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Published bySherilyn Miller Modified over 9 years ago
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Prospects for Change
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Inauguration of President Medvedev: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k_YMHDUqR58
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As Russian transitions go, it was unusual A Russian head of state has left his post despite the fact that he is alive, well, still young, and very popular – because he is regarded as a successful, effective leader Many Russians actually preferred to see Putin stay for 3d term
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The Constitution limits any President to 2 consecutive terms in office But - why not change the Constitution? Fear of instability Won’t look good internationally So, to assure continuity - Putin’s closest lieutenant was nominated for – and then elected - President (Operation Successor) Putin became a powerful Prime Minister Dual Power Dyarchy “Tandemocracy”
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Putin’s speech at the Parliament in February 2008 “The 2020 speech” We were in a situation of deep crisis 8 years ago But we have found our way out of the crisis Russia is on the right track It is safer, stronger Economy is growing, incomes are rising Need for modernization of the economy Political stability as key to continued success In the context of Putinism, the Medvedev Presidency was perceived as a vehicle for continuity with gradual, incremental changes
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3 key points about Putin’s Russia: 1. Looking back, most Russians feel that the country has made significant progress toward recovery 2. Looking around and forward, they see huge problems Some of them – inherited from the past Others – created in the Putin years 3.Putin has served as a transition manager But the transition isn’t over yet And in the next phase, the Putin legacy will be treated pragmatically – whatever works
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The challenges Modernization of the economy Rebuilding infrastructure Social investments: health, education, other social programs to improve quality of life Crucial: ROLE OF THE STATE Which model of development to follow? How effective is the state mechanism?
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Medvedev on need for political change: http://eng.kremlin.ru/videohttp://eng.kremlin.ru/video
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ROLE OF THE STATE Economic growth is a result of not just higher oil prices Also – result of a restoration of the Russian state The state needed to be rebuilt That rebuilding was done by very crude methods It involved increasing abandonment of liberal-democratic norms And it resulted in consolidation of bureaucratic capitalism
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Bureaucracy is bigger, more powerful, more corrupt, and less accountable Among the bureaucrats, the Enforcers have gotten too strong, other elites resent this Rule of law, always an endangered species in Russia, suffered further setbacks
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Business climate in Russia (poll of 1200 executives, WCIOM, Nov.07) 54% - report successful development of their businesses On 11 indicators of “business climate” – “bad’ or “so-so” Especially hard to start a new business Government policy is criticized Bureaucracy, corruption OVERWHELMING: need for clear and strictly observed rules (63%)
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WCIOM poll, Oct.08 What kind of state do you want Russia to be? 42% - a democratic system with a market economy (down 6% in 10 years) 16% - a socialist state with a communist ideology (down 4%) 21% - a state with its own type of system and its own path (up 3%) 3% - monarchy and empire (down 3%)
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WCIOM poll, Jan.08 55% - country going in the right direction 20% - not (down 10% from 2004) 56% - Russia needs stability, evolutionary reforms 29% - radical reforms (down 10% from 2004) 51% - revise results of privatization, unfair and illegal 29% - No (down from 36%) 51% - all peoples of Russia must have same rights and opportunities 37% - interests of ethnic Russians must be uppermost 56% - treat post-Soviet states as all others 25% - Russia must try to dominate
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Deep depoliticization of the society Russians are becoming increasingly private people I’ll take care of myself Voting doesn’t change anything Let the govt do its work Trust the President Still, upsurges of activism are usually provoked by the developments affecting people’s economic interests Opposition movements are marginalized
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WCIOM poll, 2008: In the international arena, Russia must strive to establish closer relations with the West Yes - 60:24
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Russia is in a conservative phase In a triple sense: The new ruling class is determined to maintain its wealth and power The public is depoliticized and values stability Emphasis on Russian identity and traditions as distinct from Western values And yet, Russia must modernize without delay Can Russia’s modernization be carried out while society is in this condition?
