1. Cognitive Schemata for Cooperation and Negotiation Dr. Catherine Tinsley, Dr. Laurie Weingart, Dr. Robin Dillon, Nazli Turan

2. Theory Formation Identify Cultural Factors CUNY, Georgetown, CMU Computational Models CMU, USC Virtual Humans USC Implementation CMU RESEARCH PRODUCTS Surveys & Interviews CUNY, CMU, U Mich, Georgetown Cross-Cultural Interactions U Pitt, CMU Data Analysis CUNY, Georgetown, U Pitt, CMU validation Validated Theories Models Modeling Tools Briefing Materials Scenarios Training Simulations Common task Subgroup task

3. Theoretical Background Negotiations/ dispute resolution marked by ambiguity and uncertainty –About the other party: motives, interests, BATNA –About the situation: linkage effects, other parties, history When uncertainty is high, any information about counterparts and the situation can exert a powerful influence (regardless of veracity) Schemata/ stereotypes of other will influence negotiator interactions

4. Research Questions What are negotiators’ schemas about each other vis-à-vis –Goals= WHAT each party is trying to accomplish Economic goals Relational goals –Strategies= HOW each party will reach their desired end state Ways of communicating Ways of persuading Ways of moving the negotiation forward How are these schema influenced by –History of Interaction of Countries (friendly/ hostile) –Generalized versus Specific Schema

5. Research Design Participants read a description of a dispute and are asked to –Characterize each party in the dispute –Take the perspective of each party in dispute and imagine what their goals and strategies might be –Respond to questions about their country’s cultural values Independent variables –History of interaction of disputant countries Friendly vs. Hostile –Country of disputants Own vs. Generic country from your hemisphere (Middle Eastern/ Western) –Country of respondent (U.S., Turkey, Egypt)

6. Pre-test Efforts Worked with ARO provided information regarding actual scenarios experienced by returning officers Created two scenarios: Hospital and Oil Worked with expatriates from Middle East (Lebannon, Iran, etc.) to refine scenarios, names, items Pre-tested with US sample Revised scenarios to reduce sensitivity of scenarios (described as “too hot”) and improve generalizability Revised items for comprehension MURI 14 Program Review-- September 10, 2009 6

7. Thank you for helping us to understand more about conflict resolution. Your participation is voluntary. On the next screen you will read about a dispute between two merchants, one from a Western country and another from [the Middle East/ Turkey]. The two countries have [friendly/hostile] relations with each other. [Both countries consider each other to be reliable. /Both counties consider the other to be unreliable.] You will be asked to take the perspective of each party and describe what you think the goals and strategies of each party might be. Scenario Introduction

8. A Middle Eastern /Turkish merchant, named Ahmed owns a textile mill and produces clothing for both domestic and foreign markets. A Western merchant, named Steven, buys clothing from different parts of the world to sell to department stores that operate in his home country. During Ahmed and Steven’s first transaction, the negotiation over the price, quantity and quality (thread-count and quality of materials) of product proceeded quite smoothly. A problem has arisen, however, in that Steven claims that the initial product he was shipped (25% of the total ordered) was of inferior quality than he thinks they agreed to. Ahmed, however, rejects as Steven’s claim stating that the textiles are exactly the quality in their contract. Unfortunately the contract, as written, is vague and says “quality textiles will be shipped.” Steven has paid 50% up front for these textiles and has suggested that if Ahmed does not improve the quality of the textiles he will withhold further payment. Steven has countered that he will only ship 25% more of the total product unless Paul agrees that the quality is not a problem. Both are hoping to resolve this issue as a future long term relationship could be mutually financially beneficial. Scenario

9. Data Collection US Student pre-test data (267 participants) US Student data (162 participants) Turkey data (127 participants) Egypt data (57 participants) MURI 14 Program Review-- September 10, 2009 9

