1. The Not-So-Civil Service: Power Resources and the Relationship Between Ministers and their Senior Civil Servants October 17th, 2006

2. Resources – Senior Bureaucratic Officials expertise expertise – policy – process person-power person-power relationship with other departments relationship with other departments relationship with clientele relationship with clientele

3. Resources -- Ministers political legitimacy political legitimacy expertise expertise – political vis-a-vis public vis-a-vis public vis-a-vis cabinet vis-a-vis cabinet ability to manage relationship ability to manage relationship outside expertise outside expertise competing lines of advice competing lines of advice relationship with cabinet, PM relationship with cabinet, PM relationship with public/media relationship with public/media

4. Resources -- Ministers political legitimacy political legitimacy expertise expertise – political vis-a-vis public vis-a-vis public vis-a-vis cabinet vis-a-vis cabinet ability to manage relationship ability to manage relationship outside expertise outside expertise competing lines of advice competing lines of advice relationship with cabinet, PM relationship with cabinet, PM relationship with public/media relationship with public/media

5. Ministerial Resources and Public Opinion Polling exponential rise in the growth of public opinion polling by government departments exponential rise in the growth of public opinion polling by government departments – revolution in computer technology costs of public opinion polling have dropped costs of public opinion polling have dropped the role of the minister as the political antenna of the department may be becoming obsolete the role of the minister as the political antenna of the department may be becoming obsolete – senior bureaucrats probably have a better read of public opinion on a given policy issue

6. Resources -- Ministers political legitimacy political legitimacy expertise expertise – political vis-a-vis public vis-a-vis public vis-a-vis cabinet vis-a-vis cabinet ability to manage relationship ability to manage relationship outside expertise outside expertise competing lines of advice competing lines of advice relationship with cabinet, PM relationship with cabinet, PM relationship with public/media relationship with public/media

7. The Tenure of Ministers (the Constant) “ministerial musical chairs” “ministerial musical chairs” – move often and frequency has increased effects on ministerial power effects on ministerial power – the traditional view ministerial musical chairs weakens the power of minister ministerial musical chairs weakens the power of minister – the counter-traditional view avoids ministerial capture avoids ministerial capture

8. The Tenure of Senior Public Servants (the change!) the revolving deputy ministerial door the revolving deputy ministerial door – move often and frequency has increased effects on deputy ministerial power effects on deputy ministerial power – the traditional view equalizes the relationship between DMs and ministers – both are short-term departmental residents equalizes the relationship between DMs and ministers – both are short-term departmental residents – an alternative view strengthens the Centre (e.g PCO) strengthens the Centre (e.g PCO) DM becomes representative of the Centre (e.g. PCO) DM becomes representative of the Centre (e.g. PCO)

9. The Tenure of Ministers and their Senior Public Servants changing patterns in the tenure of ministers and deputy ministers... changing patterns in the tenure of ministers and deputy ministers... effects are ambiguous/contradictory effects are ambiguous/contradictory complex interaction between both patterns complex interaction between both patterns power of ministers/DM in new environment is an open empirical question power of ministers/DM in new environment is an open empirical question HOWEVER... HOWEVER... relationships are changing relationships are changing both changes are important in terms of relationships between departments and The Centre both changes are important in terms of relationships between departments and The Centre

10. Governing from The Centre October 17 th, 2006

11. Centralized Accountability: Collective Ministerial Responsibility what is “responsible government”? what is “responsible government”? – the executive must maintain the confidence of Parliament what is collective ministerial responsibility? what is collective ministerial responsibility? – all ministers must resign if the cabinet loses the confidence of Parliament what constitutes having the confidence of Parliament? what constitutes having the confidence of Parliament? – what pre-conditions would the operation of collective cabinet ministerial responsibility require?

