum game, supply-demand, market logic Role of the Russian state – typical of energy markets today Issue: not whether energy trade is “politicized” (because it always is) – but what specific policies are pursued Boils down to the question of whether Russia is a mere gas station or a sovereign country where the national government must have a say in how its natural resources should be used

36. Now to the Russian concerns

37. 1. The West is undermining stability in Russia Oh, really? Western support of Putin has been one of the major causes of his success – the West has helped the rise of Putin and shares responsibility for Putinism Western critique of Russia’s retreat from democracy is fully justified – not just as a prudent policy, but also as maintenance of international legal regime re human rights No real interference or pressure And it’s not just the West, but Russian democrats, too Russian leaders should admit that it has compromised a number of key norms of democratic governance, for whatever reason – and they should commit themselves to restoring these norms, because Russian democracy is needed by the Russians themselves And don’t get paranoid – it’s no longer the Cold War

38. 2. The West wants to prevent the rise of Russia’s influence Partly true, but is there such a united policy of the West? No – not yet, at least The overall attitude remains ambivalent Different countries have different attitudes Some are traditionally wary of Russia, others not There is both competition and cooperation If EU is looking for ways to reduce its dependence on Russian energy supplies, it’s not an anti-Russian policy, it’s good business practice We cannot abolish competition But we can regulate it together to prevent it from threatening everyone’s security And we should be able to expand our cooperation Does the West need a strong Russia? Of course!

39. 3. The West wants to grab Russia’s natural resources Russia needs to sell It is a matter of deals - And of regimes Current Western policy is, indeed, aimed at achieving maximum market freedom And yes, the West would like to have unimpeded access to resources in Russia and elsewhere So would China and India – every country that relies on imports of raw materials, energy, etc. But is such unimpeded access a realistic goal? Sovereign states will continue to assert their rights Western policy is evolving, pragmatic International energy security is a key interest for everyone – and appropriate regimes need to be created collectively

40. 4. NATO enlargement Takes place based on shared interests Provides security An organization of democracies Russia has opposed it from day one NATO has heeded some of Russia’s concerns But perhaps not enough And perhaps enlargement has acquired an inertia which has generated unnecessary tensions And we can certainly start a new dialog about it Let’s discuss our mutual concerns Let us create a NATO-Russia audit panel to examine the relationship

41. Russia-West Obsolete assumptions What is “the West”? Is Russia needed to give “the West” coherence? But will Western interests be served by treating Russia as a rogue state? Need to rethink – but only together The West needs self-critique, not smugness The West is confronted with huge problems The global center of economic gravity is shifting from Atlantic to Pacific – and the West cannot do anything about it What is Western unity? Against whom? For whom? Mobilizing the West against the Rest is lunacy

42. Russia won’t be drawn into an anti-Moslem alliance It won’t be drawn into an anti-China alliance And it won’t be drawn into an anti-Western alliance Russia wants to retain maximum freedom of action – But what is that maximum? International constraints are very tight even for the US, and much tighter for Russia

43. Current tensions between Russia and the West Partly – a natural process of sorting out interests Do we need to introduce elements of military power in this process? It’s like putting your gun on the table when you’re discussing a business deal The other side will do likewise… It creates an unhelpful atmosphere So, let’s keep competing and keep talking But let’s not turn it into preparations for war It won’t be like Iraq or Afghanistan No one is winning in those wars – but at least the rest of the world is alive A war between NATO and Russia will be humanity’s last war in the sense that there will be no humanity left after it Mutual interests – mutual vulnerabilities in all spheres

44. In the 1990s, the West’s influence was growing both inside Russia and around it. The result: growing opposition to Western pressures and interference In the 2000s, Russia has been trying to become more independent A tough, “realist” approach to IR The world as an increasingly anarchic place, disorder is growing, every one has to guard their interests But at the same time, Russia has become more deeply integrated with the West than ever before On both sides, the rise of concerns and frictions reflects the fact of that deepening of integration A divorce is not an option

