1. Indifferentiability of Permutation-Based Compression Functions and Tree-Based Modes of Operation, with Applications to MD6 Yevgeniy Dodis Leonid Reyzin Ronald L. Rivest Emily Shen

2. MD6 Hash Function One of earliest announced SHA-3 candidates Presented by Rivest at CRYPTO ’08 Mode of Operation MD6 f Variable input length (VIL), specified output length d Compression Function f Fixed input length (FIL), 4-1 compression

3.  1-1 map π const 15 8+2 64 89 words 16 words Prepend Map Chop MD6 Compression Function f key, auxdata = 64/4

4. MD6 Mode of Operation

5. (2,0) (2,1) z =1 (“root bit”) Chop to d bits (1,9) partially filled empty

6. Analyzing Mode of Operation General approach: If compression function f is “secure”, then mode of operation MD6 f is “secure” e.g., f collision-resistant  MD6 f collision-resistant f preimage-resistant  MD6 f preimage-resistant f PRF  MD6 f PRF Is this enough? (Crutchfield)

7. Random-Oracle-Like Behavior Random oracles (ROs) used to prove security of: signatures, CCA encryption, ZK, etc. RO in theory  hash function in practice When is this secure? f is a FIL-RO  MD6 f is a VIL-RO?

8. Security Notion: Indistinguishability f and MD6 f are fixed public functions… MD6 f VIL-RO G D ? or ?

9. Variant notion of indistinguishability: D has access to inner component Indifferentiability:  simulator S s.t. left/right indistinguishable to any D Note: not a symmetric relationship Indifferentiability (Maurer et al. ‘04) MD6 C FIL-RO C VIL-RO G Sim S D ? or ?

10. Indifferentiability Theorem (Maurer et al.): If H is indifferentiable from RO, then any cryptosystem proven with RO is secure when RO is replaced by H How do we apply this to MD6? View f as RO Prove MD6 f is indifferentiable from RO Conclude MD6 f may safely be plugged into applications that require VIL-RO (viewing f as RO)

11. Our Results and Interpretation Our result: MD6 RO is indifferentiable from RO More generally: any* tree-based mode of operation using FIL-RO is indifferentiable from VIL-RO What does this mean? MD6 mode of operation is safe for use as RO Gives confidence that mode of operation is well-built Pushes RO assumption one level down – from MD6 to f Can we push RO assumption even further down? Stay tuned…

12. Deterministic tree structure (wrt calls to f ) * Requirements of Mode of Operation

13. Deterministic tree structure (wrt calls to f ) Unique parsing of f -inputs into –metadata –raw data –f -outputs * Requirements of Mode of Operation

14. Deterministic tree structure (wrt calls to f ) Unique parsing of f -inputs into –metadata –raw data –f -outputs * Requirements of Mode of Operation metadata f -output 1 f -output 3 f -output 2 f -output 4 level > 0 (non-leaf)

15. Deterministic tree structure (wrt calls to f ) Unique parsing of f -inputs into –metadata –raw data –f -outputs * Requirements of Mode of Operation metadata level = 0 (leaf) raw data

16. Deterministic tree structure (wrt calls to f ) Unique parsing of f -inputs into –metadata –raw data –f -outputs Root predicate * Requirements of Mode of Operation z = 1

17. Deterministic tree structure (wrt calls to f ) Unique parsing of f -inputs into –metadata –raw data –f -outputs Root predicate Final output processing – regular, invertible* function * Requirements of Mode of Operation Chop to d bits

18. Deterministic tree structure (wrt calls to f ) Unique parsing of f -inputs into –metadata –raw data –f -outputs Root predicate Final output processing Message reconstructibility * Requirements of Mode of Operation

19. Simulator MD6 C FIL-RO C VIL-RO G Sim S D ? or ?

20. Simulator On a query x: –Previously seen? Repeat the answer. –Non-root query ( z = 0)? Random answer. –Root query ( z = 1)? Reconstruct M s.t. x is final query. If not possible, random answer. Consult G on M. Return random answer consistent with G(M).

21. Proof Sketch Sequence of games to transform “ideal” game ( D interacts with G, S ) into “real” game ( D interacts with MD6 C, C ) Define 3 types of “bad” events ( S -collisions and “lucky guesses” by D ) If no bad events, D ’s view identical Probability of bad events is negligible Therefore, D ’s distinguishing advantage is at most negligible

22. Pushing RO Assumption to Compression Function Level  1-1 map π const 15 8+2 64 89 words 16 words Prepend Map Chop key, auxdata

23. Pushing RO Assumption to Compression Function Level View π as random permutation Prove f indifferentiable from FIL-RO Similar proof techniques f indifferentiable from FIL-RO (viewing π as random) MD6 f indifferentiable from VIL-RO (viewing f as FIL-RO)  MD6 f indifferentiable from VIL-RO (viewing π as random)

24. Conclusion Proved: Indifferentiability of MD6 mode of operation (viewing compression function as RO) Result is quite general, applies to many sensible tree- modes (including other SHA-3 candidates, sequential modes) Proved: Indifferentiability of MD6 compression function (viewing π as random permutation) Interpretation: MD6 mode of operation does not have structural weaknesses MD6 mode of operation can be used as RO (assuming random permutation)