2.  Summary Presentation of Haiti  Challenges Leading to Policy Level Findings  Lessons from the Norwegian Portfolio in Haiti  Lessons Learned

3.  Political variables  Small number of years under democratic rule since independence, which include 20 years of US occupation.  Dominant influence of autocratic rulers in the period.  Weak central and local institutions since the mid- 1980s.  Major negative effects of embargo during military rule (1990-1994).  Increased economic and political influence of narco- money after 1994.  Split between legislative and executive branches after the return to democracy and throughout the Aristide period.  Socio-Economic indicators  Poorest country of the hemisphere with a GDP: $1,155 USD and a HDI rank of 145 th in 2010.  Population in 2007: approx. 9.1M  Life expectancy at birth: 55  Maternal mortality rate: 523 (Norway: 10)  Youth literacy rate 2000-07: M: 76%/F: 87% largely funded by external sources, including transfers from the diaspora  Transparency Int. Rank: 146 th in 2010 Summary presentation of Haiti

4.  Fragmentation of funding strategies without clear connection to identifiable national programmes or to Haitian counterparts hindered the portfolio’s capacity to link with overarching objectives.  Late production of an umbrella policy statement capable of bringing together this fragmented portfolio created a vacuum with the correlated lack of clear direction (coherence and linkage).

5.  The balance between political objectives and development objectives was very unstable fluctuating from one to the other. This made evaluation criteria of development projects seem non pertinent.  Important tools were not developed such as conflict analysis and context sensitive management approaches, both weakened the portfolio in the Haitian environment.

6.  Consequently risk analysis came late in the portfolio’s development cycle; it did not inform monitoring and it relative absence was a weak foundation for evaluation operations.  Monitoring mission agenda marked a clear choice of discussing transparently with all parties and stakeholders. Norway’s MFA was viewed as a team player. It had a very positive ripple effect on other donors.

7.  Peacebuilding, dialogue and political processes require flexibility, personal engagement (and support) and risk management, within a programme framework. Commitment (personal or institutional) cannot be a substitute to more organized and reflexive forms of interventions.  Emergency procedures and their shortcuts should give way to rebuilding and consolidating focused approaches.  Doing so requires the breaking down of existing institutional dichotomies between political and development stakeholders in donor countries.

8.  A first step towards improved accountability and learning for stakeholders can be to document key outputs and outcomes through participatory monitoring. Systematic participatory monitoring can be a transparent tool for accountability in project management even in conflict or emergency situations.  The challenge – not to be underestimated – is to find ways to implement participation in data collection and feed-back of information.

9.  As early as possible after the intervention, the objective of creating systems for institutional learning, knowledge management and transfer as well as monitoring/quality assurance by decision makers must become a priority. These activities must include network building operations and information/lessons learned sharing.  A strategy for any fragile or conflict-prone state must address continuity of interventions, local ownership and sustainability of these conflict prevention and peace building interventions.