10. Relational Goals Economic GoalSurvey Items Maximize Joint Gain/Compromise Achieve best possible solution for both parties, even if it takes time Brainstorm a creative solution that meets both parties’ needs Work hard to uncover the most favorable solution for both parties Arrive at a compromise solution Meet the other party half way on issues Yield/Maximize Other Give in to the other party’s demands Yield to the other party's demands Maximize other party’s gain Ensure the other party gets a good outcome, even at my own expense Prevent/Block Other Block the other party from any gain Prevent the other party from getting anything Prevent the other party from meeting objectives Maximize Own Gain Maximize his own gain Make sure his goals are met Satisfy his own needs Minimize his potential losses 10

11. Scale Reliabilities (α) Turkey dataDescribing ARAB Describing WEST Both Arab & West Max Joint Gain/Compromise.70.69.74 Yield/Max Other.74.77.84 Prevent/Block Other.58.62.78 Max Own Gain.49.51.71 US DATA Max Joint Gain/Compromise.80.70.79 Yield/Max Other.73.66.74 Prevent/Block Other.72.82 Max Own Gain.62.72.77 11

12. Relational Goals GoalSurvey Items Self Oriented Preserve his own honor Avoid shame Show he is not afraid to stand his ground Show that he cannot be pushed around Establish authority over the other party Avoid being seen as week Save his own “face” (reputation) Other Oriented Make sure the other party’s honor is preserved Allow the other party to save his “face” (reputation) Make sure the other party avoids shame Find out more about the other party Build relationship Maintain a harmonious interaction Work to establish a better relationship Embedded in the past Find a solution that respects tradition Reach an agreement that is consistent with the past Arrive at an outcome that is compatible with how tings have been done before MURI 14 Program Review-- September 10, 2009 12

13. Scale Reliabilities (α) Turkey dataDescribing ARABDescribing WESTBoth Arab & West Self oriented.79.82.90 Other oriented.70.65.83 Relationship.73.57.67 Past.67.64.79 US DATA Self oriented.73.80.82 Other oriented.79.69.80 Relationship.77.60.62 Past.67.55.65 MURI 14 Program Review-- September 10, 2009 13

14. Results – Economic Goals Independent Variables: Participant Country, Country Relations (Friendly/Hostile), and Country/Region Prime (Generic/Own) Main effect for Participant Country, p <.001 Main effect for Country/Region Prime, p < 0.05 No main effect for Country Relations Significant interaction effect for Country Relations * Participant Country, p =.05 MURI 14 Program Review-- September 10, 2009 14

15. Economic Goals by Subject 15

16. Economic Goal: Max Joint Gain MURI 14 Program Review-- September 10, 2009 16 Middle Eastern Target (p =.02) Western Target (p =.20) Respondent

17. Economic Goal: Yield MURI 14 Program Review-- September 10, 2009 17 Middle Eastern Target (p =.004) Western Target (p =.04) US RespondentTurkey RespondentUS RespondentTurkey Respondent

18. Economic Goal: Max Own MURI 14 Program Review-- September 10, 2009 18 Middle Eastern Target (p =.04) Western Target (p =.2) US RespondentTurkey RespondentUS RespondentTurkey Respondent

19. Results – Relationship Goals Independent Variables: Participant Country, Country Relations (Friendly/Hostile), and Country/Region Prime (Generic/Own) Main effect for Participant Country, p <.001 Main effect for Country/Region Prime, p =.002 No main effect for Country Relations No interaction effect for Country Relations * Participant Country MURI 14 Program Review-- September 10, 2009 19

20. Relationship Goals by Subject 20

21. Tentative Conclusions Results show no evidence of ego-centric biases Results show little evidence of stereotyping –Knowledge set of respondents Results suggest different normative conflict resolution approaches exist between US and Turkish subjects MURI 14 Program Review-- September 10, 2009 21

22. Tentative Conclusions The normatively different approaches to resolving this type of conflict: –Turkish subjects see a softer approach, i.e., see both parties as less self-interested and more interested in joint gains Differences are exacerbated in hostile environment: Turkish see protagonist as more soft and US see protagonist as more hard-line MURI 14 Program Review-- September 10, 2009 22

23. Next Steps Deeper analysis of current data –SME’s on factor structures –Generalized vs Country specific schema Broader data collection on current scenarios Begin designing and pre-testing interactive scenario MURI 14 Program Review-- September 10, 2009 23