1. 20 th ISMOR COL Jeff Appleget TRAC-WSMR 28 August 2003 Future Combat System (FCS) Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) Metrics for Transformation

2. 5/5/2003 2 Agenda Background – Army Transformation – FCS and Objective Force – Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) FCS AoA – Challenges – FCS AoA Metrics – Selected Results Conclusion

3. 5/5/2003 3 The Army Transformation These three reasons mandate Army transformation: –First – a future operational environment that poses complex, adaptive and asymmetric threats equipped with advanced technologies. –Second is the requirement to employ land forces that are decisive at every point on the spectrum of operations, in any terrain - in all weather. –Finally, the Army must be far less reliant on forward stationing and pre- positioned stocks. Rather, it must be capable of deploying anywhere in the world on little or no notice to fight and win. Responsiveness Deployability Versatility Agility Lethality Survivability Sustainability Quality of firsts: See First, Understand First, Act First, Finish Decisively.

4. 5/5/2003 4 FCS and Objective Force FCS is the networked system of systems that will serve as the core building block within all Objective Force Units of Action (UAs). The UA is comprised of a family of advanced, networked space-, air- and ground-based maneuver, maneuver support and sustainment systems that will include manned and unmanned platforms. The hallmarks of Objective Force operations will be: –developing situations out of contact, –maneuvering to positions of advantage, –engaging enemy forces beyond the range of their weapons, –destroying them with precision fires and maneuver, and –decisively assaulting enemy capabilities or locations at times and places of our choosing.

5. 5/5/2003 5 Analysis of Alternatives AoA and the Acquisition Process “Typical” AoAs: Replace M1 with M1A1. Replace M113 with M2. Replace “old” M109 with Paladin. Typical Alternatives Keep what we have (M1). Buy the new one (M1A1). Improve what we have (Product-improvement Program, or “PiP). FCS AoA Purpose - Compare the Cost and Operational Effectiveness of the FCS UA to the alternatives. Alternatives: Current [Legacy] light, heavy, SBCT, PiP’d SBCT, FCS Block I, FCS Block II, FCS Increment 1] (7 total). IOC B A Concept & Technology Development System Development & Demonstration Production & Deployment Systems Acquisition Operations & Support C Sustainment FRP Decision Review FOC OT&E Pre-Systems Acquisition (Program Initiation)

6. 5/5/2003 6 Some FCS AoA Challenges The Unit of Action (UA - an FCS-equipped Brigade) will replace: Legacy light, heavy, and SBCT brigades, all with different missions. Several weapon system platforms will be replaced with a “system of systems” intertwined with existing and proposed non-FCS acquisition programs. Senior decision makers very comfortable with conventional MOE/MOP (LER, SER, FER). Three reasons for shift from exchange ratios: –Operational Environment – Threat is asymmetric & adaptive. –The UA will fight differently than its predecessors (Operational and Organizational (O&O) concepts & TTPs). –Shift from platform-centric to network-centric operations.

7. 5/5/2003 7 FCS AoA Metrics Most “traditional” metrics we have previously used are platform-centric, such as LERs, SERs and FERs. Argues for greater reliance on qualitative metrics at force level (for effectiveness) balanced with quantitative metrics at system level (for performance) to establish causality. Some new Measures: –Size of Area of Operations. –Size of Force used to successfully accomplish mission. –Time to complete mission. –Kills at standoff (NLOS/BLOS vs LOS). –Acquiring and Understanding Earlier. –Acquiring and Killing High Payoff Targets (HPTs). –[Lethality-Enhanced] Survivability of Infantry.

8. 5/5/2003 8 MAP DELETED Increment 1's enhanced SA/SU, freedom of maneuver, and more responsive and lethal fires resulted in an AO almost 3 times that of Legacy Heavy and was able to neutralize enemy long-range fires and complete the mission. The Legacy and SBCT PiP'd forces did not neutralize enemy long range fires and were forced into a hasty defense before mission completion. Legacy AO 3 1 SBCT PiP'D AO INC 1 AOBLK I AO 1 1 1 2 5 3 7 4 5 6 3 7 Legacy SBCT PiP'D INC 1 BLK I 2 3 2 3 6 3 2 4 4 4 21 hours, did not complete mission 12 hours, did not complete mission 12 hours – INC 1 and 10 hours – Block I, mission completed Starbursts indicate multiple dilemmas (near- simultaneous engagements) presented to the Threat Brigade/UA Area of Operations

