1. Navy in JIAMD Programs – The Way Ahead Sea-Based Terminal Working Group Update to NDIA RDML Brad Hicks Deputy Surface Warfare for Combat Systems/Weapons (N76F) April 7, 2005

2. 2 Sea Power 21 Missile Defense Operations Sea Strike FORCEnet Sea Basing Sea Shield Missile defense is a key capability in executing Sea Power 21 and the National Strategy Missile defense is a key capability in executing Sea Power 21 and the National Strategy Maintaining the Joint Sea Base sanctuary is the Navy’s highest operational level missile defense priority Provide regional defense for allies and expeditionary forces where land based missile defenses are denied, as well as critical air and seaports Active missile defenses augmented by advances in ISR and INFO OPS (IO) provide high leverage offensive defensive integration in missile defense UNCLASSIFIED

3. 3 The Challenge Analysis defines clear capability gap –2012 MCO-3 (POM 06) –2020 MCO-1 & MCO-2 (PR07) COCOM Priority A potential Navy contribution to a joint BMD solution Defense of the Joint Sea Base, APODs, and SPODs from SRBM & MRBM Defense of the Joint Sea Base, APODs, and SPODs from SRBM & MRBM

4. 4 The Joint Missile Defense Vision Reduction in threat TBMs D-DAY D+1D+2D+3D+4D+5 Navy Army USMC AF Engagement Information Operations Information Operations Time Critical Strike Time Critical Strike To address… Number of threat TBMs IO Assessment % TBMs reduced Assess Risk TCS Assessment % TBMs reduced Offensive IO TCS for TELs Missile engagement Tier 2 Missile Engagement SBT PAC-3 % TBMs reduced Assess Risk Tier 1 Missile Engagement SM-3 ABL THAAD % TBMs reduced Sea Based Terminal Defense Contributes to Layered Defense Sea Based Terminal Defense Contributes to Layered Defense

5. 5 Two Tier Sea Based Defense BMDS Exo-atmosphere Endo- atmosphere Layered Defense requires Midcourse and Terminal Engagement Capability Depth of fire needed to achieve desired Pn / Pra SRBM / depressed trajectories may not allow engagement by exo-atmospheric systems

6. 6 SBT Assessment History FY03 SBT Study Near term focus SM-2 Block IV mod test POM 06 BUR Netted TAMD assessment Included assessment of SBT missile options PR07 Navy SBT way ahead effort TF Missile Defense issue 14 Dec Navy-MDA BOD SBT Brief Significant MDA interest  Result was joint Navy-MDA sponsorship of SBT BMD Assessment

7. 7 SBT Assessment Charter Examine a range of options for SBT systems development Consider ongoing MDA and service programs that could be leveraged for SBT Address need to ensure Joint Assured Access and Defense of Joint Sea Base Assess combat systems options / requirements Present options and assessment to MDA and Navy leadership

8. 8 Sea-Based Terminal BMD Assessment Working Group Organization Assessment Leads Kevin Apel CAPT(s) Bill McQuilkin Threat Assessment Steve Peduto Capabilities-Gaps Analysis Gary Schnurrpusch Systems Architecture Jerry Rogers Options CDR Gary May Technical Leads Mickey Skamangas Bill Tropf SBT Working Group MDA (DT, AB, TR, SE, PI, BC)OPNAV (N76, N70, N81, N2) PEO IWS (1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 6.0 7.0) PEO Ships JHU-APLNSWC-DD SEA 017 DIA MSICSPAJ8 JTAMDO USA USAFSTRATCOM AMRDEC

9. 9 Sea-Based Terminal BMD Assessment Analysis Team Approach Threat Assessment: –Define threat space –Characterize operational threat environment Capabilities-Gaps Analysis: –Quantify operational capabilities & gaps given the BMDS program of record –Assess operational contribution of SBT options System Architecture: –Characterize Block 2010 BMDS baseline –Develop and characterize SBT options Options: –Characterize cost, schedule, and risk of selected options Performance assessment of SBT options

10. 10 Sea-Based Terminal BMD Assessment Option Assessment Criteria (U) Sea-Based Terminal BMD options are assessed on ability to provide robust defense of the Sea Base and forces ashore. Development status Technical maturity and risk Conceptual Modifications Cost Schedule Engage targets Adequate fire power Defend assets or area (footprint) Maintain battle space Produce effective kill Ability to fill the gap Availability of assets Mission commonality Adequate number of engagements Complexity of BMC2, communications Risk to assets ProgramPerformanceOperational Assessment Criteria

11. 11 PLATFORMS CG / DDG DDX Large Ship CVW TACAIR SBT Capability Functional Building Blocks SENSORS Modified SPY-1 Modified DDX DBR PATRIOT Radar THAAD Radar Aircraft Organic Radar Aircraft IRSTS WEAPONS SM-6 Mod SBMSE MSE Marinized THAAD THAAD C2BM Aegis BMD w/ SBT Mods OA Aegis w/ SBT Mods DDX w/ SBT Mods PATRIOT ECS THAAD C2BM Airborne Organic C2BM Airborne Integrated C2BM

12. 12 SBT Option Candidate "ESG"s Aegis/DDX with SM-6 Aegis/DDX with SBMSE Aegis/DDX with Marinized THAAD Large Ship Embarked PAC-3 Large Ship Embarked THAAD Large Ship PAC / THAAD Engage on SPY Radar TACAIR with MSE Engaging on own or Aegis Radar Surface Combatant Options TACAIR Options Embarked System Options

13. 13 Sea-Based Terminal BMD Assessment Status / Group Schedule ActivityJanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJune TOR Kick-off Meeting Threat Assessment Capability - Gap Analysis System Architecture Options Overall Assessment & Recommendations Major In-Process Reviews Final Report Refinements 2/2 1/19 2/28 3/28 EXCOMM EXCOMM / BoD EXCOMM BoD