12. Centralized Accountability: Collective Ministerial Responsibility requirements (enforced by PM) requirements (enforced by PM) – cabinet solidarity – cabinet secrecy cabinet documents exempt from Freedom of Information cabinet documents exempt from Freedom of Information the problem of leaks the problem of leaks why would cabinet ministers agree? why would cabinet ministers agree? price of being in cabinet price of being in cabinet collective self-interest collective self-interest

13. Centralized Accountability (Collective Ministerial Responsibility) and Diffuse Accountability (Individual Ministerial Responsibility) cabinet/departmental link cabinet/departmental link minister represents department in cabinet minister represents department in cabinet minister represents cabinet to the department minister represents cabinet to the department the individual minister and cabinet the individual minister and cabinet collective vs. individual ministerial paradox collective vs. individual ministerial paradox –ministers interest in maximizing their own latitude from cabinet control the conundrum of cabinet solidarity/cabinet secrecy and individual ministerial responsibilitythe conundrum of cabinet solidarity/cabinet secrecy and individual ministerial responsibility –ministers interested in maximizing cabinet’s ability to direct other ministries

14. The Structure of Government: Centralized and Diffuse Accountability structure of government is an attempt to balance between collective ministerial responsibility (centralized accountability) and individual ministerial responsibility (diffuse accountability) structure of government is an attempt to balance between collective ministerial responsibility (centralized accountability) and individual ministerial responsibility (diffuse accountability) Prime Ministerial/Cabinet government is an attempt to ensure political control... Prime Ministerial/Cabinet government is an attempt to ensure political control... – from the centre of government (Prime Minister and Cabinet) – AND over individual departments (Ministers)

15. The Structure of Government: The Balance of Centralized and Diffuse Accountability cabinet structure and operation cabinet structure and operation balance between central agencies and line departments balance between central agencies and line departments role of the Deputy Minister role of the Deputy Minister

16. The Structure of Government: The Balance of Centralized and Diffuse Accountability cabinet structure and operation cabinet structure and operation – size

18. The Canadian Ministry (in order of precedence), December 2005 1. The Right Honourable Paul Martin, Prime Minister 2. The Honourable Jacob Austin Leader of the Government in the Senate 3. The Honourable David Anderson, Environment 4. The Honourable Ralph E. Goodale, Finance 5. The Honourable Anne McLellan, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public Safety 6. The Honourable Lucienne Robillard, Industry 7. The Honourable Pierre S. Pettigrew, Health, Intergovernmental Affairs, and Official Languages 8. The Honourable James Scott Peterson, Trade 9. The Honourable Andrew Mitchell, Indian Affairs 10. The Honourable Claudette Bradshaw, Labour and Minister responsible for Homelessness 11. The Honourable Denis Coderre President of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada 12. The Honourable Rey D. Pagtakhan, Western Economic Diversification 13. The Honourable John McCallum, Veterans Affairs 14. The Honourable Stephen Owen, Public Works and Government Services 15. The Honourable William Graham, Foreign Affairs 16. The Honourable Stan Kazmierczak Keyes, National Revenue 17. The Honourable Robert Speller, Agriculture 18. The Honourable Giuseppe (Joseph) Volpe, Human Resources and Skills Development 19. The Honourable Reginald B. Alcock President of the Treasury Board and Minister responsible for the Canadian Wheat Board 20. The Honourable Geoff Regan, Fisheries and Oceans 21. The Honourable Tony Valeri, Transport 22. The Honourable David Pratt, National Defence 23. The Honourable Jacques Saada, Democratic Reform 24. The Honourable Irwin Cotler, Justice 25. The Honourable Judy Sgro, Citizenship and Immigration 26. The Honourable Hélène Chalifour Scherrer, Canadian Heritage 27. The Honourable Ruben John Efford, Natural Resources 28. The Honourable Liza Frulla, Social Development 29. The Honourable Joseph McGuire Minister of Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency 30. The Honourable Mauril Bélanger Deputy Leader of the Government in the House of Commons 31. The Honourable M. Aileen Carroll, International Cooperation

