2. Social Science of Warnings COMAP Symposium 02-1 October 2001 Eve Gruntfest Geography University of Colorado Colorado Springs ecg@uccs.edu Presented by Matt Kelsch Big Thompson Canyon, 1976

3. We Do Know Some Things About Warning process Message content Message delivery Northern Venezuela December 1999

4. Hear Understand Believe Personalize Decide to act Respond Public Response Components

5. Fallacies of Warning Myths People do not panic in response to warnings People rarely get too much information "Cry wolf" syndrome may not be applicable if previous misses are understood Public wants information from multiple sources People actively seek to confirm risk

6. Warnings are not a stimulus response action People must be able to assess their own risk before they will take action Remember

7. Social Scientists and Agencies Are Engaged in Prediction and Warning for example -- Roger Pielke Jr. (Grand Forks) Kirstin Dow and Susan Cutter (Hurricane Floyd) John Sorensen and Dennis Mileti Many agencies involved including Bureau of Reclamation, FEMA, USGS, Corps of Engineers

8. False Alarm Case Studies - Research Reports Hurricanes Bertha and Fran 1996 Carsell’s M.A. on Ventura CA failed siren test

9. Hurricanes Bertha and Fran South Carolinians ordered to evacuate twice in 1996 Impacts mainly in North Carolina Would people evacuate next time? – What factors do they consider?

10. Maybe… While Residents Do Not Find Officials Are “Crying Wolf”… People generally consider each event by itself People search elsewhere for information to assess their own risk Weather channel, quality of home construction, family situations, fear of delays in being allowed back home, Myron the local weather geek “Official” sources are only some of many sources of information

11. Most said they would heed next siren Confidence in warning process was not reduced Served as a hands on practice for real emergency – family plans were developed Ventura, CA Case a Siren Test That Went Wrong- Carsell’s Survey Findings

12. The car is not a boat At 1.5 feet the vehicle moves downstream

13. The TRUCK Won’t Make It Either

14. Italian Hydrologic Engineer Enrica Caporali’s Flood Warning Follow-up Study Two flood warnings in October 1992 – It didn’t flood In December 1992 telephone survey of 518 residents

15. Memory of the warnings – most heard more than one 82% remembered the warnings 28% remembered only one alarm 54% remembered two

16. After They Heard the Alarm 43% did nothing 29% moved vehicles – Age was significant People older than 54 more likely to do nothing than younger respondents 83% judged the warnings positively

17. Boulder floodplain resident survey underway To evaluate Boulder’s flash flood warning system Will provide insights into public perceptions of warnings and weather information So far – 33% have been returned – 265 surveys (only 123 included here)

18. Boulder floodplain residents – preliminary finding n=123

19. TV most important – (28%) Internet – (18%) - Ahead of radio

20. Some other intriguing data 63% know distinction between flash flood WATCH and WARNING 46% know that 100-year flood is larger than 20-year flood How many do you think – of the 123 so far tallied have a NOAA Weather radio?

21. NOAA Weather Radio owners

22. Boulder floodplain resident survey Stand by for findings – by early 2002

23. Five Major Questions 1.How is detection related to response? 2. For the rarest events - are warnings possible? Likely? 3. Are people negatively affected by false alarms or “close calls”? 4. How do we measure warning success – and take credit for it? 5. What are the costs of unwarned events?

24. Who will fund these research projects? Calls for social science research are numerous!

25. Our Meeting in Boulder in 2011 New understanding of warning systems Better uses of what we know Many “measured” successes – reduced losses