1. The Middle East Free Zone: “Building Blocks & the Way Forward” Ambassador Dr. Sameh Aboul-Enein NATO Defense College Rome, 9 th of October 2013

2. 2 I. The Current Situation The “Arab Spring / Winter” undoubtedly changed fundamental dynamics in the Middle East, with significant implications for the political and security settings of the region. Public opinion increasingly plays a more prominent role in Arab societies and, in this respect, will have a fundamental role in the formulation of disarmament and security policies. Given the democratic changes, parliaments— particularly through their committees on foreign affairs, Arab affairs and national security—are expected to play a more prominent role in foreign policy issues. Presumably, nuclear issues will receive considerable attention. Such dynamics may bring greater pressure to bear on progress on the subject of the zone and may serve as positive game-changers in broader disarmament and non-proliferation discussions. As recently witnessed, the flow of masses in the streets is a sign of their desire for deeper engagement in the policymaking and security concerns in the Middle East.

3. 3 II. Building Blocks 1- NPT Regime It is important to address the centrality of the NPT regime when negotiating a treaty-based Middle East zone. Negotiators should consider IAEA safeguards, as well as verification and inspection mechanisms. These tools must be implemented in a manner that complies with Article IV of the NPT, avoids hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation on peaceful nuclear activities. The 1995 Middle East resolution called for the establishment of a nuclear and other WMD-free zone (WMDFZ) in the region and was integral to the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. For many member states, the resolution constitutes the fourth pillar of the regime. In addition, the “NPT 2010 Action Plan” and its mandate for the Facilitator, UN Secretary General and Depository States remains the terms of reference for the Zone (2012 delayed conference).

4. 4 II. Building Blocks (cont’d) 2- Other Relevant International Treaties The role of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in any future zone is also important. The commitment by States not to carry out any nuclear weapon text explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction, is one of the critical building blocks of any future zone. Those vested in the establishment of a Middle East zone should give a greater degree of attention to the CTBT, in addition to other international treaties such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

5. 5 3- The Pelindaba Treaty The Treaty prohibits the research, development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, testing, possession, control or stationing of nuclear explosive devices in the territory of parties to the Treaty and the dumping of radioactive wastes in the African zone by Treaty parties; The Treaty also prohibits any attacks against nuclear installations in the zone by Treaty parties and requires them to maintain the highest standards of physical protection of nuclear material, facilities and equipment, which are to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes; To allow for the verification of its nuclear non-proliferation undertaking, the Treaty requires parties to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA equivalent to the agreements required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; The Treaty provides for verification and compliance mechanisms, including the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE), which serves as a compliance mechanism and encourages regional and sub-regional programs for cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology; The establishment of AFCONE encourages African states to take responsibility for natural resources and, in particular, nuclear material, and protects against the dumping of toxic waste. II. Building Blocks (cont’d)

6. 6 4- The Argentina-Brazil Institutional Experience The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Weapons (ABACC) is a regional organization that also has relevance to the establishment of a Middle East zone. The Middle East requires a similar bold vision to rid the region of nuclear and other WMDs and reposition it on a non-nuclear course. The relationship attained by Brazil and Argentina through ABACC, in addition to the signature in July 1991 of the Agreement for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, is significant. While recognizing the sovereign right of each nation to access nuclear technology for scientific, technological, economic and social development, both Brazil and Argentina created a Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). Moreover, the Agreement implied a clear and definite compromise for the use of all peaceful-use materials and nuclear facilities submitted to Brazil and Argentina’s jurisdiction and control. It was within this context that ABACC was created to manage and apply the SCCC. II. Building Blocks (cont’d)

7. 7 5- The South African Experience Dismantled the six completed gun-type devices at Armaments Corporation of South Africa Ltd. (ARMSCOR) under controlled and secure conditions; Melted and recast the highly-enriched uranium (HEU) from the six devices, including a partially complete seventh device, and returned it to the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) for safe-keeping; Fully decontaminated ARMSCOR facilities and returned severely contaminated equipment to the AEC, including a melting furnace; Converted the ARMSCOR facilities to conventional weapon and non-weapon commercial activities and destroyed all hardware components of the devices, technical design and manufacturing information; Joined the NPT, signed the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, and submitted a full and complete national initial inventory of nuclear material and facilities as required by the Safeguards Agreement; Welcomed the first IAEA team in South Africa in November 1991. II. Building Blocks (cont’d)

