1. Weak Identifier Multihoming Protocol (WIMP) draft-ylitalo-multi6-wimp-00.txt J. Ylitalo, V. Torvinen, E. Nordmark Vesa Torvinen Ericsson Research Nomadiclab, Finland 59th IETF - Seoul, Korea

2. Overview Experiments with "weak" authentication and light cryptographic operations –Up to 2000-4000 times faster than public key operations? Context establishment and re-addressing separated –Initiation phase stateless for responder –Locators can change dynamically, and be private End-point identifiers are (currently) not routable –Initiator: ephemeral ID (hash of nonce) –Responder: hash of FQDN draft-ylitalo-multi6-wimp-00.txt

3. Basic operations Reverse hash chain H n = Hash(random) H n-1 = Hash(H n ) … H 0 = Hash(H 1 ) = anchor Secret splitting X xor pad = e(X) draft-ylitalo-multi6-wimp-00.txt INITIATOR RESPONDER INIT: mac(H0(I)) --------------------------> CC: temporary_H0(R) <------------------------- CCR: H0(I) --------------------------> CONF: H0(R) <-------------------------- REA: H1(I), mac(H2(I)), locators --------------------------> AC1: H1(R)_piece_1 <------------------------- ACn: H1(R)_piece_n <------------------------- ACR: H1(R), H2(I) -------------------------->

4. Major issues End-point & flow IDs –Flow-id not inline with draft-ietf-ipv6-flow-label-09.txt –End-point IDs should be routable (cf. SIP) –Hijacking attack; attacker establish state in victim so that when victim tries to send packets to server, he will actually send them to attacker –DoS attack; easy generation of a storm of INIT messages (statelessness helps) Adopt solution from other drafts, e.g. NOID? draft-ylitalo-multi6-wimp-00.txt