1. The Limits of Institutional Design Francis Fukuyama Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies

2. Presidential/PM v. Electoral Systems PluralityPR Presidential ParliamentaryWestminster US, Philippines Latin America Continental Europe

3. Participation v. speed of decision- making (Buchanan and Tullock) Percentage of population required to make decision Expected Decision Costs

4. Types of veto gates Electoral system –PR/plurality, district size, thresholds, timing Party discipline –Open v. closed list PR, campaign finance Bicameralism Federalism and decentralization Independent Judiciaries

5. System Rankings Classic Westminster Parliamentary/PR with strong parties Premier-presidential Presidential with plurality voting Parliamentary with fragmented parties Presidential with fragmented parties

6. British Election Results, 2001

7. Successful Institutional Reform Electoral systems –Chile 1988, Japan 1994, Italy 1994, New Zealand 1996, Thailand 1997 Federalism –Brazil, Fiscal Responsibility Law (2000)

8. Conclusions No such thing as an optimal political system Institutions come in complex, interdependent packages Good institutions heavily dependent on local context and traditions Need to invest in local knowledge of institutions Leadership matters Formal institutions matter less than many think