8. 8 6- The 2011 IAEA Forum The IAEA forum on “Experience of Possible Relevance to the Creation of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East,” held in Vienna in November 2011, is useful for discussions on the subject of a Middle East zone. Forum attendees presented several constructive proposals that should be taken into consideration, including suggestions to: Take stock of the importance of declaratory policy and, in particular, declarations of good intent and identify specific and practical confidence- building measures; Consider the lessons and context of other regions prior to the establishment of a NWFZs; Review existing multilateral principles for establishing such zones and review the relevant theory and practice of establishing the five existing NWFZs; Discuss the experience of the representatives from the five NWFZs in setting up and implementing such zones and discuss the region of the Middle East in context; II. Building Blocks (cont’d)

9. 9 III. The Way Forward The South African example sets a precedent for dismantlement in the international community. Moreover, the technical and nuclear rollback dimensions of the South African case are particularly useful for potential disarmament strategies in the Middle East, including in Israel. South Africa’s experience with placing fissile material under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon State is further useful to future disarmament scenarios. In addition to South Africa, past successes in reversing the nuclear tide include Brazil and Argentina to roll back their nuclear programmes and to create a bilateral verification agency; and the decisions by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to transfer nuclear weapons to Russia following the breakup of the Soviet Union. The Middle East needs a similarly bold vision to rid the region of nuclear weapons and solidly put the region on a non-nuclear course.

10. 10 III. The Way Forward (cont’d) It is also essential for Iran and the IAEA to intensify their dialogue on the urgent resolution and clarification of all outstanding substantive issues. Iran should comply fully with its obligations under relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council and meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors. A diplomatic solution is the only solution to the Iranian file and the legitimate right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy consistent with the NPT should be respected. Despite these unique challenges, the Middle East will need to follow a similar pattern to other regions that have established nuclear-weapon- free zones. The Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba have all involved negotiation of a treaty text, agreement on verification models with the IAEA and an institution-building process. And like all these zone regimes, a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free- zone should encourage the use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, and enable states to pursue bilateral, regional and international cooperation on nuclear energy to support their economic, medical and technological development.

11. 11 III. The Way Forward (cont’d) I believe that in preparation for the Middle East conference, certain technical provisions of the NWFZ and WMD-free zone in the Middle East should be addressed, with particular attention given to dismantling and destroying existing or remaining nuclear weapons capabilities, facilities and devices under international verification mechanisms. Ultimately, all regional facilities producing weapons grade fissile materials in the region will have to be shut down and decommissioned or converted to civilian uses under standard international safeguards.

12. 12 III. The Way Forward (cont’d) A more substantive approach towards engaging all countries in the region of the Middle East is required in order to guarantee full participation in the conference on the subject of a Middle East zone. The conference on a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) provides a constructive framework for all the states of the region, including all members of the League of Arab States, Iran and Israel. Viewed strategically, this Conference could advance the broader cause of peace and security in the region. The process of establishing a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East can become a new tool for security. The sequencing in this process is delicate, requiring states to both deepen and strengthen efforts towards achieving a comprehensive treaty-based free zone in the Middle East.

13. 13 III. The Way Forward (cont’d) Syrian Case The recent events in the Middle East, particularly in Syria, should inspire policy makers to accelerate worldwide efforts for disarmament including a serious push to move forward with the nuclear-free zone in the region. The significant role of the Security Council (United Nations) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons “OPCW” (International WMDs Conventions).

14. 14 III. The Way Forward (cont’d) THE EGYPTIAN INITIATVE The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, in his statement to the United Nations General Assembly on the 28th of September 2013, announced the following initiative (3 steps) to activate international and regional efforts aiming to establish the zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East: FIRST STEP: Request all countries in the Middle East, as well as the five permanent members of the Security Council, to deposit official letters to the Secretary General of the United Nations, confirming their support for declaring the Middle East a region free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

15. 15 III. The Way Forward (cont’d) THE EGYPTIAN INITIATVE SECOND STEP: Countries of the region that have not signed, or ratified, any of the international conventions on weapons of mass destruction, should commit, before the end of this year, to simultaneously sign and ratify the relevant conventions. They should also deposit an instrument to that effect to the Security Council; This would translate into the following: That Israel accedes to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state, ratifies the Chemical Weapons Convention, and signs and ratifies the Biological Weapons Convention. That Syria ratifies the Biological Weapons Convention, and takes the remaining steps it had pledged in relation to the Chemical Weapons Convention. That Egypt ratifies the Biological Weapons Convention, and signs and ratifies the Chemical Weapons Convention, provided that all countries of the Middle East complete accession measures to the international conventions prohibiting weapons of mass destruction, and the relevant arrangements.

16. 16 III. The Way Forward (cont’d) THE EGYPTIAN INITIATVE THIRD STEP: Accelerate international efforts to ensure that the delayed 2012 Conference to establish a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East is swiftly held, preferably before the end of this year, or by Spring 2014 at the latest. The Secretary General, the three depositary countries of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as the facilitator should further intensify their efforts so that the conference is held within the above timeframe.

17. Thank You