19. The Canadian Ministry (in order of precedence), February 2006 1. Harper, Stephen (Right Hon.)Prime Minister Harper, Stephen (Right Hon.) Harper, Stephen (Right Hon.) 2. Nicholson, Rob (Hon.)Leader of the Government in the House of CommonsMinister for Democratic Reform Nicholson, Rob (Hon.) Nicholson, Rob (Hon.) 3. Emerson, David (Hon.)Minister of International TradeMinister for the Pacific Gateway and the Vancouver-Whistler Olympics Emerson, David (Hon.) Emerson, David (Hon.) 4. Blackburn, Jean-Pierre (Hon.)Minister of LabourMinister of the Economic Development Agency of Canada for the Regions of Quebec Blackburn, Jean-Pierre (Hon.) Blackburn, Jean-Pierre (Hon.) 5. Thompson, Greg (Hon.)Minister of Veterans AffairsLeBreton, Marjory (Hon.)Leader of the Government in the Senate Thompson, Greg (Hon.) Thompson, Greg (Hon.) 6. Solberg, Monte (Hon.)Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Solberg, Monte (Hon.) Solberg, Monte (Hon.) 7. Strahl, Chuck (Hon.)Minister of Agriculture and Agri-FoodMinister for the Canadian Wheat Board Strahl, Chuck (Hon.) Strahl, Chuck (Hon.) 8. Lunn, Gary (Hon.)Minister of Natural Resources Lunn, Gary (Hon.) Lunn, Gary (Hon.) 9. MacKay, Peter (Hon.)Minister of Foreign AffairsMinister of the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency MacKay, Peter (Hon.) MacKay, Peter (Hon.) 10. Hearn, Loyola (Hon.)Minister of Fisheries and Oceans Hearn, Loyola (Hon.) Hearn, Loyola (Hon.) 11. Day, Stockwell (Hon.)Minister of Public Safety Day, Stockwell (Hon.) Day, Stockwell (Hon.) 12. Skelton, Carol (Hon.)Minister of National RevenueMinister of Western Economic Diversification Skelton, Carol (Hon.) Skelton, Carol (Hon.) 13. Toews, Vic (Hon.)Minister of JusticeAttorney General of Canada Toews, Vic (Hon.) Toews, Vic (Hon.) 14. Ambrose, Rona (Hon.)Minister of the Environment Ambrose, Rona (Hon.) Ambrose, Rona (Hon.) 15. Chong, Michael (Hon.)President of the Queen’s Privy Council for CanadaMinister of Intergovernmental AffairsMinister for Sport Chong, Michael (Hon.) Chong, Michael (Hon.) 16. Finley, Diane (Hon.)Minister of Human Resources and Social Development Finley, Diane (Hon.) Finley, Diane (Hon.) 17. O'Connor, Gordon (Hon.)Minister of National Defence O'Connor, Gordon (Hon.) O'Connor, Gordon (Hon.) 18. Oda, Bev (Hon.)Minister of Canadian Heritage and Status of Women Oda, Bev (Hon.) Oda, Bev (Hon.) 19. Prentice, Jim (Hon.)Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern DevelopmentFederal Interlocutor for Métis and Non-Status Indians Prentice, Jim (Hon.) Prentice, Jim (Hon.) 20. Baird, John (Hon.)President of the Treasury Board Baird, John (Hon.) Baird, John (Hon.) 21. Bernier, Maxime (Hon.)Minister of Industry Bernier, Maxime (Hon.) Bernier, Maxime (Hon.) 22. Cannon, Lawrence (Hon.)Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities Cannon, Lawrence (Hon.) Cannon, Lawrence (Hon.) 23. Clement, Tony (Hon.)Minister of HealthMinister for the Federal Economic Development Initiative for Northern Ontario Clement, Tony (Hon.) Clement, Tony (Hon.) 24. Flaherty, Jim (Hon.)Minister of Finance Flaherty, Jim (Hon.) Flaherty, Jim (Hon.) 25. Verner, Josée (Hon.)Minister of International CooperationMinister for la Francophonie and Official Languages Verner, Josée (Hon.) Verner, Josée (Hon.) 26. Fortier, Michael (Hon.)Minister of Public Works and Government Services 26. Fortier, Michael (Hon.)Minister of Public Works and Government Services

20. The Structure of Government: The Balance of Centralized and Diffuse Accountability cabinet structure and operation cabinet structure and operation – size

21. The Structure of Government: The Balance of Centralized and Diffuse Accountability cabinet structure and operation cabinet structure and operation – size – cabinet committees number and function number and function –Clark and the Envelope System Inner and Outer CabinetInner and Outer Cabinet 12 Cabinet Committees12 Cabinet Committees envelope systemenvelope system –Chretien 4 cabinet committees4 cabinet committees reliance on full cabinetreliance on full cabinet –Harper six cabinet committees (Priorities and Planning, Operations, Treasury Board, Social Affairs, Economic Affairs, Foreign Affairs and National Security)six cabinet committees (Priorities and Planning, Operations, Treasury Board, Social Affairs, Economic Affairs, Foreign Affairs and National Security)

22. The Structure of Government: The Balance of Centralized and Diffuse Accountability balance between central agencies and line departments balance between central agencies and line departments – line departments – e.g. HRSDC, DFO, Agriculture structural heretics structural heretics –regulatory agencies –Crown Corporations –non-departmental agencies – central agencies PCO PCO PMO PMO Finance Finance Treasury Board Treasury Board

