1. CONFLICT SETTLEMENT AND PEACE-BUILDING With special reference to the challenges of non-state actors

2. GENERAL AIM: RESTORE STATE AUTHORITY + ‘MONOPOLY OF FORCE’ May have to be done with outside help (nation, regional organization, UN, NATO,EU) - and almost always economic/ humanitarian help May require period of occupation or international administration May require creating more than one state

3. WHAT GENERAL METHODS DID WE IDENTIFY FOR TACKLING NON-STATE THREATS?? 1) Physical ‘stopping’ 2) Legal techniques: a) Anti-crime b) Regs/measures to cut off supplies 3) a) Changing their minds b) Changing their supporters’ minds 4) (Target protection/resilience doesn’t really fit here)

4. APPLYING THESE METHODS TO AN ARMED NON-STATE FACTION IN CONFLICT What would ‘stopping’ or ‘eliminating’ mean? Military defeat (but NB could drive them abroad); ceasefire to gain time for other solutions After defeat, DDR is now standard solution ie disarm, disband, reintegrate. But need right methods: ’cash for guns’ rarely works, and must not cut the state’s military strength too far - as in Iraq at first

5. Relevance of legal methods, law and order New laws to (i) right wrongs that helped cause conflict, (ii) outlaw non-state violence, regulate gun ownership etc - but enforcement crucial! And important to aim laws against ‘men of violence’, not their victims Post-conflict (or ‘transitional’)justice, eg special war crimes courts: both to punish/deter real criminals, and bring forgiveness/reintegration to others (‘truth and reconciliation’) Broader concept of Security Sector Reform: rebuild army, police, courts etc to be effective, but stay under the law themselves (no new tyrants or mere revenge) Both DDR and SSR must be tailored to cases + have local ‘ownership’

6. Relevance of cutting off supplies and access Arms embargoes on some or all participants: NB importance but also headache of controlling ‘small arms’ (gun possession as such does not mean conflict or violence) Financial, trade, aid etc embargoes; transport and travel controls Cutting off trade in ‘conflict commodities’: ‘Kimberley process’ for diamonds, attempt now to apply to all ‘conflict minerals – but obvious problems

7. Relevance of changing minds and methods (of the group) Basis of all internal peace settlements is some form of this - power sharing, resource sharing, local autonomy, protection of group rights etc. Should help groups ‘migrate’: from illegal to legal: from for-profit to not-for-profit political roles or legitimate business. Tough to embrace all groups/motives: risk of ‘spoilers’ and ‘breakouts’, also of ‘failed conversion’

8. Relevance of changing minds of supporters/people in general Limits on ‘hearts+minds’ approach: no point if people were being forced by rebels, or groups have become independent of the social environment Tempting to play groups/factions against each other - further fragments authority and can increase violence = more competition (now with official arms supplies) BUT IF supporters can be won over or split: at least pushes ‘bad guys’ into a corner, makes them less a political/economic and more of a criminal problem. IF grievances are real and are addressed, supporters may be drawn into the non-violent majority in a more representative new regime  also less likely for new rebels to arise

9. And one more method: Relevance of regional cooperation/integration (eg SE Asia, parts of Africa, Caribbean, W Pacific): As a minimum, less harmful interference + risks of international ‘overspill’ reduced Can help find culturally appropriate settlements, provide acceptable peace forces In best case (eg EU) can develop into true community and ‘single security space’: allowing wider/deeper range of common laws and measures against all NSAs, and also spreading reforms that make causes of conflict less likely