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Putin’s 20/20 speech: “…a strategy of innovation-based development of the country, based on our key competitive advantage – the human potential, on the most effective use of human knowledge and skills for constant improvement in technology, economic results, and quality of life.” Massive investments in human resources needed – and recognized But it is not just investments – human motivations are more complex Individual freedom is a key value for new generations of Russians – and unless the state is structured in such a way that that freedom is protected and enhanced, the human potential will not be realized – at least to the extent expected
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The Medvedev challenge: Impossible to deal with the problems without reforming the state No effectiveness without accountability No accountability without rule of law No rule of law without electoral dem ocracy
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Medvedev: looking for a “third path” between democracy and authoritarianism The issues: courts, media, political rights On these issues, there can be liberalization
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But: Elites fears of instability, loss of control The Enforcers’ influence The military-industrial complex Will Medvedev turn to the people for support? Will he try to wake them up? One way or another, political struggles are likely to become more open and intense It is an open question who will win Liberals are unpopular Enforcers may appeal to the people, too Their backup option: Fortress Russia
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Dual Power Even a democratic state gets wobbly when there are two top political executives with similar levels of authority The Roman Empire? There, the division was territorial – and it did lead to wars between the rivals In Byzantium, there were times when two emperors would be in charge, but ultimately one would push out the other one way or another In Russia – lots of precedents, all of them resulting in one side establishing primacy, the other side being either completely destroyed or marginalized, turned into mere window dressing
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Russian precedents of Dual Power 20 th century Yeltsin: 1993 Gorbachev-Yeltsin: 1990-91 Brezhnev-Kosygin: 1964-68 1917: Provisional Government - Soviets 18 th century Empress Catherine and Emperor Peter III Empress Anna and Supreme Council 17 th century Peter I and Princess Sofia Time of Troubles
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Always ended in one side winning All these incidents of dual power occurred during crises Situations of state weakness or even collapse, sometimes triggering off a civil war Is the situation different today?
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In 1989-91, Russia experienced a democratic revolution – and democracy began to suffer soon afterwards The leaders of the new Russian state, which emerged from the ruins of the USSR, wanted capitalism more than democracy They were deeply unsure of their ability to keep power while they plundered the public assets of the Soviet state Democracy worked for them to the extent that it enabled them to dismantle the Soviet system But it became a threat to their interests once they began to rule Since 1993, they steadily moved to limit and undermine Russian democracy – all the while declaring their commitment to it By the 2000s, the idea of democracy was discredited
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Putin’s politics of order was popular both with the elites and with the public As an emergency program to pull Russia out of its transition crisis In the meantime, Russian leaders continued to proclaim their commitment to democracy, while making more and more “temporary exceptions” from it
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The Kremlin’s perspective on democracy in Russia: First, economic recovery with political stability Then, the rise of the middle class Then, a full-fledged liberal democracy
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Self-interests of the ruling class are obvious in this approach: the elites are determined to keep their power and wealth, and reject any notions of democracy which would challenge them The Dual Power regime contains checks and balances on any liberal reforms Medvedev and Putin are working in tandem But frictions and conflicts between them are inevitable Different interests, different priorities, different groups The Western factor http://www.russiatoday.com/Top_News/2009-07-27/- obama-wants-reconciliation-with-russia-.html http://www.russiatoday.com/Top_News/2009-07-27/- obama-wants-reconciliation-with-russia-.html
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Main scenarios 1. Med. gains power, Putin gradually exits - liberalization 2. Med. acts as a figurehead, Putin comes back in 2012 3. Real dual power stimulating pluralism, institutionalization, transition to democracy 4. Political upheavals, Kremlin loses control, regime change
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Impact of global economic crisis Bank of Russia: In 2008, Russia attracted $83 bln. of capital from other countries and lost $130 bln. Net capital flight - $47 bln. Forecast for 2009 for capital flight – $90-100 bln.* *Выбор России: катастрофа или революция сверху? 2009-07-13 ИНС - http://www.apn.ru/publications/print21792.htm http://www.apn.ru/publications/print21792.htm
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The economic crisis undermines stability Tests the state for its ability to function Hoping to maintain it by tightening the screws is a utopia Putinism is becoming dysfunctional, even dangerous for Russia Major changes are necessary Either from the top Or from the bottom Key variables Unity and conflicts among elites Conflicts in society – class, ethnicity Mass political attitudes
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