23. The Structure of Government: The Balance of Centralized and Diffuse Accountability various agencies (departments, agencies) which have radically different organizational purposes various agencies (departments, agencies) which have radically different organizational purposes line departments -- provide services/programs line departments -- provide services/programs central agencies – coordinate line departments central agencies – coordinate line departments –potential for conflict inherent in structure central agency mandate for horizontal coordination reinforces centripetal tendencies central agency mandate for horizontal coordination reinforces centripetal tendencies line department resistance reinforces centrifugal tendencies line department resistance reinforces centrifugal tendencies these tendencies become institutionalized these tendencies become institutionalized –even if the circumstances/concerns which give rise to these tendencies fade, the tendencies may persist

24. The Structure of Government: The Balance of Centralized and Diffuse Accountability role of the Deputy Minister role of the Deputy Minister – balance in roles of DM technically accountable to minister technically accountable to minister appointed by PM appointed by PM –receives direction from PCO –changing balance resulting from shifts in tenure of DMs

25. Channels of Political Control October 19 th, 2006

26. Channels of Central Political Control outward at political level from PM to Ministers and then downward to bureaucratic level (Deputy Ministers) outward at political level from PM to Ministers and then downward to bureaucratic level (Deputy Ministers)

27. Channels of Central Political Control Ministers Deputy Ministers Prime Minister, PMO, Min.Finance, TBP

28. Channels of Central Political Control outward at political level from PM to Ministers and then downward to bureaucratic level (Deputy Ministers) outward at political level from PM to Ministers and then downward to bureaucratic level (Deputy Ministers) downward from political level (PM/PMO) to bureaucratic level (PCO) and then outward at bureaucratic level (Deputy Ministers) downward from political level (PM/PMO) to bureaucratic level (PCO) and then outward at bureaucratic level (Deputy Ministers)

29. Channels of Central Political Control Deputy Ministers Prime Minister, PMO, Min.Finance, TBP Clerk of the Privy Council, PCO, TBS

30. Channels of Central Political Control outward at political level from PM to Ministers and then downward to bureaucratic level (Deputy Ministers) outward at political level from PM to Ministers and then downward to bureaucratic level (Deputy Ministers) downward from political level (PM/PMO) to bureaucratic level (PCO) and then outward at bureaucratic level (Deputy Ministers) downward from political level (PM/PMO) to bureaucratic level (PCO) and then outward at bureaucratic level (Deputy Ministers) downward and outward from political level (PM) to bureaucratic level (DMs) downward and outward from political level (PM) to bureaucratic level (DMs)

31. Channels of Central Political Control Deputy Ministers Prime Minister, PMO, Min.Finance, TBP

32. Channels of Central Political Control outward at political level from PM to Ministers and then downward to bureaucratic level (Deputy Ministers) outward at political level from PM to Ministers and then downward to bureaucratic level (Deputy Ministers) downward from political level (PM/PMO) to bureaucratic level (PCO) and then outward at bureaucratic level (Deputy Ministers) downward from political level (PM/PMO) to bureaucratic level (PCO) and then outward at bureaucratic level (Deputy Ministers) downward and outward from political level (PM) to bureaucratic level (DMs) downward and outward from political level (PM) to bureaucratic level (DMs)

33. Channels of Central Political Control Ministers Deputy Ministers Prime Minister, PMO, Min.Finance, TBP Clerk of the Privy Council, PCO, TBS

34. Channels of Central Political Control unique role of the DM unique role of the DM – receives political direction from... Minister Minister PCO and Clerk PCO and Clerk PM PM –indirectly through appointment

35. Channels of Bureaucratic Influence DM influence over Ministers DM influence over Ministers – from Minister to Cabinet

36. Channels of Bureaucratic Influence Ministers Deputy Ministers Prime Minister, PMO, Min.Finance, TBP

37. Channels of Bureaucratic Influence DM influence over Ministers DM influence over Ministers – from Minister to Cabinet PCO influence over PM/Min. Finance/Treasury Board PCO influence over PM/Min. Finance/Treasury Board

38. Channels of Bureaucratic Influence DM influence over Ministers DM influence over Ministers – from Minister to Cabinet PCO influence over PM/Min. Finance/Treasury Board PCO influence over PM/Min. Finance/Treasury Board – from PM/Min. Fin./Treasury Board to Cabinet

