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1 © Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark, 2004 Who is the User? The Employment of User-Designers by User-Firms Carliss Y. Baldwin Harvard Business School MIT Innovation Lab Boston, MA April 15, 2004
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2 © Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark, 2004 Some history Josiah Wedgwood William Perkin vs. August Hofmann –“the academic-industrial knowledge network” –Germany “beat” Britain in dyes Andreas Bechtolscheim (e.g.) –user-designer-founder James Gosling (e.g.) –User-designer-employee (albeit highly optioned)
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3 © Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark, 2004 My question for today Does the “power” of user innovation rest on founder-owners or employees? Start sketching …
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4 © Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark, 2004 Three parts to problem-solving Perceive functional gap— Users comparative advantage
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5 © Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark, 2004 Three parts to problem-solving Perceive functional gap— Users comparative advantage Close the gap— Designers with domain knowledge
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6 © Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark, 2004 Three parts to problem-solving Perceive functional gap— Users comparative advantage Close the gap— Designers with domain knowledge Allocate resources— Entrepreneurs or financiers with economic knowledge
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7 © Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark, 2004 Shorthand Notation User DesignerOwner or Agent
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8 © Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark, 2004 Wedgwood Configuration: 3 in 1 User DesignerOwner, NOT Agent THIS CONFIG- URATION DOES NOT SCALE!
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9 © Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark, 2004 Configuration 1 (Classic) User Designer (might be a User, too!) Owner NOT Agent User-owner buys a solution designed by someone else
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10 © Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark, 2004 Configuration 2 (Von Hippel?) User DesignerOwner NOT Agent Owner HIRES User-Designers to solve specialized problems
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11 © Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark, 2004 The Configurations are NOT mutually exclusive Owner-founder problem-solving can be supplemented by BOTH Classic and Von Hippel problem-solving In “modern” corporations, we lose the owner- founder altogether –Owner-founder replaced by passive shareholders –Get “layers of agents”— the Board of Directors, Senior Management Team, and Specialists Not if, but where, when and why
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12 © Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark, 2004 Von Hippel Problem-Solving: Benefits Relative to Wedgwood, User-Designer-Employee (UDE) accelerates work on problems –Solutions don’t have to be very good if the discount rate is positive and the “Owner’s delay” is long –E.g., suppose owner needs to get a PhD! Relative to Classic, UDE can achieve more precise targeting of functional gaps vs. “mass-produced” solutions (Bessen)
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13 © Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark, 2004 Von Hippel Problem-Solving: Costs User-Designer-Employee (UDE) IS an agent Therefore: –Choice of which problems to solve may not be identical to the owner’s (problem-ranking conflicts) –Choice of solutions may not mimic the owner’s (problem-solving conflicts) We have all experienced these agency problems! –After a while, the owner (or the owners other agents) may even not understand what the UDE is doing (need equivalent Ph.D)
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14 © Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark, 2004 Digressions Examples of UDEs –Internal MIS groups –Process engineers –Accountants –HR professionals The “Rashomon” enterprise –Same place, different perceptions »IBM in the early 1990s; DEC until demise
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15 © Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark, 2004 Our research Seeks to explore the nature of this deep agency problem We are in a theory-building stage All results preliminary and model- dependent
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16 © Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark, 2004 Base Case:Designers=UDEs They come out of “school” capable of solving problems (in some domain). Their knowledge is non-transferrable. They can rank designs = solutions to problems. They care about money, effort and the quality of designs. – u(w, x 1, …, x M, e)
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17 © Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark, 2004 Base Case: UDEs are employed by User-firms
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18 © Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark, 2004 Some preliminary results/conjectures UDEs are in a symbiotic relationship with “Professional Schools” –like MIT and HBS Once they are entrenched in a domain of knowledge, the Schools may have NO interest in improving “their” graduates’ ability to estimate the economic value of solving a specific problem Intuition: Less precise problem ranking = More employment = More demand for schooling
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19 © Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark, 2004 More preliminary results/conjectures UDEs will want to create the following “institutions” –Library—ex post revelation of designs –Signup sheets—ex ante declaration of design intentions –See “Architecture of Cooperation” on economics of these institutions These institutions are Good News for the UDEs’ employers –Support/Subsidize!
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20 © Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark, 2004 The “Tom Sawyer” Model Tom Sawyer’s fence Knowers vs. Competitors in the UDEs’ domain –Knowers want the solution with least effort –Competitors want to WIN (fame, glory and warm glow) Tweaking the Library+Signup Sheets institution to disclose “winners” greatly changes the Competitors’ incentives to play A very Machiavellian strategy!
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21 © Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark, 2004 Bottom Line It makes good economic sense to create user- designer-employees (UDEs) –Most important: Doesn’t preclude other problem-solving approaches But “behind the walls” created by the UDE’s specialized knowledge, strange games can go on –Schools’ game: fuzz up the economics of problem-solving –Library’s game: share solutions, reduce redundant effort –Tom Sawyer’s game: Knowers entice Competitors to solve their problems and share the solutions for fame and glory
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22 © Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark, 2004 Thank you!
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