1. Conventional Arms Control and Confidence Building Measures in Asia Takeshi Fukuda Researcher, National Diet Library of Japan The 22nd United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues Saitama, Japan, 25-27 August 2010

2. Structure of Presentation Comparison of Nuclear Arms Control and Conventional Arms Control Classification of Conventional Arms Control Regional Arms Control: In the Case of Europe Arms Control in Asia: Current Situation and Challenges 1

3. Comparison of Nuclear Arms Control and Conventional Arms Control Nuclear Arms Control  Consequences of war: Catastrophe  Image of Weapons: Horrible “absolute weapons”  Appeal for arms control: Strong and morally persuasive ---- Many states support the ultimate goal of “a nuclear-free world” Conventional Arms Control  Consequences of war: Depend on situations  Image of Weapons: Less horrible, sometimes necessary for our security  Appeal for arms control: Not so strong and difficult to set the objectives ---- No state supports “a conventional weapons-free world” 2

4. Comparison of Nuclear Arms Control and Conventional Arms Control (cont.) Nuclear Arms Control  “Nuclear weapons” is a single category of weapons  Key players in arms control: Limited (countries that possess nuclear weapons or aspire to obtain them)  Likelihood of nuclear warfare: Very low Conventional Arms Control  “Conventional weapons” is NOT a single category of weapons  Key players in arms control: Many (every state has a chance to be a key player)  Likelihood of conventional warfare: Extremely high 3

5.  For many countries, conventional warfare is a more imminent threat than nuclear warfare.  The progress of conventional arms control could drastically influence the international security.  Conventional arms control is closely linked with nuclear arms control.  We need to see a broad strategic and political environment. Comparison of Nuclear Arms Control and Conventional Arms Control (cont.) 4

6. Classification of Conventional Arms Control by Forms of Regulation TypesExamples Complete ban on a certain weapon Mine Ban Treaty (1997) Convention on Cluster Munitions (2008) Partial ban or restriction on a certain weapon Amended Protocol II of CCW (1996) Protocol III of CCW (1980) Restriction of the number of weapons Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty, 1990) Arms trade control Arms Trade Treaty (under negotiation) Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) Helsinki Final Act (1975) Vienna Documents of 1990s 5

7. Ultimate Goal: Enhancing National, International, and Human Security Arms Control for Humanitarian Purposes Objective: Eliminating human suffering caused by weapons How to achieve the objective: Prohibiting or regulating weapons Examples: Mine Ban Treaty Convention on Cluster Munitions Arms Control for Strategic Purposes Objective: Preventing war How to achieve the objective: Increasing strategic stability (focusing on the military balance of power) Examples: CFE Treaty, CBMs in Europe Classification of Conventional Arms Control by Objectives 6

8. TypesAdvantages / Disadvantages Unilateral Rapid decision and implementation Lack of legal obligations, Difficulty in verification, No assurance that a rival state will take similar measures Bilateral / Regional Relative easiness of building a consensus and taking into account conditions unique to the concerned region Limited geographical impact Global Universality of agreement (greater impact on international security) Difficulty in consensus-building Classification of Conventional Arms Control by Geographical Area/Number of Participating States 7

9.  Classifications don’t reflect priority or superiority.  Each framework has both advantages and disadvantages.  What is important is to choose a framework suitable for an intended goal. Classification of Conventional Arms ControlClassification of Conventional Arms Control 8

10. Regional Arms Control in Europe  Europe is the place where the concept of CBMs / CSBMs was developed.  In 1973, NATO, WTO and the European neutrals agreed on starting negotiations under the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).  The 1975 Helsinki Final Act adopted in the CSCE is the first document on CBMs.  Helsinki Final Act prescribes that participating states shall notify their “major military manoeuvres exceeding a total of 25,000 troops” in advance to each other. 9

