1. How Welfare and Employment Policies Affect Children Beth Clark-Kauffman Greg J. Duncan Northwestern University Pamela Morris MDRC

2. The Next Generation Project Participating researchers from: MDRC University of Texas at Austin Northwestern University University of California at Los Angeles University of Oregan University of Michigan New York University Syracuse University Social Research and Demonstration Corporation www.mdrc.org/NextGeneration Funders: The David and Lucile Packard Foundation William T. Grant Foundation John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation

3. Question: Do work-promoting welfare policies help or hurt poor children’s school achievement?Method: Pool data on ~30,000 children whose families were enrolled in 7 random-assignment experiments

4. Welfare Reform and Child Well- Being Welfare Reform Provisions Work mandates and incentives Sanctions Time limits Changes in Adult Behavior Employment Welfare Receipt Total Family Income Changes in Child Resources and Context Parenting; gatekeeping Cognitive stimulation inside and outside the home Maternal mental health Changes in Child Well- being

5. Effects of welfare reform policies on children may differ by child age or stage Effects of welfare reform policies on children may differ by child age or stage Sensitivity to change  Early childhood  Transitions in development BUT, also differences in family demography

6. Turn to experiments of 1990s: Various “treatments”  Mandated Employment Services Work or Education  Generous Earnings supplements  Time limits Random Assignment Follow-up after 2-3 and, in some cases, 5 years

7. In contrast with recent work with these data, we: Pool microdata rather than working with study-specific impact estimates  Allows us to test effects for smaller groups of children Add more studies and longer-run follow-ups from existing studies  To understand generalizability of effects

8. Experiments Mandated Training Mandated work Earnings supplements Time limit NEWWS Atlanta 12 Grand Rapids 34 Riverside 56 MN MFIP I 7 MN MFIP II 8 Milwaukee New Hope 9 Canadian SSP 10

9. Experiments (continued) Mandated Training Mandated work Earnings supplements Time limit FL FTP 11 LA Gain 12 Connecticut Jobs 1st 13

10. Sample Sizes Age:0-12-34-56-78-910-1112-15ALL 1803902110029398534092558206732872 Earnings supp. MFIP13310379708217305375644792 New Hope – 231712952592401751401283 New Hope – 517435623825521310101337 CT Jobs First1357807987736584444214009 SSP – 3643111631633124810288765116890 SSP – 54 586122951200002327 Non – ES LA Gain001692301941712681032 NEWWS – 201275162200002897 NEWWS – 502392323600005628 FTP3416185563993462541632667

11. Regression analyses Dependent variable:  Achievement  Parent Earnings and Income Independent variables:  Experimental status x age  Age  Source of achievement report  Study dummies  Baseline earnings, AFDC, maternal education, family structure, race/ethnicity, etc.

12. Experimental Impacts on Achievement standard deviation units) *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 Age at baseline AllEarnings Supplement Other Programs 0-1-.062-.040-.181 2-3.046.067*-.030 4-5.069**.112**.038 6-7.007.018-.072 8-9.023.016.043 10-11-.102 *-.110*-.057 12-15-.089-.058-.186*

13. Effects are robust to model specification changes such as: Adding interactions between experimental indicator and:  Parent and family characteristics  Follow-up length  Source of achievement report Including only the subset of studies that include all age groups Clustering at various levels Including only one achievement score or point in time per child

14. Experimental Impacts on Family Income (annual, in 2001$) *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.10 Age at baselineEarnings Supplement Other Programs 0-11,566 **749 2-31,523 **298 4-52,040 **230 6-71,718 **184 8-92,189 **201 10-111,505 **-140 12-151,941 **129

15. Experimental Impacts on Earnings (annual, in 2001 $) *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.10 Age at baselineEarnings Supplement Other Programs 0-1924 **676 2-3775 **879 ** 4-51,107 **493 ** 6-7802 **1,450 ** 8-91,199 **787 10-11650 *631 12-15702 *1,141 *

16. Summary: Welfare reforms targeted to parents CAN affect their children Program design matters  Policies that increase income bring benefits to younger children Child age matters  Welfare reform policies that increase employment can benefit younger children  Transitions in and out of middle childhood: sensitive periods

17. Greg Duncan greg-duncan@northwestern.edu

18. Gayle and her daughter Gayle, a single mother of one adolescent-aged daughter, Susan, noted that Susan was having several problems in school. Skipping school had become a big problem. Normally getting C’s or better, Susan was now getting D’s and F’s. Gayle knew her daughter was skipping school, and she was sure it had been going on frequently. However, partly because Gayle had been working she didn’t know exactly how much school Susan had missed. Gayle was afraid to confront her daughter about it or ask the school because “it’s all gonna come down on me and I’m not ready to deal with it. I don’t think I should be punished for that.” Gayle was further frustrated because she knows Susan would be going to school every day if she was home. In this situation, Gayle feels trapped between caring for her daughter and working.

19. Tina and her daughter Tina is a single mother. Her adolescent daughter Tamara takes her younger sister to day care in the morning: “Cause she’s late every day for her school, every day. And what the school says to me is they gotta do what they do, what’s their policy. She’s gotta stay after school, do her detention or she’ll lose her credit out of that morning class cause she didn’t get there on time. So, she feels sad and I feel bad because I gotta be at work at 7. She can’t be at school by 7, she can’t. We all can’t be at the same place at the same time..”