39. Channels of Bureaucratic Influence Ministers Clerk of the Privy Council, PCO, TBS Prime Minister, PMO, Min.Finance, TBP

40. Channels of Bureaucratic Influence DM influence over Ministers DM influence over Ministers – from Minister to Cabinet PCO influence over PM/Min. Finance/Treasury Board PCO influence over PM/Min. Finance/Treasury Board – from PM/Min. Fin./Treasury Board to Ministers PCO influence over DM’s PCO influence over DM’s

41. Channels of Bureaucratic Influence DM influence over Ministers DM influence over Ministers – from Minister to Cabinet PCO influence over PM/Min. Finance/Treasury Board PCO influence over PM/Min. Finance/Treasury Board – from PM/Min. Fin./Treasury Board to Ministers PCO influence over DM’s PCO influence over DM’s -DM influence over ministers

42. Channels of Bureaucratic Influence Ministers Deputy Ministers Clerk of the Privy Council, PCO, TBS

43. Channels of Bureaucratic Influence DM influence over Ministers DM influence over Ministers – from Minister to Cabinet PCO influence over PM/Min. Finance/Treasury Board PCO influence over PM/Min. Finance/Treasury Board – from PM/Min. Fin./Treasury Board to Cabinet PCO influence over DM’s PCO influence over DM’s -DM influence over ministers

44. The Integrated System: Channels of Political Control and Bureaucratic Influence DM influence over Ministers DM influence over Ministers – from Minister to Cabinet PCO influence over PM/Min. Finance/Treasury Board PCO influence over PM/Min. Finance/Treasury Board – from PM/Min. Fin./Treasury Board to Cabinet PCO influence over DM’s PCO influence over DM’s -DM influence over ministers

45. Channels of Central Political Control Ministers Deputy Ministers Prime Minister, PMO, Min.Finance, TBP Clerk of the Privy Council, PCO, TBS

46. Channels of Bureaucratic Influence Ministers Deputy Ministers Prime Minister, PMO, Min.Finance, TBP Clerk of the Privy Council, PCO, TBS

47. The Political-Bureaucratic System Political Level Bureaucratic Level

48. Implications of the Organizational Structure 1. political-bureaucratic interface (and potential for conflict) exists at numerous sites PM/PMO and PCO PM/PMO and PCO central agency ministers and central agencies central agency ministers and central agencies PM and DMs PM and DMs line departments ministers and DMs line departments ministers and DMs

49. Implications of the Organizational Structure 2.political-bureaucratic interfaces exist at numerous sites creates potential for complex strategies of political control or bureaucratic influence creates potential for complex strategies of political control or bureaucratic influence blockage of one line (political control or bureaucratic influence) does not mean that control/influence not exercised blockage of one line (political control or bureaucratic influence) does not mean that control/influence not exercised

50. Implications of the Organizational Structure 3.multiple lines of conflict/control more simplistic model highlighted democratic questions; reality is more complex more simplistic model highlighted democratic questions; reality is more complex –two sets of tendencies to balance (also two potential axes of conflict) political officials vs. public servants political officials vs. public servants The Centre vs. the Periphery The Centre vs. the Periphery

51. Dilemmas of Organizational Structure – Centripetal and Centrifugal Tendencies political control vs. impartiality political control vs. impartiality democratic paradox democratic paradox central political accountability vs. diffused political accountability central political accountability vs. diffused political accountability parliamentary paradox parliamentary paradox –accountability/responsibility/answerability –collective ministerial responsibility – accountability directly to the electorate –individual ministerial responsibility – accountability to parliament top-down responsiveness vs. bottom- up responsiveness top-down responsiveness vs. bottom- up responsiveness bureaucratic paradox bureaucratic paradox –effectiveness/efficiency

52. The Centrifugal Tendencies responsiveness (bottom-up) to clientele/public/changing circumstances responsiveness (bottom-up) to clientele/public/changing circumstances – effectiveness, efficiency diffused political accountability diffused political accountability – ability to answer effectively for actions taken within individual departments impartiality (vs. political control) impartiality (vs. political control) – ability to insulate activities from political interference

53. The Centripetal Tendencies top-down responsiveness top-down responsiveness coherence coherence centralized political accountability centralized political accountability collective cabinet responsibility collective cabinet responsibility political control (vs. impartiality) political control (vs. impartiality)