1. CALIFORNIA NATURAL GAS PIPELINE SYSTEM LT SEZGIN OZCAN LT MEHMET BUHUR

2. AGENDA  Back-story  Node decisions  How many?  Where?  Model the Natural Gas Pipelines of California  Which lines would be best to attack?  How bad would California be hurt?  How many pipes to attack to break the system? 1

3. CALIFORNIA'S SUPPLIES OF NATURAL GAS BACK-STORY 2

4. 3

5. Why to attack a pipeline? 4

6. 4

8. source sink 20-30‘’ SOURCE 30-40 ‘’ 0-20 ‘’ CONSUMPTION arizona San Fransisco oregon

9. PIPELINE WHAT’S THE FLOW ON AN ARC ? 7

10. NETWORK GOAL: MAXIMUM GAS FLOW TOTAL FLOW WITHOUT INTERDICTION: 5378.5 TOTAL POPULATION : 4.043.988 NUMBER OF NODES : 23 NUMBER OF ARCS: 50 8

11. source WHERE TO ATTACK 9

12. source attack San Jose 1.056.000 people affected 1 ATTACK 20-30‘’ SOURCE 30-40 ‘’ 0-20 ‘’ CONSUMPTION 10

13. source attack 3.243.988 people affected %73 system down 2 ATTACK attack 20-30‘’ SOURCE 30-40 ‘’ 0-20 ‘’ CONSUMPTION 11

14. San Jose-sink RESILIENCE CURVE POPULATION # ATTACKS Source-Arizona Source-Oregon Source-Arizona Source-Oregon Source-Arizona Source-Oregon Source-San Francisco Source-Arizona Source-Oregon Source-San Francisco 12

15. source Only Allowed to Attack Blue and Green Colors 20-30‘’ SOURCE 30-40 ‘’ 0-20 ‘’ CONSUMPTION CONCERNS OF THIMUR PIPELINES NOT CLOSE TO SURFACE MAY NEED MORE EXPLOSIVES SPARSELY POPULATED 13

16. source Only Allowed to Attack Blue and Green Colors 1 ATTACK attack 20-30‘’ SOURCE 30-40 ‘’ 0-20 ‘’ CONSUMPTION 408 572 PEOPLE AFFECTED 14

17. source Only Allowed to Attack Blue and Green Colors 2 ATTACKS attack 20-30‘’ SOURCE 30-40 ‘’ 0-20 ‘’ CONSUMPTION attack 768 648 PEOPLE AFFECTED 15

18. source Only Allowed to Attack Blue and Green Colors 3 ATTACKS attack 20-30‘’ SOURCE 30-40 ‘’ 0-20 ‘’ CONSUMPTION attack 1 021 580 PEOPLE AFFECTED 16

19. POPULATION # ATTACKS 17

20. CONCLUSION  The system is not resilient. Only with one attack system performance drops down to % 45 affecting over 1 million people.  Other than one example, all other attacks are nested.  The effect of a pipeline disruption may vary according to the place it happens. Large diameter pipeline may cause the system to break down whereas a smaller pipeline in highly populated area can cause causality and terror. 18

21. # ATTACKS % GAS SHORTAGE CONCLUSION

22. Future work We did not include the storage facilities in the system. These facilities can back up the disrupted pipelines. Expected causality rate of a pipeline explosion may be modeled with respect to population and diameter. 191

23. QUESTIONS?

25. Z=Total flow-∑( xbar(i,j)*Y(i,j)*p(i,j)) p(i,j) = Diameter 40 = 1 Diameter 30 = 2 Diameter 20 = 10