9. 5/5/2003 9 Attack (dismtd) ReconAttack (Bde) AssaultAttack (mtd) Dismounted Infantry Ratios Legacy Heavy and SBCT forces required more force, infantry and combat vehicles, than Increment 1 to conduct the same tactical mission. Increment 1 was more successful than Legacy Heavy and SBCT in accomplishing the mission. – Lost fewer forces. – Killed more Threat. – Completed the mission earlier. Increment 1 infantry and combat vehicles were enabled by a highly reliable communications network, more numerous aerial sensors, and long-range precision effects. INC 1 Notes: 1.SBCT and SBCT PiP'd have the same sized forces in the Balkans and Caspian BDE 2.Caspian Assault does not have any combat vehicles in the Increment 1 force Attack Combat Vehicle Ratios Attack (dismtd) ReconAttack (mtd) Attack (Bde) Force Comparison

10. 5/5/2003 10 Increment 1 completed the mission earlier and with more combat strength remaining than legacy and interim forces –25% to 65% faster in mounted attack and assault operations. –Dismounted operations take a similar amount of time to complete. Attack (Bde) Attack (mtd) Time to Complete Mission Percent of Legacy/Interim Mission Time ReconAttackAssaultAttack (dismtd) Dismounted Supported by Mounted Operation Legacy Heavy and SBCT PiP'd did not complete the mission Time to Complete Mission

11. 5/5/2003 11 Increment 1 acquired Threat earlier with better resolution than legacy and Stryker forces. Earlier acquisitions enabled the commander to plan maneuver and effects before contact (precision maneuver). Acquisitions of resolution "recognition" or "identify" can be immediately engaged. Higher resolution enabled the commander to shape the battlefield using precision munitions. Seeing better and earlier enabled the commander to more rapidly understand Threat's intentions. Unique Acquisitions  Recognition (CASTFOREM Vignette) Number of Unique Acquisitions minutes 1 hour into the battle, SBCT had 38% fewer targetable acquisitions than Increment 1 BN Cdr's COP Resolution (CASTFOREM Vignette) Number of Unique Acquisitions minutes 1 hour into the battle, SBCT had 14% less knowledge of Threat locations than Increment 1 Increment 1 Acquires & Understands Threat Earlier

12. 5/5/2003 12 39 Total HPTs: 10 - HVY MG 10 - APC 4 - Tank 3 - Arty 6 - Mortar 2 – AT Gun 4 - HVY ADA Unique Acquisitions  Recognition Level and Kills of Threat HPTs (CASTFOREM Vignette) Increment 1 gains targetable information on HPTs earlier and more quickly destroys key targets. SBCT understands as well as Increment 1 only after the force is engaged in the close fight. minutes INC 1 - 26 SBCT - 27 INC 1 - 22 SBCT - 19 SBCT engages in the close fight Increment 1 Acquires & Kills Threat HPTs Earlier

13. 5/5/2003 13 Mortars Artillery Blue Infantry Losses to Threat LOS and BLOS/NLOS Blue Kills of Threat IF Systems (By Phase and Time) BLOS/NLOS(B/N) and LOS Kills of Threat Infantry Recon (~2 hours) Clearing ( 1.5-4.5 hours) Assault/Breach (2-2.5 hours) SBCT PiP'd used UAVs and ground recon assets to find Threat IF quicker than UA alternatives. Cost: SBCT PiP'd lost twice as many combat vehicles and infantry as INC 1. INC 1 kills Threat's artillery and mortars more quickly than SBCT. INC 1 kills Threat's infantry earlier and at longer ranges with BLOS/NLOS than SBCT. At the beginning of the clearing phase of battle, there are almost twice the number of Threat IF systems remaining on the battlefield for SBCT than INC 1. SBCT loses 32 infantry to indirect fire, 19 in the last phase of the battle. Increment 1 lost no infantry in the last phase. Lethality-Enhanced Survivability of Infantry BLOS/NLOSLOS

14. 5/5/2003 14 Conclusion FCS AoA has changed the way we do analysis –System of systems approach. –Network-centric warfare. New Metrics: –LERs, SERs, FERs no longer carry the day. –We’ve just scratched the surface with new metrics. –Much more difficult to quantify and measure: -System of systems performance. -C4ISR, the network, robotics performance. -Information modeling (fusion, decision making). FCS KPP analysis beginning for May ’04 MSB update.