11. Regional Arms Control in Europe (cont.) Principal Measures Established by the 1999 Vienna Document 1. Annual exchange of information on a) Military organization, manpower and major weapon systems b) Plans for the deployment of major weapon systems c) Defense planning (defense policy and doctrine, force planning, defense expenditures and budgets) 2. Annual meeting for discussing the issues relating to defense planning 3. Facilitating contacts among military units and personnel (including joint military training and exercises) 4. Prior notification of major military activities (e.g. activities involving at least 9,000 troops or 250 battle tanks) 5. Invitation of observers from other states to major military activities 6. Restrictions on major military activities (e.g. States can conduct military activities involving more than 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks only once within three years) 10

12. Regional Arms Control in Europe (cont.) The Open Skies Treaty  Signed by the CSCE countries in 1992 and enforced in 2002.  States parties can conduct observation flights over the territories of other parties by aircrafts equipped with sensors.  In principle, the observing party can fly and observe anywhere it wants as long as it follows the treaty’s procedure.  The number of observation flights each state is obliged to accept is basically determined by their geographical size (For example, the US and the Russia-Belarus group: up to 42 flights per year / France, Germany, Italy, Turkey, and the UK: up to 12).  From August 2002 to June 2010, 673 flights were conducted (one observation flight every four days). 11

13. Regional Arms Control in Europe (cont.) Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)  Signed by the NATO and WTO countries in 1990.  Setting the ceilings on the number of the five major weapons (battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and combat helicopters) deployed in the area “from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountain”.  Because the ceilings were determined by considering the military balance between NATO and WTO, each alliance can possess the same number of weapons, for example, up to 20,000 battle tanks and 6,800 combat aircraft. 12

14. Regional Arms Control in Europe (cont.)  Arms control in Europe has matured during the 1990s.  Fundamental question: Did the progress of arms control increase the stability in Europe? Or, did the reduced international tension enable agreements on arms control?  European history implies that successful arms control needs a certain level of détente.  Paradox: Arms control is necessary for unstable regions with intense conflicts, but in such regions, consensus-building on arms control is quite difficult. 13

15. Arms Control in Asia  The structure of conflicts in Asia is considerably different from that in Europe.  In Europe: relatively simple structure of conflicts (“the East versus the West” during the Cold War)  In Asia: diverse and multifaceted conflicts (most of the conflicts are not interrelated with each other)  Many countries in Asia are modernizing and reinforcing their armed forces.  Arms control is much needed in Asia, but it is not easy for Asian countries to come to an arms control agreement. 14

16. Arms Control in Asia (cont.) Signatories of the Mine Ban Treaty in Europe and in Asia 15

17. Arms Control in Asia (cont.) Signatories of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Europe and in Asia 16

18. Arms Control in Asia (cont.) 1996 Agreement on CBMs between China and India  Aim: To stabilize the border areas  Limitation of forces: To keep the strength of armed forces within the border areas at “minimum levels” and set ceilings on those forces  Prior notification of large scale military exercises within the border areas  Weakness: Obligations under the agreement are not strong and not applicable to the forces outside the border areas 17

19. Arms Control in Asia (cont.) CBMs under the Framework of the ARF  The ARF requests the participating countries to;  Hold dialogues on security perceptions, including voluntary statements of defense policy  Have enhanced contacts, including high level visits and recreational activities  Exchange observers at military exercises  Hold annual seminars for defense officials and military officers  Weakness: NOT legally binding  Measures beyond mere dialogue, such as prior notification of exercises or exchange of information on defense budgets and force structure, are yet to be institutionalized 18

20. Arms Control in Asia (cont.) Is it possible to enhance the arms control architecture in Asia?  Possible, but not a simple task  ARF framework is important, but forming a meaningful agreement within it is not easy, because of the large membership of the ARF  Bilateral and sub-regional dialogues are vital in Asia  We have no option other than to continue patient dialogues for confidence-building and to gradually strengthen arms control measures in the region 19