45. The dominant trends in Russian foreign policy thinking  No desire to confront the West  Recognition of Western concerns  Relations with the West are top priority But also:  Primacy of national interests, emphasis on independence  Multivector foreign policy Pragmatism Emphasis on business Readiness for dialog, for development of joint solutions to problems Signs not of weakness – but of new confidence, and new prospects for Russia

46. Western countries, including Canada, do and will influence the ongoing debates in Moscow one way or another – By their own actions, or inactions Both individually and collectively A key factor in these debates – assessing the state of the world How is it perceived by Russian policy-makers, interest groups, public opinion? There is no aspect of world politics or the world economy which would not affect Russia in one way or another

47. If the idea of containment of Russia gains ground, it is unlikely to result in a more cooperative, more pro-Western Russia Quite the contrary outcome can be expected Anti-Western elites in Russia are strong and active Let us not push Russia toward totalitarian mobilization Antagonizing Russia won’t solve any of Western problems It will only create new ones The world cannot afford zero-sum games between the West and Russia -  Because the two sides are too well-armed, and their arsenals remain trained primarily on each other And there is no good reason why Russia and the West should be in confrontation -  Because mutual interests between Russia and the West far outweigh any differences and considerations of competition

48. New forms of cooperation between states are necessary Our capability for collective action is too limited Neither Russia nor the West are interested in worsening the global disorder Perhaps, we are coming to the real end of the Cold War

49. Realistic terms of the possible deal Priority of cooperation over competition Construction of a new world order Mutual security arrangements  Which means taking each other’s interests and concerns into account No hegemony No ideological wars Competition by the rules Primacy of international law

50. Huge agenda for joint actions  Arms control and disarmament – prospects for NPT, START, SORT, INF, CFE?  Afghanistan  Global economic crisis  Energy policy  Climate change  The food crisis  The water crisis

52. Russians and Americans: Mutual perceptions

53. RussiansAmericans Fully agree 1556 Somewhat agree 3734 Somewhat disagree 235 Fully disagree 113 Hard to say 142 “Do you agree or disagree that democracy is the best way to govern a state?” Poll conducted among 1600 Russians and 1060 Americans in June-July 2006 (http://www.levada.ru/press/2006071102.html)

54. RussiansAmericans Much more democratic 167 Somewhat more democratic 3562 Somewhat less democratic 1319 Much less democratic 86 Hard to say 286 “10 years from now, will Russia be more democratic or less democratic than today?” Poll conducted among 1600 Russians and 1060 Americans in June-July 2006 (http://www.levada.ru/press/2006071102.html)

55. RussiansAmericans Very positive 414 Positive 2058 Negative 4121 Very negative 155 Hard to say 202 Poll conducted among 1600 Russians and 1060 Americans in June-July 2006 (http://www.levada.ru/press/2006071102.html) “What is your attitude to US actions to promote democratic freedoms and human rights throughout the world?”

56. “Is the US friendly or unfriendly towards Russia?” Blue – friendly, green – unfriendly, red – hard to say

57. “Is the US playing a positive or negative role in the world today?” Blue – positive, green – negative, red – hard to say

58. “What kind of relations between Russia and US would you like to see in the coming years: closer than today, the same, or less close?” Blue – closer, green – same as now, red – less close, gray – hard to say

59. “Do you like or dislike President Bush?” Blue – like, green – dislike, red – hard to say

60. How do Western countries treat Russia?  As a friend - 4  As a partner - 32  As a competitor - 33  As an enemy - 7  They mostly ignore Russia - 15  Hard to say - 8 http://www.levada.ru/interrelations.html

61. Do other countries present a military threat to Russia? (Levada Center, June 2007)  Definitely yes – 15%  Likely yes – 33%  Likely no – 33%  Definitely no – 11%  Hard to say – 8% http://www.levada.ru/interrelations.html

62. What is the main threat to Russia’s security? (June 2007 poll by Levada Center)  Iran’s nuclear program – 8%  North Korea’s nuclear weapons – 8%  Deployment of US BMD systems in countries neighboring Russia – 60%  Hard to say – 24% http://www.levada.ru/interrelations.html

63. Public opinion, US and Russia..\Arms control\Steinbruner on US-Russia perceptions.doc..\Arms control\Steinbruner on US-Russia perceptions.doc